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( i ) 
ABSTRACT 
I n 1900, when the other European great powers were already 
involved i n two a n t a g o n i s t i c a l l i a n c e systems, B r i t a i n remained 
uncommitted and i s o l a t e d ; i n 1914, she entered the c o n t i n e n t a l 
war on the side of one of those a l l i a n c e s and against the other. 
This t h e s i s studies t h i s e v o l u t i o n from i s o l a t i o n to commitment 
from the perspective of Parliamentary o p i n i o n , discusses what 
the o p i n i o n of Members of Parliament was on t h i s momentous 
t r a n s i t i o n , and seeks to el u c i d a t e the question of the extent t o 
which Parliament was informed of the o b j e c t i v e s and methods of 
B r i t i s h p o l i c y , and the extent to which i t was able to i n f l u e n c e 
or c o n t r o l them. The main primary source used i s t h e r e f o r e 
Hansard, The Parliamentary Debates (4th and 5th Ser i e s ) . A f u l l 
d iscussion i s o f f e r e d of a l l of the main debates i n the House of 
Commons between 1900 and 1914 on f o r e i g n p o l i c y , and p a r t i c u l a r 
a t t e n t i o n i s paid t o Parliamentary o p i n i o n on the 'balance of 
power' i n Europe and on B r i t a i n ' s e v o l v i n g r e l a t i o n s w i t h the 
two European a l l i a n c e systems. The important question i s r a i s e d 
of the extent to which Parliament was adequately informed of 
important developments such as the developing m i l i t a r y commitment 
to France, the growth of the Anglo-Russian connection, and the 
f a i l u r e to reach an understanding w i t h Germany; and the extent to 
which i t was t h e r e f o r e able to in f l u e n c e the v i t a l developments 
which l e d t o B r i t a i n ' s entry i n t o the war of 1914. An argument 
i s o f f e r e d t o show t h a t , although there was from 1909 onwards a 
s p i r i t e d Radical campaign i n Parliament against the government's 
p o l i c y , the m a j o r i t y on a l l sides i n Parliament supported t h a t 
p o l i c y and was i n favour of the balance-of-power p o l i c i e s which 
led B r i t a i n i n t o war i n 1914. 




This study of the extent of Parliamentary c o n t r o l over 
B r i t i s h f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n the years before the F i r s t World War 
seeks to e s t a b l i s h how f a r Parliamentary o p i n i o n on the one 
hand, and the conduct of f o r e i g n p o l i c y by the Executive on 
the other, were the two faces of the same coin . I t may be 
argued t h a t indeed they could not be separated, and t h a t the 
Government could not pursue a p o l i c y which d i d not have the 
strong support of a s u b s t a n t i a l m a j o r i t y i n the House of 
Commons, since i n the f i n a l analysis i t was Parliament which 
had to vote the funds which financed the execution of p o l i c y , 
and which would have to vote the funds f o r a war i f the 
Government's handling of f o r e i g n a f f a i r s should take B r i t a i n 
i n t o war (as indeed was to happen i n August 1914).^ On the 
other hand, i t i s equally c l e a r t h a t the conduct of f o r e i g n 
p o l i c y remained,within the general understanding of B r i t a i n ' s 
u n w r i t t e n c o n s t i t u t i o n , a j e a l o u s l y guarded p a r t of the 
Royal p r e r o g a t i v e , exercised on the Sovereign's behalf by 
the government of the day, and conducted by the Foreign Secretary 
assisted by the Foreign O f f i c e and B r i t a i n ' s d i p l o m a t i c 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s abroad. Although t r e a t i e s were generally made 
p u b l i c , they d i d not depend on Parliamentary approval i n order 
f o r t h e i r r a t i f i c a t i o n to be e f f e c t i v e ; although governments 
made much d i p l o m a t i c i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e to Parliament i n 
the form of Command Papers or Blue Books, i t was they who 
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c o n t r o l l e d t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n and selected what should be 
published. By t h e i r very nature, d i p l o m a t i c n e g o t i a t i o n s had 
to be conducted i n secrecy i f they were to have much prospect 
of success, and i t was only when they had come to f r u i t i o n t h a t 
t h e i r outcome would be communicated to Parliament. From t h i s 
p o i n t of view, i t must t h e r e f o r e appear t h a t there was l i t t l e 
t h a t the House of Commons could do to exercise d e t a i l e d 
su p e r v i s i o n over the day-to-day running of f o r e i g n p o l i c y ; 
the most t h a t i t could do was to attempt to set the o v e r a l l 
parameters w i t h i n which p o l i c y was conducted, and to comment 
on the r e s u l t s . 
During the period from 1900 to 1914, B r i t a i n ' s p o s i t i o n 
i n the European balance of power moved from 'splendid i s o l a t i o n ' 
to an i n c r e a s i n g involvement i n Continental a f f a i r s and an 
inc r e a s i n g commitment to one side of the European balance, the 
Franco-Russian A l l i a n c e , t h i s process of course culminating 
i n the u l t i m a t e Continental p o l i c y of entry i n t o the European 
land war, and the despatch of the B r i t i s h Expeditionary Force 
i n 1914. By the beginning of our p e r i o d , the other f i v e 
European great powers were already d i v i d e d i n t o two competing 
a l l i a n c e systems: the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e of Germany, A u s t r i a -
Hungary and I t a l y (since 1882) and the Dual A l l i a n c e of 
France and Russia (since 1894). B r i t a i n remained uncommitted, 
and her adhesion to one or other of those systems was the l a s t 
and perhaps the greatest remaining p r i z e i n the diplomacy of 
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Europe. Around the t u r n of the century, w h i l e the Boer War 
(1899-1992) made B r i t a i n ' s i s o l a t i o n appear dangerous and the 
cause of much weakness i n her European and i n her i m p e r i a l 
s i t u a t i o n , i t was Germany which was making the running i n urging 
the B r i t i s h to end t h e i r i s o l a t i o n by j o i n i n g the T r i p l e 
A l l i a n c e ; but t h i s o p p o r t u n i t y , i f i t ever r e a l l y e x i s t e d 
outside the imagination of the German Emperor and a few 
B r i t i s h enthusiasts l i k e Joseph Chamberlain (the Secretary 
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of State f o r the Colonies), was missed. Instead, s t a r t i n g 
w i t h the Anglo-French entente of 1904, and continuing w i t h the 
Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, B r i t i s h p o l i c y appeared 
to draw closer t o the Franco-Russian A l l i a n c e , f i r s t of a l l 
i n i m p e r i a l and c o l o n i a l questions, but subsequently (and 
most n o t i c e a b l y a f t e r 1909) i n European a f f a i r s also. I n pa r t 
t h i s was seen to be the n a t u r a l consequence of the r i s e of the 
German naval challenge to B r i t a i n ' s t r a d i t i o n a l naval supremacy 
(the necessary p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r the maintenance of 'splendid 
i s o l a t i o n ' ) : i t was indeed during B r i t a i n ' s most obvious 
period of i s o l a t i o n , during the Boer War, t h a t Germany's 
Second Navy Law of 1900 made manifest her ambition to construct 
a powerful, compact and modern b a t t l e f l e e t which would enable 
her to exercise naval leverage against the e x i s t i n g dominant 
naval power, Great B r i t a i n . The Second Navy Law was t r a n s l a t e d 
i n t o English and published by the n a v a l i s t p u b l i s h e r , Brassey, 
even before i t had been f o r m a l l y approved by the Reichstag, so 
i t i s obvious t h a t i t was w e l l known to B r i t i s h p u b l i c and 
p o l i t i c a l o p i n i o n from the outset. The growth of the German 
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f l e e t was to exercise a powerful f a s c i n a t i o n f o r B r i t i s h 
o p i n i o n , and to generate increasing alarm at the collapse 
of the o l d 'Two Power Standard 1, which culminated i n the naval 
scare of 1909 (sometimes r e f e r r e d to by h i s t o r i a n s as the 
'a c c e l e r a t i o n c r i s i s ' ) , which produced the famous slogan 'We 
want e i g h t and we won't w a i t ' . As a r e s u l t of the stormy 
debates i n the House of Commons on the German naval programme 
and the alleged inadequacy of the B r i t i s h naval estimates, 
which took place i n March 1909 and which are discussed l a t e r 
i n t h i s t h e s i s , the n a v a l i s t s on the Conservative benches and 
i n the press and p u b l i c at large d i d not have t o w a i t , and 
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di d get t h e i r e i g h t . But i t i s worth n o t i c i n g t h a t i t was also 
from t h i s year onwards t h a t the term ' T r i p l e Entente' as a 
d e s c r i p t i o n of B r i t a i n ' s a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h the Franco-Russian 
A l l i a n c e became common usage i n o f f i c i a l B r i t i s h d i p l o m a t i c 
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correspondence, as w e l l as i n press comment. I n a r e a l sense, 
the replacement of the o l d Two Power Standard by a new one-power 
standard d i r e c t e d against Germany alone made the growing 
a s s o c i a t i o n of B r i t a i n w i t h the e x i s t i n g anti-German a l l i a n c e 
i n Europe both necessary f o r B r i t i s h s e c u r i t y and also, 
s t r u c t u r a l l y , more or less i n e v i t a b l e . The extent to which 
t h i s was recognised by opinion i n Parliament forms an important 
pa r t of the discussion which f o l l o w s . 
Government c o n t r o l over the Parliamentary timetable 
meant t h a t i t could u s u a l l y r e s t r i c t the o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r the 
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House of Commons to debate f o r e i g n p o l i c y questions. I t was 
by the beginning of the Twentieth Century accepted that 
t r e a t i e s which involved the cession of t e r r i t o r y required 
Parliamentary sanction, as d i d those which involved any 
element of subsidy or other f i n a n c i a l payment ( t h i s p r o v i s i o n 
r e f l e c t i n g the Commons' f i n a n c i a l c o n t r o l ) ; w h i l e of course 
an agreement w i t h a f o r e i g n power which r e q u i r e d l e g i s l a t i o n 
to give i t e f f e c t had to secure the approval of Parliament 
i f the l e g i s l a t i o n was to be passed. But such t r e a t i e s were 
r e l a t i v e l y r a r e and di d not provide occasion f o r frequent 
debate on f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n general. The annual debate 
f o l l o w i n g the announcement of the government's programme 
i n the King's Speech d i d provide an occasion to ra i s e f o r e i g n 
p o l i c y questions among other matters, an op p o r t u n i t y sometimes 
taken by backbench speakers; but i t i s i n f a c t noticeable t h a t 
i t was more usual f o r domestic questions of greater apparent 
urgency and i n t e r e s t t o take precedence over f o r e i g n a f f a i r s . 
I n extreme cases, a question w i t h f o r e i g n p o l i c y i m p l i c a t i o n s 
might be ra i s e d on a Motion of Censure brought by the Opposition 
but t h i s was an unusual procedure and almost unknown i n f o r e i g n 
p o l i c y matters. On occasion, an MP was able to ra i s e a 
f o r e i g n p o l i c y question by moving the adjournment of the 
House, but t h i s required the cooperation of Mr. Speaker or else 
the support of a s u b s t a n t i a l body of members, and was not a 
t a c t i c which could be employed very f r e q u e n t l y . I t was also 
possible to secure a debate by moving a r e d u c t i o n i n the 
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f i n a n c i a l estimates when they were reported back to the 
House of Commons, but t h i s was an i n f r e q u e n t l y successful 
t a c t i c . The only r o u t i n e occasion on which f o r e i g n p o l i c y 
matters could be r e g u l a r l y r a i s e d was at Question Time, and 
indeed, Parliamentary Questions d i d provide the only regular 
o p p o r t u n i t y f o r g e t t i n g at the Foreign Secretary i n Parliament; 
but of course i t i s of the nature of Question Time th a t members 
could ask questions but not make speeches, and to be accepted 
by the Clerks and allowed by the Speaker, the questions had to 
be genuine (or apparently genuine) requests f o r i n f o r m a t i o n . 
The House i n v a r i a b l y had to accept a r e f u s a l by the Foreign 
Secretary to answer a p a r t i c u l a r question on the grounds of 
c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y or the n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t , and i t was almost 
comically easy f o r successive Foreign O f f i c e spokesmen to 
avoid p r o v i d i n g genuine answers. For a l l of these reasons, i t 
was d i f f i c u l t f o r ordinary MPs to exercise much c o n t r o l over 
the f o r m u l a t i o n and conduct of p o l i c y , and much inge n u i t y was 
displayed i n the long-running t u s s l e between successive 
governments and the back benches f o r i n f l u e n c e over p o l i c y . 
This t h e s i s i s l a r g e l y derived from a d e t a i l e d study of 
those major debates on f o r e i g n a f f a i r s which d i d take place i n 
s p i t e of the obstacles to debate which have been o u t l i n e d here. 
The debates provide the best and most coherent i n d i c a t i o n of 
the c l i m a t e of Parliamentary o p i n i o n , and the ways i n which 
governments responded to i t or sought t o i n f l u e n c e i t . The main 
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primary source which has been here e x p l o i t e d i s t h e r e f o r e , of 
course, Hansard: and eleven major debates over t h i s f i f t e e n -
year period have been i d e n t i f i e d and studied. They are as 
f o l l o w s : 
(1) The Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e : 13th February 1902. 
(2) East I n d i a Revenues(Tibet) : 13 A p r i l 1904. 
(3) The Anglo-French Convention : 1st June 1904. 
(4) The Anglo-Russian Convention : 17th Febraury 1908. 
(5) Navy Estimates : 16th-22nd March 1909. 
(6) Estimates : Russia and Persia : 24th March 1909. 
(7) Vote of Censure : 29th March 1909. 
(8) Great B r i t a i n and Germany : 27th November 1911. 
(9) Debate on the Address : Persia : 21st February 1912. 
(10) Supply Committee : Foreign O f f i c e 
Vote : 10th J u l y 1912. 
(11) Great B r i t a i n and the European Powers : 
3rd August 1914. 
Occasional reference has been made to discussion i n the House of 
Lords, but e s s e n t i a l l y , t h i s i s presented as a study of op i n i o n 
i n the House of Commons, as the rep r e s e n t a t i v e chamber r e f l e c t i n g 
and responsible to p u b l i c o p i n i o n . 
CHAPTER ONE 
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THE DEBATE ON 
THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE OF 1902 
1.1 The Negotiation of the A l l i a n c e 
Although B r i t i s h p o l i c y had been moving towards a 
r e c o g n i t i o n of the i d e n t i t y of i n t e r e s t between B r i t a i n and 
Japan i n China, the period of n e g o t i a t i o n which led u l t i m a t e l y 
t o the s i g n i n g of the A l l i a n c e i n January 1902 was p r o t r a c t e d . 
The A l l i a n c e was not a sudden event. By October 1901, the 
f o r e i g n o f f i c e s of the two countries were already studying 
the i m p l i c a t i o n s of a b i l a t e r a l agreement, and were ready t o 
move from the stage of i n f o r m a l discussion to tha t of o f f i c a l 
n e g o t i a t i o n ; a momentous step f o r both, which could not have 
been undertaken without exhaustive p r i o r s c r u t i n y . ^ 
S h o r t l y a f t e r assuming o f f i c e as Prime M i n i s t e r of 
Japan, Katsura set out f o r h i s cabinet a broad p o l i t i c a l 
programme which was to lead to the conclusion of an agreement 
of some s o r t w i t h a major European power w i t h Far Eastern 
i n t e r e s t s ; e s s e n t i a l l y because the problems of Japanese p o l i c y 
since the Sino-Japanese war of 1895 had demonstrated t h a t i t 
was not possible f o r Japan, single-handed, to advance i t s i n t e r e s t s 
on the East Asian mainland, or to e s t a b l i s h the desired p r o t e c t o r a t e 
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over the Korean peninsula. However, i t would be a mistake t o 
i n f e r from t h i s t h a t the a f f a i r s of the Far East were t o be 
decided i n Europe, or were being resolved i n accordance w i t h the 
9 
p o w e r - p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h i n Europe. B r i t a i n i n 
p a r t i c u l a r was looking f o r a way of defending i t s i n t e r e s t s 
i n China and elsewhere i n the Far East, w i t h o u t having to enter 
too c l o s e l y i n t o the Continental balance of power i n Europe; 
t h i s could be assured by an agreement w i t h Japan. For the 
B r i t i s h , the idea of a b i l a t e r a l agreement w i t h Japan was the 
n a t u r a l consequence of the f a i l u r e of previous attempts to 
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achieve r e g i o n a l understandings w i t h Russia or Germany. The 
B r i t i s h Foreign Secretary, Lansdowne, had already considered 
the general l i n e s of an agreement before he entered i n t o r e a l 
discussions w i t h Hayashi, the Japanese M i n i s t e r i n London^on 
16th October 1901. I t was clear t h a t the Japanese were anxious 
to p r o t e c t t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n Korea and would r e s i s t Russian 
encroachments there. I n t h i s important conversation, Lansdowne 
and Hayashi approached the idea of a general Anglo-Japanese 
a l l i a n c e i n the Far East, i n c l u d i n g suggestions f o r naval 
cooperation (which were important t o both the A d m i r a l i t y and 
the Foreign O f f i c e , perplexed as they were by the problems of 
securing B r i t a i n ' s naval s e c u r i t y worldwide).^ Russian progress 
towards an agreement w i t h China during October 1901, and r e p o r t s 
t h a t Russia was also seeking an arrangement w i t h Japan, helped 
to overcome B r i t i s h reservations about becoming too c l o s e l y 
i d e n t i f i e d w i t h Japanese i n t e r e s t s , since i t was evident t h a t the 
Russian proposals about Manchuria were i n i m i c a l to B r i t i s h 
i n t e r e s t s there and throughout the Chinese Empire. ~* The 
a l l i a n c e w i t h Japan seemed to Lansdowne and h i s colleagues to 
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o f f e r the best a v a i l a b l e means of defending those i n t e r e s t s 
against Russian encroachment, and the A l l i a n c e was duly 
concluded on 30th January 1902. 
The genesis of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e of 1902 
i s t h e r e f o r e to be found i n the events i n China since the 
Boxer r e b e l l i o n and the f o r e i g n i n t e r v e n t i o n i n the summer of 
1900. The B r i t i s h and Japanese governments took a s i m i l a r view 
of these events and were i n close and u n i n t e r r u p t e d communication 
throughout.^ The A l l i a n c e was a n a t u r a l development from t h i s 
i d e n t i t y of view, and was necessary to define f u r t h e r t h e i r 
common i n t e r e s t s ( p a r t i c u l a r l y i n view of the Russian occupation 
of Manchuria), and to formalise the mutual o b l i g a t i o n s i n t o 
which they were prepared to enter. Under the terms of the 
A l l i a n c e , B r i t a i n and Japan promised each other to maintain 
n e u t r a l i t y i f e i t h e r were involved i n war w i t h one other power 
i n defence of t h e i r i n t e r e s t s i n the Far East; but i f the enemy 
was a c o a l i t i o n of two or more powers, then they would make war 
i n f u l l a l l i a n c e and i n common.^ I n so f a r as Japan secured 
s p e c i f i c r e c o g n i t i o n of her s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t i n Korea, while 
B r i t a i n obtained only a general Japanese r e c o g n i t i o n of her 
i n t e r e s t s i n mainland China and the Yangtse V a l l e y , i t may w e l l 
be argued (as i t was at the time) t h a t the Japanese gained 
more of value to them than d i d the B r i t i s h . However, to Lansdowne, 
the mere f a c t of there being a t r e a t y which d e l i v e r e d B r i t a i n from 
her previous i s o l a t i o n i n the Far East was of inestimable value, 
and i t provided an o f f s e t to the danger of a Russian agreement 
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w i t h China over Manchuria. Furthermore, Japan now recognised 
and became committed to the defence of B r i t a i n ' s commercial 
i n t e r e s t s i n the Yangtse, and indeed, i n October 1902, became 
inv o l v e d i n the contest w i t h Germany over the withdrawal of 
g 
f o r e i g n troops from Shanghai. As f o r Japanese preponderance 
i n Korea, t h a t was s t r a t e g i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t to the B r i t i s h , 
even though i t was, no doubt, i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the maintenance 
of f u l l independence f o r Korea (and B r i t a i n was now committed 
to accepting the le g i t i m a c y of Japanese a c t i o n there i f threatened 
by the expansionist a c t i v i t y of another power, namely, Russia); 
a Japanese ascendency was regarded as being p r e f e r a b l e to 
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Russian expansion. 
Consequently, the A l l i a n c e w i t h Japan could be presented 
as a great success f o r B r i t i s h diplomacy. I t could be argued 
t h a t i t threatened no other peaceful power, and i t promised to 
uphold the p o l i c y of the 'open door' to commercial a c t i v i t y t o 
which B r i t a i n was committed i n C h i n a . ^ I t t r e a t e d Manchuria as 
an i n t e g r a l p a r t of the Chinese Empire, and t h e r e f o r e the 
commitment to the i n t e g r i t y of China must include a commitment 
to upholding t h a t p r i n c i p l e i n Manchuria as w e l l as elsewhere 
( u n l i k e the a b o r t i v e Yangtse Agreement w i t h Germany of 1 9 0 0 ) . ^ 
And i t i d e n t i f i e d the p r o t e c t i o n of the Korean peninsula, as 
w e l l as of China as a whole, as being an i n t e r e s t scarcely less 
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important to B r i t a i n than to Japan. That the A l l i a n c e was 
renewed i n 1905 (ahead of time, and a f t e r the Japanese v i c t o r y 
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i n the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05), and f o r a f u r t h e r ten 
years, i s s u f f i c i e n t evidence of how q u i c k l y i t became c e n t r a l 
to B r i t a i n ' s Far Eastern p o l i c y . 
I t d i d however mark a s i g n i f i c a n t departure i n B r i t i s h 
p o l i c y , from i s o l a t i o n to commitment. I n defending the A l l i a n c e 
i n the House of Lords on 13th February 1902, Lansdowne sought 
to d e f l e c t c r i t i c i s m on t h i s score by making a v i r t u e out of 
the change, and arguing t h a t B r i t i s h p o l i c y could no longer 
be governed, i n the new i n t e r n a t i o n a l c l imate of armed a l l i a n c e s , 
13 
by 'any musty formulas or old-fashioned s u p e r s t i t i o n s ' . Of 
course i t was an a l l i a n c e w i t h a non-European power, and l i m i t e d 
i n i t s scope t o the Far East, so t h a t i t d i d not have to i n v o l v e 
B r i t a i n i n the European system of a l l i a n c e s ; indeed, i n so f a r 
as i t provided an a l t e r n a t i v e to a German a l l i a n c e , i t o f f e r e d 
a means of making 'splendid i s o l a t i o n ' from European entanglements 
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easier r a t h e r than more d i f f i c u l t t o maintain. I t was to be 
the f i r s t i n a se r i e s of such r e g i o n a l agreements designed t o 
shore up ; B r i t a i n ' s i m p e r i a l i n t e r e s t s i n areas where they were 
p a r t i c u l a r l y v u l n e r a b l e , but since i t s successors (the Anglo-
French Entente of 1904, and the Anglo-Russian agreements of 
1907) were concluded w i t h European powers, they d i d , over time, 
have the e f f e c t of drawing B r i t a i n inexorably i n t o the European 
balance of power. I t i s the r e f o r e a ppropriate f o r the h i s t o r i a n 
to consider, as d i d some f a r - s i g h t e d commentators at the time, 
whether t h i s A l l i a n c e w i t h Japan should be considered as marking 
the d e f i n i t i v e abandonment of B r i t a i n ' s i s o l a t i o n . 
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1.2 The Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e Debated 
The Treaty was l a i d before Parliament (though not 
r e q u i r i n g Parliamentary approval f o r r a t i f i c a t i o n ) on 11th 
February 1902. I t appeared i n the London newspapers on 12th 
February. I t was b r i e f l y debated i n the House of Lords on 
13th February, and was the subject of a longer debate i n the 
House of Commons on the same d a y . ^ This debate was i n s t i g a t e d 
not by the Government, but by a backbencher of the L i b e r a l 
Opposition; Mr. Henry Norman rose at 4.30 p.m., a f t e r questions 
on the business of the House, to move the adjournment ' f o r the 
purpose of discussing a matter of urgent p u b l i c importance', 
the Japanese A l l i a n c e ; though the Speaker of the House d i d not 
grant the debate u n t i l , according to the r u l e s of procedure, 
not less than f o r t y Members had r i s e n i n t h e i r places t o 
support Norman's m o t i o n . ^ There was i n the r e s t of the debate 
no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t the povernment would have provided time f o r 
a debate i f i t had not been forced by the Opposition. 
Norman observed t h a t the Treaty had come upon Parliament 
and p u b l i c 'as a b o l t from the b l u e 1 when i t appeared i n the 
press. He e v i d e n t l y believed i t t o be a sudden development 
(which, as the preceding s e c t i o n has shown, i t was n o t ) , and 
he demanded to know what reason l a y behind what he considered 
to be i t s hasty p u b l i c a t i o n . He was i n no doubt about the 
momentous departure i n p o l i c y which the A l l i a n c e represented: 
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... the subject i n question i s an o f f e n s i v e 
and defensive Treaty of A l l i a n c e , i n v o l v i n g a 
momentous change from the t r a d i t i o n a l f o r e i g n 
p o l i c y of t h i s country, and p l a c i n g the B r i t i s h 
Empire i n a s i t u a t i o n i n which i t might be 
compelled to declare war i n a cause which was 
not of i t s own seeking. ^ 
This of course was no more than a statement of the t r a d i t i o n a l 
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B r i t i s h i s o l a t i o n i s t argument against 'entangling a l l i a n c e s ' , 
but i t came s u r p r i s i n g l y from Norman f o r two reasons. The f i r s t 
was t h a t he was n o t , i n f o r e i g n a f f a i r s , on the r a d i c a l or 
Gladstonian wing of the Party but was, i n f a c t , recognised as 
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a L i b e r a l I m p e r i a l i s t . The second was t h a t , as a recognised 
a u t h o r i t y on Far Eastern a f f a i r s , who had published on both 
Japan and Russia, he was a long-standing advocate of closer 
r e l a t i o n s between B r i t a i n and Japan. His o b j e c t i o n s to the 
terms of the Treaty were t h e r e f o r e not wholly convincing, and 
the Conservative defenders of t h e i r p o l i c y ^ a b l e t o d i s c r e d i t 
some of h i s p o i n t s : Cranborne pointed out h i s i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s , 
and was able to assure the House t h a t the A l l i a n c e had not been 
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h a s t i l y negotiated or l i g h t l y entered i n t o . Nevertheless, 
Norman d i d emphasise w i t h some c o n v i c t i o n t h a t the A l l i a n c e 
r a i s e d the danger t h a t B r i t a i n might be drawn i n t o c o n f l i c t 
w i t h France and Russia i f , i n a war between Russia and Japan 
over Korea, France were t o go to Russia's assistance under the 
terms of t h e i r Dual A l l i a n c e ( d a t i n g i n i t i a l l y from 1894, but 
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extended i n scope i n 1899). He also pointed t o the danger 
t h a t r e l a t i o n s w i t h Russia, which had r e c e n t l y been f r i e n d l y , 




A f t e r the o f f i c i a l defence of the A l l i a n c e ( t o which 
we s h a l l come s h o r t l y ) , the Opposition a t t a c k was continued 
by the L i b e r a l leader, S i r Henry Campbell-Bannerman, t a k i n g 
f u r t h e r some of the arguments suggested by Norman. He expressed 
the fear t h a t the A l l i a n c e would not only antagonise the 
Russians, but would also b r i n g B r i t a i n i n t o c o n f l i c t w i t h the 
French, and t h a t such a war against the Franco-Russian A l l i a n c e 
would inexorably spread from the Far East t o other p a r t s of 
the world where t h e i r i n t e r e s t s were opposed t o those of B r i t a i n . 
Campbell-Bannerman made i t c l e a r t h a t the o f f i c i a l Opposition 
view d i d not envisage a change of p o l i c y i n the Far East, but 
t h a t closer r e l a t i o n s w i t h Japan should not be allowed t o get i n 
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the way of improving r e l a t i o n s w i t h Russia. Later i n the 
debate, the former L i b e r a l leader i n the House of Commons, S i r 
W i l l i a m Harcourt, underlined Campbell-Bannerman's argument t h a t 
a war a r i s i n g out of the Japanese A l l i a n c e could not be r e s t r i c t e d 
to the Far East: 
... and i f you are going i n t o a war such as 
you are contemplating, when attacked by two 
Powers - everybody knows whom you mean, i t i s 
no use endeavouring t o conceal i t - t h a t war w i l l 
not be waged i n China, Korea, or the Gulf of 
P e c h i l i ; i t w i l l be waged i n Central Asia. I t w i l l 
be waged by a Power which has the capacity of 
pouring u n l i m i t e d forces i n t o Persia and i n t o 
Afghanistan, upon your I n d i a n f r o n t i e r . I n t h i s 
Treaty you are st a k i n g upon the dice the peace 
and the f u t u r e of your I n d i a n Empire. Your f l e e t s 
w i l l be engaged not only i n the China Seas, but i n 
the Meditarranean and i n the B a l t i c . 
How much wiser, maintained Harcourt, had been the p o l i c y of 
successive B r i t i s h governments since 1815 of a b s t a i n i n g from 
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being involved i n a l l i a n c e s whose o s t e n s i b l e o b j e c t i v e was 
always s t a t e d t o be the maintenance of peace and the status quo 
(as was the case w i t h the present T r e a t y ) : 
We have maintained w i t h o u t these a l l i a n c e s 
now, f o r the b e t t e r p a r t of the century, a 
great and potent i n f l u e n c e i n Europe, and 
now we are going to abandon t h a t p o l i c y and 
embark upon a f u t u r e which no man can foresee. ^ 
He concluded by demanding t h a t the government should give a proper 
explanation of i t s d e c i s i o n t o depart from ' p r i n c i p l e s which have 
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been consecrated by the t r a d i t i o n s of n e a r l y a c e n t u r y 1 . 
Although these leading L i b e r a l spokesmen stopped short of 
denouncing the conclusion of a b i n d i n g a l l i a n c e , which they 
characterised as being both defensive and o f f e n s i v e , and 
maintained t h a t they were merely seeking explanations from the 
government, i t was s t r i k i n g t h a t both the Gladstonian and the 
I m p e r i a l i s t (or Roseberian) wings of the L i b e r a l Party were 
u n i t e d i n t h e i r misgivings about the extent to which the 
A l l i a n c e w i t h Japan represented a surrender of t h a t t r a d i t i o n a l 
freedom of d e c i s i o n and a c t i o n which had kept B r i t a i n out of so 
many c o n f l i c t s over previous decades. 
The Conservative government's explanations d i d not make 
much of the l i n e taken by Lansdowne i n the House of Lords, t h a t 
i t was no longer wise nor d e s i r a b l e t o adhere to the o l d 
p o l i c y of i s o l a t i o n i n an i n c r e a s i n g l y dangerous i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
environment, but r a t h e r , stressed t h a t the o b j e c t i v e s of the 
new A l l i a n c e were themselves e n t i r e l y peaceful and concerned w i t h 
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the maintenance of the s t a t u s quo i n China. Lord Cranborne, 
who was Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the Foreign O f f i c e 
(and Lord Salisbury's son), spoke f o r the government immediately 
a f t e r Norman: 
The r e a l o r i g i n of t h i s Treaty was the a n x i e t y 
to maintain the status quo i n China ... the 
p o l i c y of t h i s country i s almost everywhere the 
maintenance of the status quo. 
This, he maintained, was the case w i t h the three main concerns 
of the Treaty, the i n t e g r i t y of the Chinese Empire, the p o l i c y 
of the 'open door', and the s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n of Japan i n Korea. 
These requirements were already i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y recognised, and 
the s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n of Japan i n Korea had been recognised even 
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by the Russians. The other i n t e r e s t e d governments had very 
l a r g e l y accepted or welcomed the new agreement, which gave r e a l 
assurances f o r the s t a b i l i t y and expansion of B r i t a i n ' s very 
s u b s t a n t i a l commercial i n t e r e s t s i n China: 
There are two Powers - Great B r i t a i n and Japan -
who have a p e c u l i a r i n t e r e s t i n m a i n t a i n i n g the 
i n t e g r i t y of China, and the p o s i t i o n of Japan i n 
the Far East, and who are p e c u l i a r l y able - the 
one on account of her Navy, and the other on 
account of the nearness of her m i l i t a r y base -
to maintain t h a t p o l i c y . Under these circumstances, 
the question which presented i t s e l f t o the Government, 
and now presents i t s e l f t o the House of Commons, i s 
could we not go one step f u r t h e r than we went i n the 
previous conventions and agreements which I have 
described to the House? Could we not go a l i t t l e 
beyond the mere d e c l a r a t i o n of our p o l i c y of 
preserving the open door and m a i n t a i n i n g the 
i n t e g r i t y of China, by d e f i n i n g how t h a t p o l i c y 
must be c a r r i e d out? ^7 
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The answer to t h a t question was e v i d e n t l y the A l l i a n c e then 
before the House, and Cranborne went on to st r e s s i t s 'cautious' 
wording, and t o minimise as f a r as he could the o b l i g a t i o n s which 
i t e n t a i l e d . The attempt, i n Cranborne's e v i d e n t l y c a r e f u l l y 
prepared statement, t o avoid answering the d i s q u i e t expressed 
by Norman, was no doubt the reason f o r Campbell-Bannerman's 
sharp r e t o r t t h a t , ' I do not know t h a t the noble Lord has 
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completely s a t i s f i e d us.' I t t h e r e f o r e f e l l t o the Prime 
M i n i s t e r , A.J. Balfour (who was Lord Salisbury's nephew) to 
s a t i s f y them. Balfour i n v a r i a b l y spoke w i t h o u t notes, responded 
i n h i s l o f t y but shrewd way t o the argument of the moment, and 
was the most formidable debater on the Conservative benches; 
he began h i s speech w i t h a c e r t a i n amount of sarcasm at 
Campbell-Bannerman's professed u n c e r t a i n t i e s . He d i d not 
attempt to minimise the magnitude of the step represented by 
the Japanese A l l i a n c e , and at the end of h i s speech he conceded 
t h a t , ' t h i s Treaty throws an o b l i g a t i o n on t h i s country which 
29 
might p o s s i b l y be onerous'. But he j u s t i f i e d the government's 
p o l i c y of accepting t h a t o b l i g a t i o n b y s t r e s s i n g the complete 
i d e n t i t y of i n t e r e s t s of B r i t a i n and Japan i n the Far East, and 
t h e i r mutual commitment to the defence of the status quo, which 
was moreover i n the i n t e r e s t s of a l l the s t a t e s whose n a t i o n a l s 
traded i n China. He p o i n t e d l y omitted the name of Russia from 
h i s l i s t of peaceful t r a d i n g nations (though l a t e r i n h i s speech 
he d i d r e f e r t o h i s government's wish f o r good r e l a t i o n s w i t h 
Russia), and produced h i s most cogent, i f c h i l l i n g , argument: 
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There can be no greater blow t o the sta t u s quo 
i n the Far East than t h a t two Powers should 
coalesce to crush e i t h e r us or Japan ... I f 
we were at war w i t h a Power i n the Far East, the 
value of Japan to us i s c l e a r and manifest. But 
i s i t conceivable t h a t we should permit two 
Powers t o crush Japan? I do not t h i n k t h a t i t 
i s . . . I t i s n e i t h e r good f o r us t h a t Japan 
should be crushed, nor t h a t through a c o a l i t i o n 
of two Powers she should be ob l i g e d t o mould her 
p o l i c y i n a d i r e c t i o n a n t a g o n i s t i c t o our 
i n t e r e s t s . Now t h a t t h i s Treaty has been 
c a r r i e d out, i t i s q u i t e evident t h a t t h a t 
contingency cannot take place.30 
The A l l i a n c e , Balfour i n s i s t e d , would act as a powerful d e t e r r e n t 
against the p o s s i b i l i t y of Russia adopting an 'adventurous p o l i c y 
i n the Far East, and would thus act to strengthen those forces 
making f o r peace and s t a b i l i t y . B a lfour's arguments were almost 
sycophantly endorsed by E a r l Percy (who was to succeed Cranborne 
as Under-Secretary at the Foreign O f f i c e a f t e r Salisbury's 
death). A f t e r a l l e g i n g gross inconsistency on the p a r t of the 
Opposition leaders i n t h e i r a t t i t u d e towards 'splendid i s o l a t i o n ' 
he went on t o g l o r y i n i t s abandonment: 
I f ever there was a Treaty which j u s t i f i e d us i n 
departing from our t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i c y , i t i s t h i s 
Treaty. For my own p a r t ... I t h i n k the greatest 
guarantee f o r European [ s i c ] peace and the peace 
of the Far East, and the greate s t guarantee against 
any f u r t h e r acts of aggression i n those p a r t s i s t h a t 
you should make your i n t e n t i o n s known and show other 
c o u n t r i e s t h a t you have the power, i f necessary, t o 
enforce them. 31 
With such f o r t h r i g h t warnings as these being u t t e r e d i n the House 
of Commons, i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t the Russian Foreign M i n i s t e 
(who had himself been hoping f o r an agreement w i t h Japan) should 
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have been disconcerted by the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . 
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Apart from a c l o s i n g speech from a Conservative back-
bencher, J.C. Macdona, which was even more sycophantic towards 
Salisbury than Percy had been towards B a l f o u r , the only 
other speeches i n the debate were from two members, one 
Conservative ( S i r Howard V i n c e n t ) , and one L i b e r a l (Joseph 
Walton), who both p r i d e d themselves on s i t t i n g f o r i n d u s t r i a l 
seats, and who both agreed i n the view t h a t the Treaty was h i g h l y 
d e s i r a b l e and would be of b e n e f i t t o B r i t i s h trade and e n t e r p r i s e . 
At the end of t h i s debate, rai s e d by a backbencher but dominated 
by the f r o n t benches on both sides, Norman explained t h a t he 
had moved the adjournment i n order t o e l i c i t i n f o r m a t i o n from 
the government and t h a t , having a t t a i n e d t h a t o b j e c t i v e , he 
would now withdraw h i s motion. The House then proceeded w i t h 
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i t s o r d i n a r y business. The Opposition, of course, could not 
have secured the r e p u d i a t i o n of the Treaty even had they wanted 
t o ; i f Norman had pressed h i s motion, the House might have 
adjourned, but t h a t would hardly have a f f e c t e d the government's 
f o r e i g n p o l i c y . I n any case, the government had a large m a j o r i t y 
i n the House which could be r e l i e d upon t o support i t s p o l i c y 
i f necessary ( i t w i l l be noticed t h a t no Conservative speaker i n 
the debate expressed any misgivings about the T r e a t y ) . 
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r a c t i c e d i d not r e q u i r e Parliamentary approval 
f o r a t r e a t y of t h i s k i n d . There was no cession of t e r r i t o r y 
i n v o l v e d , no f i n a n c i a l i m p l i c a t i o n s , and no consequent l e g i s l a t i o n 
was needed. Consequently, a l l t h a t Norman and the Opposition 
could secure was explanations from the Government, and the 
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o p p o r t u n i t y f o r Members of the House to express t h e i r opinions. 
I t w i l l be n o t i c e d t h a t , apart from the expression of some 
t r a d i t i o n a l misgivings by Harcourt and other L i b e r a l s , the 
House of Commons appeared w i l l i n g to accept what was openly 
admitted by Government spokesmen t o be the abandonment ( a t 
l e a s t i n the Far East) of B r i t a i n ' s t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i c y of 
'splendid i s o l a t i o n ' and i t s replacement by a b i n d i n g defensive 
a l l i a n c e ; the Opposition's attempt to p o r t r a y the a l l i a n c e as 
being o f f e n s i v e as w e l l as defensive was not s u f f i c i e n t l y 
e f f e c t i v e t o persuade any Conservative speakers t h a t i t was 
t h e r e f o r e unacceptable. One unde r l y i n g reason why the Anglo-
Japanese A l l i a n c e was so d e s i r a b l e from the B r i t i s h p o i n t of 
view was t h a t , by shoring up B r i t a i n ' s p r e v i o u s l y over-extended 
p o s i t i o n i n the Far East, i t removed the need f o r an agreement 
w i t h another European power w i t h i n t e r e s t s i n China; i t was 
t h e r e f o r e easier r a t h e r than harder t o r e s i s t the blandishments 
of Germany, t h a t B r i t a i n should j o i n the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e i n 
r e t u r n f o r German support i n China, and consequently easier t o 
maintain the p o l i c y of i s o l a t i o n i n Europe by a 'calculated 
departure' from i s o l a t i o n i n the r e s t r i c t e d and comparatively 
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remote r e g i o n of the Far East. This, however, was not an 
aspect of the matter which was dwelt upon i n the debate, e i t h e r 




THE ANGLO-FRENCH ENTENTE OF 1904 
2.1 Growth of the Anglo-French Understanding 
As already observed, by the beginning of the t v e n t i e t h 
c e ntury, the European great powers, excluding only B r i t a i n , 
had d i v i d e d themselves i n t o two competing a l l i a n c e s (although 
there was room f o r doubt even then about the firmness of 
I t a l y ' s commitment to the i n t e r e s t s of her partners i n the 
T r i p l e A l l i a n c e ) . ^ The purpose of these a l l i a n c e s were p r i m a r i l y 
p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y , t o promote the s t r e n g t h and t e r r i t o r i a l 
s e c u r i t y of each of the powers, but they were also intended 
t o advance the i n t e r e s t s of each of them i n t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r 
spheres of i n f l u e n c e , t o avoid any danger of c o n f l i c t or 
i n t r u s i o n t h e r e , t o resolve possible causes of antagonism, and 
to promote the commercial i n t e r e s t s and cooperation of the 
various a l l i a n c e p a r t n e r s . The rapprochement between France 
and Russia, begun i n 1891 and complete by the beginning of 
1894, seemed l i k e l y to lead to an a l l i a n c e of the two, not 
only against Germany and the powers of the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e 
(the o s t e n s i b l e purpose of the agreement), but also t o t h e i r 
cooperation against B r i t a i n . I t was known i n the 1890s t h a t 
B r i t a i n remained g e n e r a l l y closer i n sympathy t o the T r i p l e 
A l l i a n c e , i f only because the B r i t i s h recognised t h e i r common 
i n t e r e s t w i t h A u s t r i a and I t a l y i n preventing Russian expansion 
at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, and p a r t i c u l a r l y Russia's 
a c q u i s i t i o n of the s t r a t e g i c a l l y v i t a l S t r a i t s between the Black 
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Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean, the Bosphorus and the 
2 
Dardanelles. I t was to some extent t h i s adhesion of B r i t a i n 
t o the purposes of the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e which helped t o b r i n g 
3 
about the a l l i a n c e of Russia and France. 
I t i s t r u e t h a t the Russian government d i d not give the 
French f u l l and unequivocal support i n the acute c r i s i s i n 
Anglo-French r e l a t i o n s i n 1898, the Fashoda a f f a i r ; but the 
f o l l o w i n g year the French Foreign M i n i s t e r , Delcasse, secured 
a renewal and extension of the Franco-Russian A l l i a n c e , 
p r i m a r i l y to improve the s e c u r i t y of the a l l i e s i n south-eastern 
Europe, but also t o f a c i l i t a t e f u t u r e cooperation against the 
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B r i t i s h . And, of course, the Russians were deeply antagonised 
by the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , which we have 
already considered, which they q u i t e r i g h t l y perceived t o be 
d i r e c t e d against themselves and t h e i r ambitions i n China and 
Korea. 
So f a r as the French were concerned, t h e i r p r i n c i p a l , 
though not t h e i r only, grievance against B r i t a i n l a y i n Egypt, 
which the B r i t i s h had occupied i n 1882 and from which they 
stubbornly refused t o withdraw i n s p i t e of occasional promises 
t o do so, and frequent French demands t h a t they should. The 
a b o r t i v e French e x p e d i t i o n t o Fashoda was an attempt to re-assert 
a French presence i n the Valley of the N i l e , and t o b r i n g about 
a s i t u a t i o n i n which the B r i t i s h could be induced t o end the 
occupation of Egypt, as the French wished, and end the B r i t i s h 
hegemony i n the Eastern Mediterranean.^ The i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n of 
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the questions of Egypt and the S t r a i t s , and t h e i r common 
h o s t i l i t y to B r i t i s h power i n the Eastern Mediterranean 
was a powerful stimulus t o Franco-Russian cooperation the r e , 
although Russian i n t e r e s t s i n Egypt were, of course, less 
than France's; and i t was c l e a r t h a t i f there were war 
between B r i t a i n and France i t would be about Egypt, but i f 
there were war between B r i t a i n and Russia, i t would be about 
the S t r a i t s and Constantinople (and perhaps Persia t o o ) . ^ 
The nightmare of those who feared the dangers of B r i t a i n ' s 
i s o l a t i o n i n European a f f a i r s as w e l l as i n the Far East was 
t h a t a c o n f l i c t w i t h e i t h e r France or Russia might become a 
c o n f l i c t w i t h both; p r e c i s e l y of course the anxiety on which 
the German Emperor counted i n h i s plan t o draw the B r i t i s h 
i n t o a c l o s e r and more b i n d i n g commitment to the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e . 
The Kaiser had, however, miscalculated when he supposed t h a t the 
antagonism between B r i t a i n and her two main i m p e r i a l r i v a l s , 
France and Russia, could not be r e c o n c i l e d , and t h a t B r i t a i n 
would i n the end be forced t o enter the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e on 
Germany's terms. There was, as l a t e r events showed, a d i f f e r e n t 
s t r a t e g y which B r i t a i n could f o l l o w , of r e c o n c i l i n g the 
d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h France and Russia by t r y i n g t o n e g o t i a t e about 
t h e i r sources of i r r i t a t i o n and areas of c o n f l i c t . I f the 
B r i t i s h and French f e l t themselves f r u s t r a t e d by t h e i r mutual 
h o s t i l i t y , and i f each f e l t i t s e l f to s u f f e r from the h o s t i l i t y 
of the other, then they had a strong i n c e n t i v e t o reach an 
agreement which would o b l i t e r a t e t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s . This was 
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the r e c o g n i t i o n which l e d to the s i g n i n g , on 8th A p r i l 1904, 
of the agreements between B r i t a i n and France which we know 
c o l l e c t i v e l y as c o n s t i t u t i n g the beginning of the Anglo-French 
Entente; these agreements adjusted a range of h i s t o r i c Anglo-
French disputes i n various p a r t s of the wo r l d , of which the 
c e n t r a l p a r t of the deal was the r e c o g n i t i o n of s p e c i a l 
i n t e r e s t s of France i n Morocco, and of B r i t a i n i n Egypt. 
The r e c o g n i t i o n by the B r i t i s h of France's s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s 
i n Morocco was the p r i c e which they had t o pay t o secure French 
r e c o g n i t i o n of B r i t a i n ' s s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n i n Egypt. By i t s e l f , 
t h i s would have made the Agreement a t t r a c t i v e t o a l a r g e s e c t i o n 
of i n f l u e n t i a l B r i t i s h o p i n i o n , such as Lord Cromer, the great 
Egyptian pro-consul, who repeatedly urged upon Lord Lansdowne, 
the B r i t i s h Foreign Secretary, t h a t no p r i c e was too high t o 
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secure French support f o r B r i t a i n ' s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of Egypt ; 
but i t had wider i m p l i c a t i o n s and a t t r a c t i o n s as w e l l . The 
French were aware t h a t one of Lansdowne's arguments i n support 
of an Anglo-French settlement of outstanding d i s p u t e s , and one 
which was p a r t i c u l a r l y a t t r a c t i v e t o h i s colleagues i n the 
Cabinet, was t h a t i t would probably t u r n out to be the 
precursor of a b e t t e r understanding w i t h Russia as w e l l ; 
a longstanding o b j e c t i v e of Conservative policy-makers which, 
i f achieved, would also remove the danger of the Japanese 
9 
A l l i a n c e drawing B r i t a i n i n t o c o n f l i c t w i t h Russia. 
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Some h i s t o r i a n s consider t h a t t h i s l a s t c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
was f o r a time the most powerful i n c e n t i v e to achieving an 
understanding w i t h F r a n c e . ^ I n February 1904, Japan and 
Russia went t o war over Manchuria and Korea. This presented 
the B r i t i s h government w i t h the r e a l t h r e a t of becoming 
involved i f France were t o a s s i s t Russia, since the Japanese 
would then be able t o invoke the terms of t h e i r a l l i a n c e w i t h 
B r i t a i n and demand B r i t i s h assistance (though what the 
Japanese r e a l l y wanted from t h e i r a l l i a n c e w i t h B r i t a i n was 
not B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y support, but merely t h a t B r i t i s h 
p o l i t i c a l weight should keep France and other European powers 
n e u t r a l ) . The prospect of being sucked i n t o the Far Eastern 
c o n f l i c t on opposing sides, and pos s i b l y seeing i t t h e r e f o r e 
spread t o other areas where t h e i r i n t e r e s t s had h i s t o r i c a l l y 
been opposed, gave both the B r i t i s h and the French added impetus 
i n the search f o r t h a t general and comprehensive settlement 
which they had been pursuing since King Edward's v i s i t t o Paris 
i n May 1903. As e a r l y as the end of 1902, the B r i t i s h government 
had come to the conclusion t h a t i t was powerless t o prevent 
the extension of French i n f l u e n c e i n Morocco, t h a t i t s own 
i n t e r e s t s there were of much less importance than i t s i n t e r e s t s 
i n Egypt, and t h a t i t should t h e r e f o r e be possible to reach an 
accord which would end i t s d i f f i c u l t i e s i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
of Egypt ( l a r g e l y caused by French o p p o s i t i o n on the Egyptian 
Debt Commission) by a comprehensive settlement w i t h France.^ 
The French Foreign M i n i s t e r , Delcasse", had p r e v i o u s l y hoped to 
achieve both the expulsion of B r i t a i n from Egypt, and also the 
27 
a c q u i s i t i o n of Morocco by France, by means of cooperation 
w i t h Germany,in s p i t e of the long-standing Franco-German 
enmity which r e s u l t e d from Germany's annexation of Alsace-
Lorraine i n 1871; but i n 1900 the German government had 
i n s i s t e d t h a t , as an e s s e n t i a l p r e l i m i n a r y to such cooperation, 
France should j o i n i n a general r e c o g n i t i o n of the e x i s t i n g 
t e r r i t o r i a l s t a t u s quo i n Europe, which would of course have 
e n t a i l e d French acceptance of Germany's possession of Alsace-
Lorraine. As i t was axiomatic i n French p o l i t i c s t h a t no 
m i n i s t e r could survive i n o f f i c e i f i t became p u b l i c knowledge 
t h a t he had assented to the loss of the ' l o s t provinces', 
Delcasse concluded t h a t he could not r e l y upon the g o o d w i l l 
of Germany, nor achieve h i s ambitions w i t h German help. He was 
at l e n g t h converted by the French Ambassador i n London, Paul 
Cambon, and by the c o l o n i a l i s t p o l i t i c i a n , Etienne, t o the 
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a l t e r n a t i v e of an entente w i t h the B r i t i s h . The outbreak 
of the Russo-Japanese war i n February 1904 thus provided only 
an added impetus t o a process of d i p l o m a t i c raprochement which 
was already g a t h e r i n g i t s own momentum, and which had the 
support of important organs of the newspaper press i n both 
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c o u n t r i e s . I t would be f a i r t o say t h a t the Anglo-French 
Agreement, when published soon a f t e r i t s s i g n a t u r e i n A p r i l 
1904, caused less s u r p r i s e to B r i t i s h p u b l i c o p i n i o n and t o 
Parliament than had the Japanese A l l i a n c e two years p r e v i o u s l y ; 
i t also proved t o be genuinely more popular and less c o n t r o v e r s i a l , 
and as we s h a l l see, was approved by the House of Commons wi t h o u t 
a d i v i s i o n . Although t h i s was not an aspect of the question 
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much noticed i n the Parliamentary debate, i t was p r i v a t e l y 
expected t h a t French good o f f i c e s would, i n due course, lead 
to an improvement i n r e l a t i o n s w i t h Russia a l s o , which would 
help to r e l i e v e B r i t a i n of anxiety about the s e c u r i t y of i t s 
Indian f r o n t i e r s , as w e l l as about Russian encroachment i n 
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China. Any such development would, however, have to wa i t 
u n t i l the war between Russia and Japan was over; f o r the time 
being, the main preoccupation of the B r i t i s h government and the 
House of Commons was w i t h the terms of the Agreement w i t h 
France. 
2.2 The Anglo-French Agreement : 8th A p r i l 1904 
The Anglo-French Agreement f e l l i n t o three p a r t s , which 
were published and debated by the House of CommonSjtogether w i t h 
some secret a r t i c l e s which n a t u r a l l y remained unpublished and 
whose content became the source of much speculat i o n i n the 
press and Parliament, u n t i l they were f i n a l l y published by 
the L i b e r a l Foreign Secretary, S i r Edward Grey, i n November 
1911, when they were found t o be much less s i n i s t e r than had 
o f t e n been supposed.^ As has been already observed, the core 
of the entente was the Egypt-Morocco b a r t e r , which formed the 
main subject of the f i r s t agreement. B r i t a i n declared t h a t 
she had no i n t e n t i o n of a l t e r i n g the p o l i t i c a l s t a t u s of Egypt, 
while France undertook no longer t o ask f o r a time l i m i t t o be 
placed upon the B r i t i s h occupation, and to support whatever 
means B r i t a i n judged necessary t o carry out i t s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ; 
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i n r e t u r n , France declared t h a t she had no i n t e n t i o n of 
a l t e r i n g the p o l i t i c a l status of Morocco, and B r i t a i n 
undertook not to oppose whatever a c t i o n France judged to be 
necessary t h e r e , but to lend i t her di p l o m a t i c support. Thus 
B r i t a i n assigned Morocco to France's sphere of i n f l u e n c e and 
France recognised B r i t i s h preponderance i n Egypt. At the same 
time, both guaranteed f o r at l e a s t t h i r t y years e q u a l i t y of 
commercial o p p o r t u n i t y i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e areas; the freedom 
of n a v i g a t i o n i n the Suez Canal was r e a f f i r m e d , and l i k e w i s e 
t h a t of the St\ni|-_sof G i b r a l t a r , where i t was a f f i r m e d t h a t the 
northern^coast of Morocco would not be f o r t i f i e d . The second 
of the agreements contained an adjustment of competing French 
and B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s i n Newfoundland and sub-Saharan A f r i c a ; 
the French surrendered t h e i r h i s t o r i c r i g h t s i n the Newfoundland 
f i s h e r i e s i n r e t u r n f o r a monetary indemnity from B r i t a i n , and 
s i g n i f i c a n t B r i t i s h t e r r i t o r i a l concessions i n A f r i c a , i n v o l v i n g 
the cession of B r i t i s h t e r r i t o r y i n the Gambia, N i g e r i a , and 
the l i e s de Los; these concessions allowed the French to acquire 
some 14,000 square miles of formerly B r i t i s h t e r r i t o r y ( w h i l e 
s t i l l r e t a i n i n g the isl a n d s of St. P i e r r e and Miquelon o f f the 
Newfoundland c o a s t ) . Although Percy, i n presenting the agreement 
to the House, asserted t h a t the second agreement ' r e l a t e d 
e n t i r e l y t o Newfoundland', i t i s cl e a r t h a t the cessions of 
t e r r i t o r y were s i g n i f i c a n t to France's p o s i t i o n i n West A f r i c a , 
and indeed t h a t they were c r u c i a l i n g e t t i n g the French to accept 
the agreement, even though i t d i d not give them the whole of 
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the Gambia, as they had wished. The p o s i t i o n of the l i e s 
de Los, d i r e c t l y opposite to Konakry, the c a p i t a l of French 
Guinea, made t h e i r possession of great s i g n i f i c a n c e t o the 
French, whereas t h e i r importance t o the B r i t i s h had 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y declined since the ending of the former trade 
i n A f r i c a n slaves. The t h i r d agreement c o n s t i t u t e d a general 
adjustment of Anglo-French d i f f e r e n c e s i n the whole region 
l y i n g to the east of the A f r i c a n c o n t i n e n t . The French 
surrendered t h e i r former r i g h t s i n the i s l a n d of Zanzibar i n 
r e t u r n f o r B r i t a i n ' s acceptance of France's p o s i t i o n i n 
Madagascar. The d i v i s i o n of the peninsula of Indo-China 
(which we now more commonly c a l l South-East Asia) i n t o separate 
spheres of i n f l u e n c e was agreed, w i t h France predominant i n the 
east of the peninsula and the B r i t i s h i n the west. A j o i n t 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n or condominium of the disputed P a c i f i c i s l a n d s 
known as the New Hebrides, was t o be est a b l i s h e d . I n s h o r t , 
as Percy was at pains to emphasise t o the Commons, the Agreement 
removed from the sphere of f u t u r e controversy between the two 
states most, i f not a l l , of the disagreements which had p r e v i o u s l y 
b e d e v i l l e d r e l a t i o n s between them; the f a c t t h a t the French 
continued t o press f o r the cession of the whole of Gambia i s 
one instance of those o l d disputes which remained u n r e s o l v e d . ^ 
But on the whole, the Conservatives had good reason t o f e e l 
s a t i s f i e d t h a t they had s u c c e s s f u l l y resolve t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s 
w i t h France, and t h a t they were t h e r e f o r e less vulnerable t o 
German pressure and had less need t o seek Germany's support 
against t h e i r i m p e r i a l r i v a l s . I n t h i s sense, the French entente, 
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l i k e the Japanese A l l i a n c e , made the p r e s e r v a t i o n of 
B r i t a i n ' s i s o l a t i o n from s p e c i f i c a l l y European entanglements 
easier to maintain. 
The secret a r t i c l e s of the Agreement, however, may be 
held to cast doubt on t h i s view, and would undoubtedly have 
occasioned comment i n s i d e and outside Parliament had they 
been known i n 1904. Of the f i v e secret a r t i c l e s , not a l l 
were p a r t i c u l a r l y alarming to i s o l a t i o n i s t sentiment; the 
t h i r d and f o u r t h r e l a t e d t o France's arrangements w i t h Spain 
over spheres of i n f l u e n c e i n Morocco, and were w i t h e l d from 
p u b l i c a t i o n f o r l a r g e l y t e c h n i c a l reasons; the second and 
f i f t h contained assurances to the French about B r i t i s h 
i n t e n t i o n s i n Egypt. I t was the f i r s t which appeared to 
contain an open-ended commitment which might, i n due course, 
extend the scope of the entente w e l l beyond the i m p e r i a l 
bargain which i t o s t e n s i b l y was; i t provided t h a t , i f e i t h e r 
government found i t s e l f forced by circumstance t o a l t e r i t s 
p o l i c y i n e i t h e r Egypt or Morocco (which may be i n t e r p r e t e d 
as d i p l o m a t i c euphemism f o r annexation or occupation), t h e i r 
agreement would continue t o f u n c t i o n and each would t h e r e f o r e 
be able t o count upon the diplo m a t i c support of the other. No 
doubt, the B r i t i s h agreed t o t h i s p r o v i s i o n because they were so 
eager to secure French support f o r t h e i r proposed reforms i n 
the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of Egypt, and i n p a r t i c u l a r , wished t o be 
sure of France's d i p l o m a t i c pressure being a p p l i e d to other 
European s t a t e s , most notably Russia, on behalf of B r i t a i n ' s 
32 
desire to get the K h e d i v i a l Decree ( r e l a t i n g to the r e c o n s t r u c t i o n 
of the Egyptian a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ) accepted by the Public Debt 
Commission^ and no doubt they scarcely appreciated the extent 
to which t h i s would, i n t u r n , commit them to the p o l i t i c a l 
support of French ambitions i n Morocco, as has r e c e n t l y been 
ar g u e d . ^ But i t can hardly be denied t h a t i t was t h i s 
p r o v i s i o n and the B r i t i s h commitment to French ambitions i n 
Morocco which i t contained, which l e d the B r i t i s h government 
to stand beside France i n the f i r s t Moroccan c r i s i s , which 
erupted l i t t l e more than a year a f t e r the s i g n i n g of the 
Agreement and which f o r a few months appeared t o r a i s e the 
danger of a Franco-German war i n which B r i t a i n would be i n v o l v e d . 
This B r i t i s h support was, indeed, l a r g e l y and p u b l i c l y confined 
to the d i p l o m a t i c sphere, but i t also generated a m i l i t a r y 
dimension which had not been envisaged i n the o r i g i n a l agreement, 
but which was embodied i n the secret Anglo-French ' m i l i t a r y 
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conversations' which began i n January 1906. These developments 
were, of course, unknown to Parliament, j u s t as the secret a r t i c l e s 
remained unknown i n substance u n t i l t h e i r p u b l i c a t i o n i n 1911. 
On the other hand, i t should be emphasised t h a t the secret 
a r t i c l e s , l i k e the published agreements, d i d not envisage 
Anglo-French cooperation i n European questions; they d i d not i n 
any way commit B r i t i a n t o the European a l l i a n c e system on the 
side of France and Russia, and against Germany; and they d i d 
not provide f o r m i l i t a r y or naval, as opposed to d i p l o m a t i c 
cooperation between B r i t a i n and France i n e i t h e r c o l o n i a l or 
European questions. I n keeping the secret a r t i c l e s s e c r e t , the 
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Conservative government was not w i t h o l d i n g from Parliament 
i n f o r m a t i o n about a p o l i t i c a l or m i l i t a r y commitment t o 
France or to the Franco-Russian a l l i a n c e i n the European 
balance of power; f o r no such commitment was e n t a i l e d i n the 
terms on which the Anglo-French entente was concluded. The 
entente was not, i n e i t h e r i t s published or i t s secret 
f o r m u l a t i o n , addressed to the European balance of power; and 
i t was not a m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e . As Dr. Monger has so 
p e r t i n e n t l y observed, Lansdowne's ' n a t u r a l preoccupation had 
been w i t h i m p e r i a l and naval a f f a i r s ' , w h i l e i t was h i s L i b e r a l 
successor, Grey, whose 'thoughts were i n c r e a s i n g l y concentrated 
i 19 on Europe . 
2.3 The Debate on the Anglo-French Agreement 
The debate i n the House of Commons took place on 
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1st June 1904. This i s an example of a debate which took 
place i n the time a l l o t t e d to government business, f o r the 
very good reason t h a t the Agreement required the sanction of 
Parliament f o r two reasons: i t involved the payment to the 
French of f i n a n c i a l compensation f o r the loss of economic 
r i g h t s i n the Newfoundland f i s h e r i e s ; and i t involved the 
cession of t e r r i t o r y i n West A f r i c a . I n t h i s respect the 
Commons debate was q u i t e u n l i k e t h a t on the Anglo-Japanese 
A l l i a n c e , moved by Norman on a motion t o adjourn (as we have 
seen i n Chapter One); the substantive debate on the Anglo-French 
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entente was, t e c h n i c a l l y , on the second reading of a 
Parliamentary B i l l , the Anglo-French Convention B i l l , and 
was introduced by the Government's o f f i c i a l spokesman on 
f o r e i g n a f f a i r s i n the House of Commons, E a r l Percy, who was 
the Under-Secretary of State f o r Foreign A f f a i r s . Percy, 
however, made i t cl e a r t h a t the House was f r e e t o debate the 
me r i t s of the Agreement as a whole, and was not confined t o 
the s p e c i f i c p r o v i s i o n s of the B i l l ; indeed, he was e v i d e n t l y 
anxious t h a t they should be considered i n t h e i r wider context, 
since the B i l l was e x c l u s i v e l y devoted t o the f i n a n c i a l and 
t e r r i t o r i a l concessions t o be made by B r i t a i n , w h i l e the 
compensating advantages which B r i t a i n would thus o b t a i n were 
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contained i n the Agreement but not i n the B i l l . I n h i s 
p r e s e n t a t i o n of the Agreement, he emphasised t h a t w h i l e B r i t a i n 
surrendered some r i g h t s and i n t e r e s t s , she also gained a great 
deal t h a t she had long attempted to secure. I n Morocco, she 
e f f e c t i v e l y surrendered nothing t h a t she a c t u a l l y possessed, 
but d i d secure a French guarantee of the open door to commercial 
e n t e r p r i s e , and t h e r e f o r e B r i t i s h trade could expect a r e a l 
advantage as a r e s u l t . He maintained t h a t the cessions of 
t e r r i t o r y i n West A f r i c a were of no great s i g n i f i c a n c e , w h i l e 
the surrender of French r i g h t s i n Newfoundland put an end t o 
a long-standing anomaly i n the dual ownership of some of i t s 
t e r r i t o r y . Above a l l , he emphasised the enormous b e n e f i t s 
to the B r i t i s h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of Egypt which must f o l l o w from 
the ending of French o b s t r u c t i o n and i t s replacement by French 
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support, thus f r e e i n g B r i t a i n to embark on the major reform 
of t h a t a d m i n i s t r a t i o n which was embodied i n the K h e d i v i a l 
Decree. As h i s f i n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the Agreement, he 
looked forward t o a new era of Anglo-French cooperation i n 
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' A f r i c a , as w e l l as i n Asia'; he d i d not mention Europe. 
While Percy was the opening speaker f o r the Conservatives, 
i t was B a l f o u r , the Prime M i n i s t e r and h i s Party's leading 
f o r e i g n p o l i c y expert, who wound up the debate f o r the 
Government; perhaps an i n d i c a t i o n of the importance which he 
attached t o the new t r e a t y . A f t e r d e a l i n g i n h i s customary 
l o f t y manner w i t h some of the d e t a i l e d c r i t i c i s m s which had 
been made i n the debate, he addressed himself t o the a l l e g a t i o n 
t h a t the Agreement represented a 'complete r e v e r s a l of Lord 
Salisbury's f o r e i g n p o l i c y ' ( t h a t i s , the p o l i c y of i s o l a t i o n 
from European entanglements), and t h a t i t would be a b a r r i e r 
to any subsequent agreement w i t h Germany, which the government 
i n Salisbury's time had sought t o achieve. These charges he 
c a t e g o r i c a l l y r e j e c t e d : 
I e n t i r e l y deny there has been any r e v e r s a l of 
the t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i c y of our Party. I e n t i r e l y 
deny t h a t anything has been done p r e j u d i c i a l to 
the i n t e r e s t s of Germany or any other Power. I t 
would indeed be a b l o t upon our Agreement w i t h 
France, from which we hope so much f o r the peace 
and amity of the w o r l d , i f i t were regarded as 
a stumbling-block i n the way of s i m i l a r arrange-
ments w i t h other Powers i n other p a r t s of the 
w o r l d . 23 
He then went on t o s t r e s s i n f o r c e f u l and eloquent language the 
advantage to both B r i t a i n and France of removing o l d sources of 
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f r i c t i o n between them, and t o i n s i s t t h a t i t was: 
... the common v e r d i c t of both sides of 
the House ... t h a t t h i s great instrument 
w i l l be looked back upon as the beginning 
of a new and happier era i n our i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
r e l a t i o n s . ^ 
Throughout h i s speech i t was the g l o b a l detente between B r i t a i n 
and France which he emphasised, as had Percy; and, as we have 
seen, he denied t h a t the Agreement i n any way a l t e r e d the 
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European balance of power. Such was the g i s t of the o f f i c i a l 
Conservative j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the Anglo-French Agreement. 
Balfour was r i g h t when he sai d t h a t the L i b e r a l o p p o s i t i o n 
also supported the Agreement. Both Grey and Campbell-Bannerman 
spoke eloquently of the b e n e f i t s which they expected t o f o l l o w 
from the Agreement, and adopted what was, i n e f f e c t , a b i - p a r t i s a n 
a t t i t u d e towards i t . S i r Edward Grey's c o n t r i b u t i o n was 
p a r t i c u l a r l y s i g n i f i c a n t since, as a former Under-Secretary of 
State f o r Foreign A f f a i r s (under Rosebery) he was an acknowledged 
expert i n the f i e l d and was indeed a l i k e l y candidate t o become 
Foreign Secretary i n a f u t u r e L i b e r a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n (as he d i d 
i n December 1905). That he, w e l l known to be a convinced L i b e r a l 
I m p e r i a l i s t as w e l l , should have been chosen t o put the L i b e r a l 
view immediately a f t e r Percy had f i n i s h e d was a c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n 
t h a t , i n t h i s matter a t l e a s t , the o f f i c i a l l i n e of the L i b e r a l 
Party would be an i m p e r i a l i s t one, and t h e r e f o r e supportive of 
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the Conservative achievement. While conceding t h a t , as a 
ki n d of commercial bargain between the two c o u n t r i e s , the 
Agreement might be open to o b j e c t i o n on p o i n t s of d e t a i l , 
Grey praised i t almost extravagantly 'from the poi n t of view 
of general p o l i c y ' , and looked forward to the i n c r e a s i n g l y 
close Anglo-French cooperation which he b e l i e v e d i t would 
b r i n g : 
Take A r t i c l e 9, f o r instance of the Agreement 
which r e l a t e d t o Egypt and Morocco, 'The two 
Governments agree to a f f o r d one another t h e i r 
d i p l o m a t i c support i n order t o o b t a i n t h e 
execution of the clauses of the present 
d e c l a r a t i o n regarding Egypt and Morocco'. 
The words ' d e c l a r a t i o n regarding Egypt and 
Morocco' are i n themselves somewhat vague, and 
the phrase 'diplomatic support' i s again vague. 
Everything depends upon the s p i r i t and not the 
l e t t e r ; but i t i s p r e c i s e l y because so much does 
depend on the s p i r i t t h a t there are, i n t h a t 
clause alone, great o p p o r t u n i t i e s , l o o k i n g t o the 
p r o b a b i l i t i e s of f u t u r e p o l i t i c s , f o r the two 
nations using the Agreement, by a l i b e r a l 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of tha t a r t i c l e , t o draw closer 
to each other. There w i l l be c o n t i n u a l 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s of b e f r i e n d i n g each other under 
t h a t one clause alone, i f i t be i n t e r p r e t e d i n 
the s p i r i t i n which I be l i e v e the Agreement i s 
conceived. 27 
This broad i n t e r p r e t a t i o n may be seen as going some way 
beyond the for m u l a t i o n s even of Percy and B a l f o u r , towards 
envisaging a developing cooperative r e l a t i o n s h i p over a wide 
area of p o l i c y ; and i t may be observed t h a t i t was indeed Grey 
as L i b e r a l Foreign Secretary who, i n January 1906, authorised 
s t r i c t B r i t i s h support f o r the French p o s i t i o n i n Morocco at 
the Conference of Al g e c i r a s , agreed to the ' m i l i t a r y conversations' 
between the two General S t a f f s being made o f f i c i a l , and gave 
Cambon the nearest t h a t he could get t o a B r i t i s h commitment t o 
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the defence of France, without a c t u a l l y t a k i n g the matter to 
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the Cabinet. There does indeed, as t h i s speech of Grey's 
suggests, seem to be some force i n Monger's contention t h a t 
i t was Grey r a t h e r than Lansdowne who saw the French entente 
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i n European as w e l l as i n i m p e r i a l terms. However, he went on 
to f u r t h e r j u s t i f y the Agreement as a s s i s t i n g B r i t a i n to 
consolidate her e x i s t i n g p o s i t i o n i n the world and impose 
r e s t r a i n t on the danger of f u r t h e r i m p e r i a l expansion; he 
welcomed the Agreement unreservedly, and pleased the L i b e r a l 
benches by expressing the hope t h a t i t would serve as a 
'working model' f o r other such agreements. 
The importance of S i r Henry Campbell-Bannexman's 
d e c l a r a t i o n of support f o r the Agreement was not merely t h a t , 
as Leader of the L i b e r a l Opposition, h i s words set the seal on 
b i - p a r t i s a n s h i p , but more p a r t i c u l a r l y t h a t he was i n f o r e i g n 
a f f a i r s a Gladstonian L i b e r a l r a t h e r than an i m p e r i a l i s t , and 
t h e r e f o r e h i s endorsement meant t h a t both wings of the L i b e r a l 
Party would support the Agreement. He praised i t as: 
... a great instrument f o r b r i n g i n g together 
two neighbouring nations and two o l d r i v a l s ... 
and f o r promoting f r i e n d s h i p and co-operation 
between the two nations. 30 
He concluded w i t h the expectation t h a t the House would share the 
'general f e e l i n g of the country', which he declared to be 'one 
of intense s a t i s f a c t i o n at the conclusion of t h i s convention 1. 
With such endorsements from the two l e a d i n g spokesmen f o r the 
Opposition, Balfour could a f f o r d t o be complacent and to shrug 
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o f f the c r i t i c i s m s o f f e r e d from the benches behind him as 
w e l l as from some Opposition speakers. As we have seen, the 
motion was agreed without a d i v i s i o n , the second reading of 
the B i l l approved, and i t s t h i r d reading (a mere f o r m a l i t y ) 
committed f o r the f o l l o w i n g day. 
I n between these four speeches from the f r o n t 
benches, two from each side g i v i n g the o f f i c i a l M i n i s t e r i a l 
and Opposition views, there were seven speeches from the back 
benches, three from the Conservative side and f o u r from the 
L i b e r a l s , and i t was i n these speeches t h a t such c r i t i c i s m s 
of the Agreement as the House made were o f f e r e d . Among these 
speakers, there were the two most formidable back-bench expexts 
on f o r e i g n a f f a i r s , Thomas Gibson Bowles (Conservative) and 
S i r Charles D i l k e ( L i b e r a l ) . Gibson Bowles was an independent-
minded Tory, perhaps even a maverick, who had a long record 
of embarrassing h i s own f r o n t bench on a range of issues 
connected w i t h f o r e i g n a f f a i r s , i m p e r i a l defence, and finance 
(as a r e s u l t of which he was never rewarded w i t h o f f i c e i n 
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s p i t e of h i s obvious t a l e n t s ) . Bowles managed t o combine 
the most o r i g i n a l arguments of the whole debate, both f o r and 
against the Agreement, i n a s i n g l e speech; he enjoyed some 
amusement a t the expense of the mutual admiration expressed by 
Percy and Grey, condemned the i m p e r i a l core of the bargain, 
and then welcomed i t as a r e t u r n to the t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i c y of 
the balance of power i n Europe: 
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These two declar a t i o n s together amount i n 
Egypt, Siam and Morocco, t o no less than 
the p a r t i t i o n of three new Polands - to a 
compact of plunder. I t w i l l n o t , and cannot 
come to good e i t h e r f o r England or f o r France. 
I have f e l t i t r i g h t to c r i t i c i s e the 
convention from t h a t p o i n t of view. But I 
must now say tha t from a European p o i n t of 
view ... t h i s Agreement i s of the highest 
import and may be of the greate s t advantage 
This present Agreement w i t h France i s a r e t u r n 
to the o l d e r , simpler, and as I t h i n k , b e t t e r 
system of the balance of power ... The balance 
of power, instead of being an arrangement t o 
keep the peace of Europe by an agreement between 
a l l the Powers [as had been the case w i t h the 
Concert of Europe], i s an arrangement t o keep 
the peace by an Agreement between two or three 
Powers. ... This balance of power ... i s an 
e f f e c t u a l method of keeping aggressors i n order ... 
I b e l i e v e t h a t no combination can be so 
e f f e c t u a l i n producing a balance of powers as 
the combination of England and France and, 
from t h a t p o i n t of view, I t h i n k great good may 
r e s u l t . There are not absent from Europe at 
the present moment dangerous elements. ... There 
are s t a l k i n g through Europe ambitions which must 
be c u r t a i l e d and which may be developed t o a greater 
extent than seems [ l i k e l y ] a t present. Against such 
i t i s w e l l t o r a i s e a v i s i b l e b a r r i e r i n England 
and France. 32 
Without mentioning Germany by name, Bowles appealed to the concept 
of the balance of power so o v e r t l y as t o make i t q u i t e c l e a r t h a t 
he regarded the Anglo-French entente as i n e f f e c t a European 
a l l i a n c e d i r e c t e d towards the c o n t r o l of German ambitions (as 
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indeed we know t h a t the French regarded i t ) . This was an 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which went f a r beyond anything o f f e r e d by the two 
f r o n t benches on the subject, and indeed c o n s t i t u t e s one of the 
most s t r i k i n g statements ( i n Parliament a t l e a s t ) i n t h i s period 
of B r i t a i n ' s v i t a l i n t e r e s t i n m a i n t a i n i n g a European balance against Germany. 
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Nor was Gibson Bowles alone i n supposing t h a t the 
u l t e r i o r p u r p o r t of the Agreement was anti-German. This 
view was also supported, i f only o b l i q u e l y , by the L i b e r a l 
S i r Charles D i l k e , who was acknowledged to be the foremost 
a u t h o r i t y on the L i b e r a l benches on a l l matters of i m p e r i a l 
defence and f o r e i g n a f f a i r s . Having entered the House of 
Commons as e a r l y as 1868, he q u i c k l y became, w i t h Joseph 
Chamberlain, one of the leading r a d i c a l s i n domestic questions, 
but f i r s t held o f f i c e as Under-Secretary at the Foreign O f f i c e 
(1880-82) under Lord G r a n v i l l e i n the Gladstone a d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
of 1880-1885. From t h a t experience he developed an abiding 
commitment to the defence of B r i t a i n ' s i m p e r i a l i n t e r e s t s 
and, deprived of a l l prospects of cabinet o f f i c e by h i s 
involvement i n the most celebrated divorce case of the 1880s, 
made himself by t r a v e l , study and w r i t i n g , an u n r i v a l l e d 
expert on a wide range of p u b l i c questions, but p r i m a r i l y f o r e i g 
p o l i c y and defence. Having congratulated the Government on 
b r i n g i n g the Agreement before Parliament at a l l , he went on 
to assert (erroneously) t h a t 'Lord Salisbury's idea was always 
a German a l l i a n c e ' and t h a t , consequently, the entente 
represented an: 
... e x t r a o r d i n a r y new departure i n the f o r e i g n 
p o l i c y of the country, the completeness of the 
r e v e r s a l of the p o l i c y of Lord Salisbury, and 
the complete acceptance by the Government of the 
views we have been urging f o r years on t h i s side 
of the House. ^ 
D i l k e supported Grey's approbation of the Agreement as a v i t a l 
r e s o l u t i o n of o l d Anglo-French antagonisms, and although he 
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could not r e s i s t d i s p l a y i n g h i s e x p e r t i s e i n c r i t i c i s m of 
d e t a i l e d aspects of i t , he summed up s t r o n g l y i n favour 
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of the Agreement. A close reading of h i s remarks suggests 
t h a t one of Dilke's reasons f o r approving the rapprochement 
w i t h France was t h a t i t would put an end t o the o l d p r o j e c t 
( p r o p e r l y associated w i t h Chamberlain r a t h e r than w i t h 
Salisbury) f o r an accommodation w i t h Germany; he d i d not 
go n e a r l y as f a r as Gibson Bowles i n regarding i t as a 
p o s i t i v e b a r r i e r against German ambitions. 
The remaining back-bench speeches were, by comparison, 
l a c k i n g i n i n t e r e s t and a u t h o r i t y . Three Opposition back-
benchers (Robson, Walton and Emmott) objected t o those p r o v i s i o n 
i n the agreement which, they maintained, s a c r i f i c e d B r i t i s h 
commercial i n t e r e s t s t o the French, e s p e c i a l l y i n Morocco and 
Siam, and c r i t i c i s e d the f a i l u r e t o o b t a i n s a t i s f a c t o r y compensatory 
advantages. Two Conservatives (Moon and R o l l i t t ) seemed to f i n d 
i t necessary or p o l i t i c t o defend the already impregnable p o s i t i o n 
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of t h e i r government i n these matters. Gibson Bowles had already 
i n d i c a t e d the withdrawal of h i s c r i t i c a l amendment to the motion, 
and B a l f o u r , i n h i s r e p l y t o the debate, concentrated on r e f u t i n g 
D i l ke's a l l e g a t i o n s about the r e v e r s a l of the f o r e i g n p o l i c y of 
Lord S a l i s b u r y , r a t h e r than on commenting upon the much more 
i n t e r e s t i n g observations of Gibson Bowles on the European 
balance of power. The outcome was t h a t an undivided House 
endorsed the B i l l and t h e r e f o r e the p o l i c y of the Anglo-French 
Agreement; as d i d the House of Lords when i t took the second 
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reading of the Anglo-French Convention B i l l i n August. I n 
th a t debate, i t was not what was said (by Lansdowne f o r the 
Government and by Ripon f o r the Opposition) which was 
i n t e r e s t i n g , since both spoke b l a n d l y i n favour of the 
Agreement; but what was not said by Lord Rosebery. Rosebery 
was already known t o be a c r i t i c of the entente w i t h France, 
u n l i k e h i s acolytes i n the Commons such as Grey; and as a 
former Prime M i n i s t e r as w e l l as Foreign Secretary, h i s 
c r i t i c i s m s would have been p o t e n t i a l l y damaging to the 
Government's p o l i c y , and also to the prospects both of 
L i b e r a l I m p e r i a l i s m and of b i - p a r t i s a n s h i p and c o n t i n u i t y 
i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y . But on t h i s occasion, as on others, 
Rosebery (who was already withdrawing from a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
i n L i b e r a l p o l i t i c s i n t o a kin d of sulky d i s d a i n ) chose 
not t o exercise the undoubted i n f l u e n c e which he possessed, 
37 
had he cared t o use i t . 
The outcome of the debates i n Commons and Lords was a 
resounding endorsement from Opposition as w e l l as Government 
supporters f o r the new course of entente w i t h France. I t was 
widely j u s t i f i e d i n terms which were gen e r a l l y i m p e r i a l 
r a t h e r than European, and which stressed the d e s i r a b i l i t y 
of removing sources of f r i c t i o n w i t h France r a t h e r than 
b u i l d i n g defences against Germany; nor was the u l t e r i o r 
o b j e c t i v e of an understanding w i t h Russia given any p u b l i c i t y . 
Only Gibson Bowles, the maverick Tory.and to a degree D i l k e , 
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the independent L i b e r a l , noticed the longer-term European 
and balance of power i m p l i c a t i o n s , and t h e i r observations 
d i d not apparently e l i c i t any response at t h a t time. But i f 
t h e i r remarks are read i n conjunction w i t h Grey's ardent 
advocacy of i n c r e a s i n g Anglo-French intimacy, then i t 
appears t h a t the House of Commons was i n a sense a l e r t e d t o 
the f u t u r e i m p l i c a t i o n s of the Agreement. I t p r e f e r r e d , 
however, to remain w i t h the Government's more anodyne 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n s ; and i t may be noted t h a t , i n the absence of 
any i n t e r v e n t i o n by Rosebery, there was no p r i n c i p l e d 
c r i t i c i s m of the u n d e r l y i n g d i r e c t i o n which B r i t i s h p o l i c y 
was not t o take. 
* * * 
CHAPTER THREE 
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BRITAIN, RUSSIA AND THE 'FORWARD POLICY' ; THE CASE 
OF TIBET, 1904 
3.1 The Anglo-Russian R i v a l r y i n Asia t o 1904 
We have now seen t h a t both of the t r e a t i e s which 
d e f i n i t i v e l y ended B r i t a i n ' s period of 'splendid i s o l a t i o n ' , 
the Japanese A l l i a n c e of 1902 and the French entente of 1904, 
were profoundly influenced by the problem of r e l a t i o n s w i t h 
Russia, the greatest t h r e a t t o B r i t a i n ' s i m p e r i a l i n t e r e s t s i n 
Asia. The former was an attempt ( s u c c e s s f u l , as the Japanese 
v i c t o r y i n the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05 demonstrated) 
to f i n d an a l l y to r e s t r i c t the t h r e a t of Russian expansion 
i n China: t h i s imperative was made e x p l i c i t i n the Parliamentary 
debate on the A l l i a n c e . The l a t t e r was both an attempt (again 
successful) t o avoid B r i t a i n being drawn i n t o war against the 
Franco-Russian A l l i a n c e and also (and h o p e f u l l y ) the precursor 
of an improved b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Russia h e r s e l f . 
Though t h i s aspect of the French Agreement of 1904 was not 
recognised i n the debate i n Parliament, i t was an obje c t of 
French diplomacy t o b r i n g B r i t a i n and Russia closer together 
i n an anti-German c o a l i t i o n , j u s t as i t was an object of B r i t i s h 
p o l i c y to end the r i v a l r y w i t h Russia by a comprehensive 
settlement of areas of c o n f l i c t i n Asia - not merely i n China 
(which was l a r g e l y resolved by Japan's v i c t o r y i n 1905), 
but more p a r t i c u l a r l y i n those regions of Central Asia which l a y 
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between the f r o n t i e r s of the Russian and I n d i a n Empires, and 
which included the remote but s t r a t e g i c a l l y s e n s i t i v e region 
of T i b e t . A f t e r a period of prolonged and intense suspicion 
and f r i c t i o n between B r i t a i n and Russia during the Conservative 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , the p r o j e c t e d Russian rapprochement was 
e v e n t u a l l y achieved under the L i b e r a l government of Campbell-
Bannerman, w i t h Grey as Foreign Secretary, i n the Anglo-Russian 
Convention of August 1907.^ 
One of the three areas covered by the agreements of 
1907 was T i b e t , which had been a source of f r i c t i o n between 
B r i t a i n and Russia since the t u r n of the century, and which 
had provoked an acute c r i s i s i n Anglo-Russian r e l a t i o n s at 
the time of the B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y e x p e d i t i o n t o Lhasa, 
commanded by S i r Francis Younghusband, i n 1903-04. The 
Younghusband e x p e d i t i o n provoked the only f o r e i g n p o l i c y 
debate i n the House of Commons during the Conservative 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of 1900-05, which was s e r i o u s l y unwelcome and 
2 
embarrassing t o the Government. 
I t i s not d i f f i c u l t t o account f o r the long delay i n 
achieving a settlement of outstanding questions w i t h Russia, 
which was the u l t i m a t e f o r e i g n p o l i c y ambition of both 
3 
Conservative and L i b e r a l p o l i t i c i a n s . The Anglo-Japanese 
A l l i a n c e had been taken as a t h r e a t and an a f f r o n t by the 
Russian government, and B r i t a i n ' s pro-Japanese o r i e n t a t i o n 
during the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05 confirmed Russia's 
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worst suspicions of B r i t i s h h o s t i l i t y . This antagonism reached 
i t s most acute phase during t h a t war, as a r e s u l t of the Dogger 
Bank a f f a i r of October 1904 ( i n which Russia's B a l t i c f l e e t , 
on i t s way t o the Far East and i t s u l t i m a t e d e s t r u c t i o n at 
the hands of the Japanese i n the b a t t l e of the Tsushima S t r a i t , 
f i r e d upon and sank some vessels of a B r i t i s h f i s h i n g f l e e t 
i n the North Sea). This episode created severe resentment i n 
B r i t i s h p u b l i c and p o l i t i c a l o pinion and brought the two countries 
to the b r i n k of war, which was averted only by the d e l i b e r a t e l y 
r e s t r a i n e d p o l i c y of the Balfour government and by the Russian 
government's r e c o g n i t i o n of i t s f l e e t ' s v u l n e r a b i l i t y t o 
B r i t a i n ' s naval preponderance i n European waters; the French 
were t h e r e f o r e able t o mediate a settlement which avoided 
4 
recourse t o an Anglo-Russian war. But i t was a f u r t h e r obstacle 
to any improvement i n Anglo-Russian r e l a t i o n s so long as the 
war i n the Far East continued, and before i t s conclusion i n the 
Peace of Portsmouth of 5 September 1905 (the r e s u l t of American 
r a t h e r than B r i t i s h mediation and pressure)."* The outbreak of 
r e v o l u t i o n i n Russia precluded f o r the time being any substantive 
d i p l o m a t i c discussions between the two governments. I t was not 
u n t i l May 1906, when the new L i b e r a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n had been 
i n o f f i c e i n B r i t a i n f o r almost s i x months and a new Ambassador, 
Sir A r t h u r Nicolson, was despatched t o St. Petersburg, t h a t 
the time was judged t o be r i p e f o r an attempt t o reach a 
settlement w i t h Russia.^ I t was t h e r e f o r e not the Tibetan c r i s i s 
of 1904 alone which was responsible f o r the problems i n Anglo-
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Russian r e l a t i o n s , and which delayed the movement towards 
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n which bore f r u i t i n 1907; but the Tibetan 
question was one of the three important matters d e a l t w i t h 
i n the Anglo-Russian Convention of t h a t year, the terms i n 
which i t was d e a l t w i t h were very much i n f l u e n c e d by the 
c r i s i s provoked by Younghusband's mission, and the terms i n 
which the Tibetan Convention was concluded d i d e v i d e n t l y 
owe a good deal to the manner i n which Parliament, the 
L i b e r a l Opposition, and even to a degree the Conservative 
Government i t s e l f , had viewed the Tibetan question as i t 
was manifested i n the a f f a i r of the mission. I t was p a r t l y 
the d e s ire t o avoid a d d i t i o n a l causes of f r i c t i o n w i t h Russia, 
but also a r e a c t i o n against the 'forward p o l i c y ' (the a s p i r a t i o n 
toward f u r t h e r and c o n t i n u a l expansion of the f r o n t i e r s of 
the I n d i a n Empire at the expense of i t s weaker neighbours) 
which informed the Parliamentary debate. 
The debate on Tibetan p o l i c y , which took place i n the 
House of Commons on 13th A p r i l 1904 on a government motion 
r e l a t i n g t o the East I n d i a revenues, although i t d i d not cover 
the whole f i e l d of Anglo-Russian r e l a t i o n s i n Asia was, 
nevertheless, f u l l of i n t e r e s t i n g i n s i g h t s i n t o t h e i r s t a t e 
i n the d i f f i c u l t months f o l l o w i n g the outbreak of the Russo-
Japanese War of 1904-05. I t w i l l here be necessary t o review 
b r i e f l y the animosity which was c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of Anglo-Russian 
r e l a t i o n s i n the l a t e Nineteenth and e a r l y Twentieth c e n t u r i e s . ^ 
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I n Asia, i t was the inexorable advance of the f r o n t i e r s of 
the Russian Empire i n Central Asia towards the f r o n t i e r s of 
B r i t i s h I n d i a which appeared to the B r i t i s h to pose a serious 
t h r e a t to t h e i r s e c u r i t y i n I n d i a , despite the p r o t e c t i o n of 
the towering mountains which guarded Ind i a ' s f r o n t i e r s , and 
despite the long and d i f f i c u l t march which any advancing Russian 
army would have to make before i t could become a r e a l menace. 
I n Europe, i t was the long-standing Russian ambition to secure 
c o n t r o l of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, and thus gain 
access by sea t o the Eastern Mediterranean which was most 
th r e a t e n i n g t o B r i t i s h s e c u r i t y . This problem had already l e d 
B r i t a i n t o go t o war against Russia i n 1854, and to take the 
leading r o l e i n c u r t a i l i n g Russian ambitions at the Congress 
of B e r l i n i n 1878. A f t e r t h a t check, the Russians concentrated 
most of t h e i r energies on f u r t h e r expansion i n Asia, leading t o 
i n c r e a s i n g t e n s i o n and occasional c r i s e s i n the r e l a t i o n s 
between the two great i m p e r i a l powers during the 1880s and 
the 1890s. The Russian advance i n Cen t r a l Asia l e d B r i t i s h 
policy-makers t o f e e l great alarm about the s e c u r i t y of I n d i a , 
and t o seek ways of checking any f u r t h e r expansion. I t was 
p a r t l y the d i f f i c u l t y of checking Russian expansion i n Asia 
w i t h o u t a l l i e s i n Europe which l e d B r i t i s h statesmen such as 
Chamberlain to question the c o n t i n u i n g v a l i d i t y of the p o l i c y 
of i s o l a t i o n ; on the other hand, a d i r e c t understanding w i t h 
Russia became correspondingly more a t t r a c t i v e t o those such as 
Sa l i s b u r y , and l a t e r Grey, who were determined t o avoid B r i t a i n 
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becoming too dependent on the patronage of Germany; from the 
l a t e 1890s onwards, Germany was already emerging both as a 
c o l o n i a l r i v a l i n A f r i c a and i n the P a c i f i c , and as a growing 
naval power i n European waters (a subject t o which we s h a l l 
of course have to r e t u r n i n a l a t e r c h a p t e r ) . The n a t u r a l 
a l t e r n a t i v e to the p o l i c y of a l l i a n c e w i t h Germany was the 
settlement of causes of f r i c t i o n w i t h Germany's European 
opponents, France and Russia. The e f f o r t s of Salisbury's 
Conservative government from 1895 onwards to r e s t o r e B r i t a i n ' s 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o s i t i o n may be seen t o have reached t h e i r 
c u l m i n a t i o n i n the French entente of 1904, but above a l l i n 
the Russian Convention of 1907, concluded by t h e i r L i b e r a l 
successors. Among the milestones along the route t o the 1907 
Convention may be mentioned the Anglo-Russian agreement on China 
and Korea signed i n St. Petersburg on 28 A p r i l 1899; under the 
terms of t h i s agreement, both sides renounced any i n t e n t i o n of 
i n f r i n g i n g the sovereign r i g h t s of China i n regard t o r a i l w a y 
development: a r e n u n c i a t i o n e v i d e n t l y more sincere on the 
p a r t of the B r i t i s h than of the Russians, but c l e a r evidence of 
the e v o l u t i o n away from the p o l i c y of s t r i c t i s o l a t i o n t a k i n g 
place i n the l a t e years of Salisbury's a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . That 
sense of i s o l a t i o n was much heightened by the c r i s i s i n B r i t a i n ' s 
r e l a t i o n s w i t h other European powers, n o t a b l y Russia, occasioned 
by the Boer War of 1899-1902, which enabled the Russians to 
g 
improve t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n Persia u n i l a t e r a l l y . 
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Persia was w i t h o u t doubt the primary area of Anglo-
Russian r i v a l r y along w i t h the Central Asian areas around 
Afghanistan and T i b e t . Russian a c t i v i t y i n northern Persia 
made great progress d u r i n g the l a t e 1890s and the e a r l y 1900s, 
and began even to t h r e a t e n the t r a d i t i o n a l supremacy of B r i t a i n 
i n southern Persia and the region of the Persian Gulf (the 
conventional terminology used by the B r i t i s h to r e f e r to the 
Gulf i n t h i s p e r i o d ) . So acute d i d a n x i e t y on t h i s score 
become t h a t the B r i t i s h government f e l t i t necessary to warn 
the Russians t h a t B r i t a i n would not assent to t h e i r p e n e t r a t i o n 
to the shores of the Gulf, and t h a t i f Persia were put under 
i n t o l e r a b l e pressure to make concessions t o Russia i n the south, 
B r i t a i n would not h e s i t a t e to abandon her t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i c y 
of support f o r the independence and i n t e g r i t y of Persia, and 
would take any necessary counteraction i n the Gulf. The 
s i t u a t i o n i n the Gulf was by t h i s time f u r t h e r complicated by 
the prospect t h a t the German p r o j e c t f o r a r a i l w a y to Baghdad, 
w i t h a probable extension t o the head of the Persian Gulf at 
Kuwait, was l i k e l y t o be r e a l i s e d w i t h the e n t h u s i a s t i c approval 
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of the Ottoman government. 
Even before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, the 
Dogger Bank a f f a i r , and the Younghusband e x p e d i t i o n to Lhasa, 
t h e r e f o r e , r e l a t i o n s between B r i t a i n and Russia were s t r a i n e d 
across the whole area of t h e i r r i v a l r y , but above a l l i n those 
areas which were regarded by the B r i t i s h as being s t r a t e g i c a l l y 
s e n s i t i v e to the defence of I n d i a . I t was u l t i m a t e l y mediation 
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between Russia and B r i t a i n by the French which was to prove 
e f f e c t i v e i n promoting the r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of the two great 
i m p e r i a l r i v a l s i n Asia. At the end of October 1903, the 
Russian f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r , Count Lambsdorff, v i s i t e d Paris and 
held t a l k s w i t h h i s French counterpart, Delcasse. Lansdowne 
had already had discussions w i t h the French ambassador i n London, 
Cambon, about the problems i n Anglo-Russian r e l a t i o n s , and 
had sought t o e n l i s t French assistance i n persuading the Russians 
to take a more c o n s t r u c t i v e p o s i t i o n . At t h i s stage the 
Russians, s t i l l expecting to achieve great gains i n the Far 
East w i t h o u t having t o make s i g n i f i c a n t concessions t o the 
Japanese or t o t h e i r B r i t i s h a l l i e s , were u n w i l l i n g t o enter 
i n t o serious n e g o t i a t i o n s , and the e s c a l a t i n g c o n f r o n t a t i o n 
between Russia and Japan over Manchuria and Korea n a t u r a l l y 
made Anglo-Russian r e l a t i o n s i n c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t . By the 
beginning of 1904, w i t h war between Japan and Russia i n c r e a s i n g l y 
probable, the prospect of c o n s t r u c t i v e n e g o t i a t i o n s between 
London and St. Petersburg had f o r the time being disappeared. 
The outbreak of war between Russia atid Japan on 9 February 1904 
only completed the process whereby improved r e l a t i o n s between 
B r i t a i n and Russia were f r u s t r a t e d by the ambitions of Russia 
and the i n a b i l i t y of the B r i t i s h t o o f f e r her any s u f f i c i e n t 
c o n c e s s i o n s . ^ Even so, contact was maintained, as f o r instance 
i n the f r i e n d l y conversation which Edward V I I held w i t h the 
Russian M i n i s t e r i n Copenhagen on 14 A p r i l 1904; f u t u r e events 
were t o make t h i s more s i g n i f i c a n t than i t might otherwise have 
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been, since the Russian M i n i s t e r was Alexander I s v o l s k y , who 
was to become Russia's f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r a f t e r the 1905 
r e v o l u t i o n and who was t o be, w i t h Grey, the main a r c h i t e c t 
of the Convention of 1907.^* I n a d d i t i o n , and a f t e r the 
conclusion of the Anglo-French entente, the French continued 
to work f o r an Anglo-Russian rapprochement and to prevent the 
f r i c t i o n s of the Russo-Japanese war ( p a r t i c u l a r l y the Dogger 
Bank c r i s i s ) from producing an irremediable rupture i n 
r e l a t i o n s . Even though he had himself been d r i v e n from o f f i c e 
by the time the n e g o t i a t i o n s between Grey and I s v o l s k y got 
underway i n the s p r i n g of 1906, they were a r e a l success f o r 
the p a t i e n t diplomacy of the French f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r , Delcasse. 
There was no lack of w i l l i n g n e s s on the p a r t of the Conservatives 
dur i n g the d e c l i n i n g months of t h e i r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t o explore 
the prospects of an understanding w i t h a Russian government 
chastened by i t s defeat a t the hands of Japan. A f t e r the renewal 
of B r i t a i n ' s a l l i a n c e w i t h Japan, and the r e s t o r a t i o n of peace 
between Russia and Japan, the French found a ready response to 
t h e i r probings on an Anglo-Russian accord i n London. The 
movement towards the n e g o t i a t i o n s which f i n a l l y produced the 
agreements of August 1907 may be dated from 3rd October 1905, 
when the Russian ambassador sounded out the Conservative f o r e i g n 
s e c r e t a r y , Lansdowne, about the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of an improvement 
12 
i n Anglo-Russian r e l a t i o n s . 
I n Anglo-Russian r e l a t i o n s there was, t h e r e f o r e , much 
reason f o r h o s t i l i t y but also the p o s s i b i l i t y of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i f the Russians were prepared to moderate t h e i r 
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expansionist ambitions i n Central Asia i n r e t u r n f o r reaching 
a wider understanding w i t h B r i t a i n which would be i n the power-
p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s of both empires. The question of Tibet 
i n 1904 o f f e r s a good example of both tendencies, and a c l e a r 
demonstration of B r i t a i n ' s w i l l i n g n e s s to subordinate i m p e r i a l 
ambitions f o r the sake of s t a b i l i t y on the f r o n t i e r s of empire. 
3 .2 The Tibetan Question and the Younghusband Expedition 
From at l e a s t 1900 onwards there had been p e r s i s t e n t and 
apparently w e l l - s u b s t a n t i a t e d rumours of Russian i n t r i g u e i n 
T i b e t , which r a i s e d the prospect i n the minds of the B r i t i s h of 
a Russian p r o t e c t o r a t e on India's north-east f r o n t i e r , j u s t 
beyond the c l i e n t s tates of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan; and w i t h 
the a b i l i t y to threaten the s t a b i l i t y of t h a t f r o n t i e r through 
the s t r a t e g i c a l l y s e n s i t i v e southern e x t r e m i t y of T i b e t , the 
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Chumbi V a l l e y . The Viceroy of I n d i a , Lord Curzon, was 
determined to f r u s t r a t e what he saw as a Russian forward p o l i c y 
on I n d i a ' s north-east f r o n t i e r , and i n January 1903 he was 
recommending to the I n d i a O f f i c e i n London t h a t a mission should 
be despatched to Lhasa which would impose agreement on the 
Tibetans over a whole range of questions, i n c l u d i n g the f a i l u r e 
of Tibet t o implement previous agreements on f r o n t i e r questions, 
and would r e g u l a t e the f u t u r e r e l a t i o n s of Tibet w i t h I n d i a i n a 
sense favourable to I n d i a n i n t e r e s t s and the extension of I n d i a n 
i n f l u e n c e . The mission he proposed was t o be accompanied by an 
a p p r o p r i a t e m i l i t a r y f o r c e , and i t would be able t o convince the 
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Tibetans t h a t they could not play Russia o f f against B r i t a i n but 
must abandon t h a t attempt and come to a closer understanding w i t h 
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B r i t a i n . The Cabinet i n London was not disposed to allow 
Curzon t o adopt a forward p o l i c y of h i s own i n order to meet 
the forward p o l i c y of Russia i n T i b e t , and would not sanction a 
m i l i t a r y mission. But i t accepted t h a t n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h Tibet 
on the f r o n t i e r question and on trade r e l a t i o n s were necessary 
i n themselves, and so sanctioned the sending of a di p l o m a t i c 
mission l e d by Francis Younghusband (an o f f i c e r i n the Ind i a n 
army whose vigorous espousal of the forward p o l i c y had a t t r a c t e d 
Curzon's n o t i c e ) ; the mission was to advance no f u r t h e r i n t o 
T i b e t than was necessary to make di p l o m a t i c contact w i t h the 
Tibetan n e g o t i a t o r s . I t was the f a i l u r e of t h i s d i p l o m a t i c 
mission t o f i n d any competent a u t h o r i t y w i t h which i t could 
n e g o t i a t e which (as Curzon had e v i d e n t l y expected and intended) 
r e q u i r e d i t t o advance deeper and deeper i n t o T i b e t , f i r s t of 
a l l to Gyangtse, and u l t i m a t e l y t o Lhasa i t s e l f ; and which also 
l e d to i t s being given a m i l i t a r y escort f o r i t s p r o t e c t i o n . 
Even when the B r i t i s h government found i t s e l f i n the p o s i t i o n 
of having a f t e r a l l t o agree to what had i n e f f e c t become a 
m i l i t a r y e x p e d i t i o n , i t s t i l l sought t o maintain the f i c t i o n of 
i t s p u rely peaceful character f o r i t s own parliamentary reasons. 
There were two reasons f o r t h i s , one general and one p a r t i c u l a r . 
The general one was t h a t the Conservative government seems to 
have been genuine i n i t s reluctance to embark on another i m p e r i a l 
adventure a t Curzon's behest, so soon a f t e r the t r o u b l e s brought 
on i t by the South A f r i c a n war i n t o which i t had entered at the 
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behest of another great i m p e r i a l pro-consul, Lord M i l n e r . 
I t was genuinely concerned to minimise the importance of the 
mission, and to avoid the p r o t e s t s which would f o l l o w i n the 
press and i n the House of Commons i f the mission l e d t o war. 
At a place c a l l e d Guru i n T i b e t , on 31 March 1904, the w e l l 
armed, though h e a v i l y outnumbered,Younghusband mission fought 
a b a t t l e w i t h a large Tibetan f o r c e , l e a v i n g seven hundred 
Tibetans dead; once news of t h i s engagement reached the B r i t i s h 
press, there could no longer be any hope of concealing the 
m i l i t a r y character of the mission, and the a g i t a t i o n i n the 
B r i t i s h press became more i n t e n s e . ^ 
The other reason, and a more p a r t i c u l a r one, was t h a t the 
m i s s i o n ^ i f acknowledged to be a m i l i t a r y e n t e r p r i s e , would be i n 
cl e a r v i o l a t i o n of the Government of I n d i a Act of 1858 which, i n 
paragraphs 54 and 55, p r o h i b i t e d the use of I n d i a n forces beyond 
the f r o n t i e r s of I n d i a without the House of Commons having 
approved the expenditure. During the e a r l y week of the session 
of 1904 a number of backbenchers, i n c l u d i n g the government's 
own supporters such as Thomas Gibson Bowles, as w e l l as the 
more p r e d i c t a b l e L i b e r a l s and Radicals, had produced a stream 
of embarrassing parliamentary questions on t h i s aspect of the 
mission, and there had been some warning sounds even i n the 
House of L o r d s . ^ Once i t admitted t h a t the mission was a 
m i l i t a r y one, the government would have to seek Parliament's 
approval under the terms of the Government of I n d i a Act, and 
i t s attempts t o avoid the embarrassment of a debate i n the House 
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Commons would f a i l . On 13 A p r i l 1904, the secretary of s t a t e 
f o r I n d i a , B r o d r i c k , wrote to i n f o r m Curzon t h a t a number of 
Conservative backbenchers had threatened t o vote against the 
government unless i t was able t o s a t i s f y the House t h a t the 
p o l i c y on Tibet had not changed from the previous November, when 
i t s p a c i f i c p o l i c y had been p u b l i c l y emphasised.^ The slaughter 
at Guru thus had the e f f e c t of compelling a r e l u c t a n t Cabinet 
to concede a debate on T i b e t , and t o emphasise t h a t there was no 
i n t e n t i o n of annexing any t e r r i t o r y or of e s t a b l i s h i n g any k i n d 
of permanent r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t h e r e . On 13 A p r i l 1904, Bro d r i c k 
moved f o r the government: 
That t h i s House consents t o the revenues of 
I n d i a being a p p l i e d t o defray the expenses 
of any m i l i t a r y operations which have or may 
become necessary beyond the f r o n t i e r s of His 
Majesty's I n d i a n Possessions, f o r the purposes 
of p r o t e c t i n g the P o l i t i c a l Mission which has 
been despatched to the Tibetan Government. 
18 
F u l l debate then f i n a l l y ensued. 
3.3 The Debate 'East I n d i a Revenues ( T i b e t ) ' , 13 A p r i l 1904 
As we have seen, t h i s debate ( l i k e t h a t on the B i l l g i v i n g 
e f f e c t t o the Anglo-French Convention which was s h o r t l y to 
f o l l o w i t , but u n l i k e t h a t on the Anglo-Japanese a l l i a n c e ) was 
held i n government time and on a government motion, because the 
r i g h t of Parliament t o assent t o expenditure was i n v o l v e d , and 
indeed i n t h i s case enshrined i n s t a t u t e , the Government of 
I n d i a Act of 1858. The Secretary of State f o r I n d i a , St. John 
Bro d r i c k , i n i n t r o d u c i n g h i s motion, had a number of unhappy 
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tasks of which perhaps the most d i f f i c u l t was t o defend the 
Viceroy Lord Curzon from the widely held and widely expressed 
accusation t h a t he was an exponent of the forward p o l i c y who 
had i n t r i g u e d t o involve B r i t a i n i n a b l a t a n t example of i t i n 
T i b e t . He had also to seek to minimise the p o l i c y d i f f e r e n c e s 
between the B r i t i s h government and Curzon, and to i n s i s t t h a t 
he and h i s colleagues approved of the mission ( i n c l u d i n g i t s 
advance deeper i n t o Tibet under the p r o t e c t i o n of a m i l i t a r y 
e s c o r t ) , w h i l e Curzon was f u l l y and indeed e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y i n 
support of the r e s t r i c t e d d e f i n i t i o n of the mission's s t a t e d 
o b j e c t i v e s as expessed i n the celebrated telegram of 6 November 
1903, which had been published i n the Blue Book on Ti b e t issued 
by the government a few weeks p r e v i o u s l y , i n response t o the 
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a g i t a t i o n i n press and Parliament. He seems t o have succeeded 
b e t t e r i n the former than i n the l a t t e r o b j e c t i v e , s t r e s s i n g 
t h a t any d i p l o m a t i c mission i n those w i l d regions had t o be 
accompanied by a force f o r i t s p r o t e c t i o n , and p r a i s i n g the 
wise and p a c i f i c p o l i c i e s of Curzon. He stressed t h a t the 
d e c i s i o n t o a l l o w the mission t o advance i n t o T i b e t was taken 
only a f t e r the patience and diplomacy of Younghusband and the 
I n d i a n government had been exhausted by the evasive t a c t i c s of the 
Tibetans (who i n e f f e c t refused t o appear), and also as the 
c u l m i n a t i o n of a long period of v i o l a t i o n s by T i b e t of Agreements 
S 
such as t h a t of 1890, which was suppded t o demarcate the 
f r o n t i e r between Tibet and Sikkim. At the same time, observed 
Br o d r i c k , the Tibetans had been pursuing closer r e l a t i o n s w i t h 
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Russia as a counterweight t o B r i t a i n , and thus i n c r e a s i n g the 
danger of a Russian presence on the I n d i a n f r o n t i e r . The 
I n d i a n government could not acquiesce i n any change i n the 
p o l i t i c a l s t a t u s quo i n T i b e t , and the despatch of the 
mission t o ensure a r e s o l u t i o n of these problems had become 
a necessity; the s e c u r i t y of I n d i a n r e q u i r e d t h a t no e x t e r n a l 
power other than B r i t i s h I n d i a should c o n t r o l T i b e t , and the 
Tibetans had to be brought to recognise B r i t i s h ascendancy 
and to r e g u l a t e t h e i r r e l a t i o n s w i t h B r i t a i n accordingly. 
Brodrick then moved the adoption of the r e s o l u t i o n standing 
i n h i s name, and sat down.^ 
He was supported l a t e r i n the debate by h i s predecessor 
at the I n d i a O f f i c e , Lord George Hamilton, who i n a more 
e f f e c t i v e speech than Brodrick's also dwelt on the long and 
p a t i e n t e f f o r t s of the I n d i a n government t o get Tibet t o 
implement the Convention of 1890, adding t h a t : 
... w h i l e I was at the I n d i a O f f i c e [between 
1895 and 1902] I t h i n k we perhaps erred on the 
side of patience and forbearance. 
He also stressed the danger to B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s of a Russian 
presence i n T i b e t , and the d i f f i c u l t y of p l a c i n g r e l i a n c e on 
the assurances o f f e r e d by Russian diplomats: 
I t i s easy enough f o r a great country l i k e Russia 
to undertake not t o h o i s t her f l a g ; but i f one of 
her o f f i c i a l s does h o i s t i t , i t becomes very d i f f i c u l t 
to remove i t ; and, i f the Russians d i d not do so, the 
Tibetans would suppose they had the support of the 
whole power of Russia.21 
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The r i n g i n g endorsement t h a t the government adhered to the 
p o l i c y of the telegram of 6 November 1903 ( t h a t there would 
be no annexation of Tibet or Tibetan t e r r i t o r y , no m i l i t a r y 
occupation, and no permanent d i p l o m a t i c r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n s t a l l e d ) 
was l e f t to the t h i r d o f f i c i a l spokesman f o r the government, the 
Prime M i n i s t e r himself. Closing the debate f o r the p r o p o s i t i o n , 
he c r i t i c i s e d the Opposition ( t o whose arguments we s h a l l 
t u r n s h o r t l y ) f o r minimising the causes t h a t had l e g i t i m a t e l y 
e n t i t l e d B r i t a i n t o send the Younghusband mission i n t o T i b e t , 
and f o r being u n s u i t a b l y s c e p t i c a l about the nature of Russian 
i n t r i g u e s there: 
I t must be d i s t i n c t l y understood t h a t i f T i b e t 
were, by any unhappy accident, t o become the centre 
f o r i n t r i g u e and i n f l u e n c e of any power other than 
T i b e t , our d i f f i c u l t i e s and our r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s 
would not be diminished, but g r e a t l y increased by 
l e a v i n g Tibet alone. 
Like h i s colleagues, he paid fulsome t r i b u t e t o Curzon, but on 
the other hand, h i s references t o the celebrated telegram must have 
extinguished any hopes t h a t Curzon and the advocates of the forward 
p o l i c y may s t i l l have e n t e r t a i n e d t h a t the government could be 
won over to any advance of i m p e r i a l c o n t r o l i n the d i r e c t i o n of 
T i b e t : 
The telegram of the 6th November 1903, which does 
not stand alone i n the Blue Book as representing the 
views of His Majesty's Government, but merely repeats, 
i n very precise terms, the general p o l i c y of His 
Majesty's Government i n d i c a t e d throughout the whole 
[ o f the Blue Book] - t h a t telegram was most c a r e f u l l y 
considered by the Cabinet before i t was sent. I t 
represented a p o l i c y - not merely a departmental of 
the Secretary of State [ f o r I n d i a ] i n Council, but i t 
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also represented the c a r e f u l l y thought out views 
of the Government. I t represented those views 
on 6th November 1903; i t represents those views 
i n A p r i l 1904. No change whatever has occurred; 
and I do not t h i n k t h a t any change i s l i k e l y to 
occur ... We do not want to add any f u r t h e r 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s t o the d i f f i c u l t i e s which are 
c o n s t a n t l y weighing upon the statesmen who have 
i n t h e i r charge the d e s t i n i e s of our Eastern 
Empire. ^2 
This d e c l a r a t i o n , which c l e a r l y represents the Balfour m i n i s t r y ' s 
formal r e j e c t i o n i n p u b l i c of Curzon's forward p o l i c y (however 
much i t was accompanied by praise f o r h i s noble services to 
I n d i a ) , was q u i t e s u f f i c i e n t t o r a l l y the government's own 
supporters to vote f o r the motion: although there had been some 
backbench Conservative c r i t i c i s m i n the debate, there were no 
Conservative votes cast i n the d i v i s i o n against the government. 
Indeed, a small number of L i b e r a l s , i n c l u d i n g the redoubtable 
S i r Charles D i l k e , voted w i t h the government, while the great 
m a j o r i t y of the L i b e r a l s followed t h e i r Party leaders i n 
a b s t a i n i n g . I n a sense then the debate turned i n t o a triumph 
f o r the government, to such an extent t h a t one may l e g i t i m a t e l y 
wonder why they had sought to avoid the debate f o r so many weeks; 
though of course, i n s p i t e of a l l p r o t e s t a t i o n s , i t d i d serve t o 
make c l e a r the r i f t on p o l i c y between Curzon and Balfour. However 
t h a t may be, the House voted 270 i n favour of the government, and 
only 61 against, these i n c l u d i n g , as The Times remarked s a r c a s t i c a l l y , 
'a handful of l i t t l e Englanders' going i n t o the lobby w i t h the 
23 
p r e d i c t a b l y d i s s i d e n t I r i s h N a t i o n a l i s t members. 
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However, before t h i s happy outcome f o r the o r a t o r i c a l 
p r e s e n t a t i o n of the Prime M i n i s t e r , there had been some 
t e l l i n g c r i t i c i s m s of h i s p o l i c y from h i s own back benches, 
as w e l l as from the Opposition, and i t i s to the case against 
the government t h a t we must now t u r n . Campbell-Bannerman 
o f f e r e d a reasoned and on the whole temperate c r i t i c i s m of 
the government's whole p o l i c y towards T i b e t , arguing t h a t 
i t was unduly a l a r m i s t , t h a t i t magnified the importance of 
the admitted f r o n t i e r v i o l a t i o n s , and t h a t i t had allowed 
i t s e l f to be p u l l e d too f a r i n the d i r e c t i o n of the forward 
p o l i c y by the exaggerations of Curzon. His sharpest remark 
was d i r e c t e d a t the hapless B r o d r i c k , whom he accused of 
f a i l i n g to s a t i s f y the House by h i s omission of any s u f f i c i e n t l y 
convincing endorsement of the 6 November telegram. On the other 
hand, he gave a h i n t even so e a r l y i n the debate of h i s pa r t y ' s 
i n t e n t i o n t o ab s t a i n , and thus t o give t a c i t endorsement t o the 
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Younghusband mission. I t may be r e c a l l e d t h a t Campbell-Bannerman 
was not and never had pretended t o be an expert i n f o r e i g n 
a f f a i r s (and i t i s s t r i k i n g t h a t the L i b e r a l s ' acknowledged 
expert i n the Commons, S i r Edward Grey, a convinced L i b e r a l 
I m p e r i a l i s t , d i d not c o n t r i b u t e t o the debate; and since the 
d i v i s i o n l i s t s do not record abstentions we cannot t e l l from 
Hansard whether he was present or whether he had d i p l o m a t i c a l l y 
absented h i m s e l f ) ; but Campbell-Bannerman had been Secretary of 
State f o r War under Gladstone and Rosebery (1892-1895) and would 
be w e l l aware of the p r a c t i c a l i m p o s s i b i l i t y of t r y i n g to disavow 
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a m i l i t a r y mission once B r i t i s h troops had been committed and 
had indeed come under f i r e . More vigorous denunciations of 
the p o l i c y of the mission came from the L i b e r a l backbenches. 
The f i r s t backbencher to be c a l l e d to speak a f t e r the 
front-bench spokesmen f o r government and Opposition had f i n i s h e d 
was Thomas Lough. The Speaker had c l e a r l y made an appropriate 
choice here, since Lough was a prominent leader of the p u b l i c 
a g i t a t i o n against the mission which had preceded the debate, 
so he was an a l l y of the c h i e f press campaigner S i r Henry Cotton, 
and i t was known t h a t the debate had i n f a c t been p r e c i p i t a t e d 
by the news t h a t he proposed to move the adjournment on a 
matter of urgent p u b l i c business and r a i s e the Tibetan question, 
25 
i f the government d i d not i t s e l f b r i n g forward a motion. 
Lough, a r a d i c a l L i b e r a l , denounced the slaughter at Guru and 
demanded assurances t h a t the government was s t i l l bound by the 
telegram of 6 November 1903 (since so f a r B r o d r i c k and Hamilton 
had f a i l e d to give them). He c r i t i c i s e d the f a i l u r e s of both 
B r i t i s h and I n d i a n governments to view the border disputes and 
the d i f f i c u l t i e s about trade from a Tibetan p o i n t of view, and he 
attacked the idea t h a t there was anything t h r e a t e n i n g to B r i t i s h 
i n t e r e s t s i n the contacts between Russia and T i b e t , which he 
maintained were of a p u r e l y r e l i g i o u s character ( r e l a t i n g t o the 
a f f a i r s of Buddhist communities i n Russia). I n conclusion he 
v i g o r o u s l y condemned the ' m i l i t a r y character' of B r i t a i n ' s 26 Tibetan e n t e r p r i s e and i n s i s t e d on c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the p o l i c y . 
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A f t e r a b r i e f and u n i n t e r e s t i n g c o n t r i b u t i o n from a Conservative 
backbencher, E.R.P. Moon, who merely repeated the o f f i c i a l l i n e 
of h i s leaders, another Radical L i b e r a l , Charles Trevelyan, 
denounced the government from the back benches and developed 
the most s i g n i f i c a n t argument of the whole debate. He complained 
of the way i n which the government had mistreated the House and 
trampled on i t s r i g h t s before the Easter recess. He maintained 
t h a t the government had d e l i b e r a t e l y evaded i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
duty t o seek Parliament's approval f o r 'any m i l i t a r y e x p e d i t i o n 
outside the f r o n t i e r s of I n d i a ' : 
Here the p o l i c y had been d e l i b e r a t e l y decided 
upon; Parliament was a c t u a l l y s i t t i n g , and f o r 
weeks and months the m i l i t a r y e x p e d i t i o n was 
w a i t i n g t o advance i n t o T i b e t . The only t h i n g 
t h a t was s a i d was t h a t i t was a p o l i t i c a l mission, 
but i t was accompanied by an armed f o r c e of 1,000 
or 2,000 men ... Obviously the e x p e d i t i o n was a 
m i l i t a r y e x p e d i t i o n and i t was p l a y i n g w i t h words 
to c a l l i t a p o l i t i c a l mission, and i t was not 
t r e a t i n g the House i n a proper way to preclude 
them from discussing the reasons f o r t h i s 
e x p e d i t i o n before i t was entered upon. 
He had already observed t h a t by these proceedings the government 
had e f f e c t i v e l y deprived the House of i t s r i g h t s ! 
However much the House might object to t h i s 
mission i t s power over i t had been a l t o g e t h e r 
n u l l i f i e d . I t was impossible now t o t u r n the 
mission back, and a l l the House could do was t o 
r a i s e i t s p r o t e s t ; i t could do nothing t o cure 
the past and exercise very l i t t l e i n f l u e n c e over 
the f u t u r e . 
The r e s t of Trevelyan's impassioned speech was more conventional, 
very much along the l i n e s of Lough's remarks. I t may be noted 
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t h a t not even an advanced young L i b e r a l l i k e Trevelyan was 
prepared to repudiate a B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y force once i t had gone 
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i n t o a c t i o n . 
The view t h a t the government had indeed acted 
u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y and i n defiance of the established r i g h t s 
of Parliament was supported by the only other speaker from the 
Conservative backbenches, Thomas Gibson Bowles. This was less 
s u r p r i s i n g than i t may seem a t f i r s t . Gibson Bowles was of 
independent s p i r i t , and u n l i k e l y to secure o f f i c e i n a 
Conservative Cabinet because of h i s i l l e g i t i m a t e b i r t h and 
maverick temperament; he had been prominent i n using Parliamentary 
questions to f o r c e the government to p u b l i s h papers and hold 
a debate, and t h i s was not the f i r s t nor would i t be the l a s t 
occasion on which he put h i s p r i n c i p l e s above h i s p a r t y . We 
have already seen i n the l a s t chapter t h a t he would make a 
s t r i k i n g l y independent c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the debate on the Anglo-
French entente on 1 June 1904; he had already campaigned v i g o r o u s l y 
against the government i n the House of Commons and i n the 
press over the defence of G i b r a l t a r (which he held to be 
wholly inadequate); and e v e n t u a l l y he l e f t h i s p a r t y and 
a c t u a l l y stood against i t s leader i n a b y - e l e c t i o n i n 1906 
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on the issue of f r e e trade. He was perhaps t h e r e f o r e a p r e d i c t a b l e 
c r i t i c , and e v i d e n t l y h i s speech d i d not (and indeed was not 
meant t o ) persuade any Conservatives t o vote against Brodrick's 
motion, and indeed a f t e r Balfour's r e a f f i r m a t i o n of the p o l i c y of 
the telegram of November 1903, he himself voted i n the government 
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lobby. He was nevertheless a f o r c e f u l c r i t i c and d i d as 
much as any of the L i b e r a l speakers to e l i c i t Balfour's 
c r u c i a l statement. He would have none of Brodrick's c o n t e n t i o n 
t h a t the mission was a peaceful and p o l i t i c a l one: 
The e x p e d i t i o n had never been anything else 
than a m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n ; i t was an armed 
e n t r y i n t o a f r i e n d l y s t a t e w i t h o u t the consent 
and agaisnt the desire of t h a t s t a t e . I t was 
n e c e s s a r i l y and i n e v i t a b l y a m i l i t a r y occupation; 
according to the Blue Book i t was c l e a r l y 
recognised as such, and resistance was not 
only t o be expected, but was a c t u a l l y announced 
to have taken place as f a r back as October l a s t . 
Therefore, i t was i n i t s beginning, i t had 
continued t o be, and i t s t i l l was, a m i l i t a r y 
o p e r a t i o n beyond the f r o n t i e r s of I n d i a . This 
was not the f i r s t time the question of l e g a l i t y 
had been r a i s e d i n regard to t h i s s u b j e c t . He 
was aware [from advice c i t e d by B r o d r i c k ] t h a t 
i t had been held by a l e g a l a u t h o r i t y - who was 
probably i n s t r u c t e d by the person d e s i r i n g the 
advice - t h a t a subsequent consent of the House 
of Parliament was a l l t h a t was r e q u i r e d but t h a t , 
i n h i s o p i n i o n , made nonsense of the Act of 
Parliament. He g r e a t l y r e g r e t t e d t h a t the 
Government had not thought f i t at an e a r l i e r 
p e r i o d t o ask f o r the consent r e q u i r e d by the 
I n d i a Government Act of 1858, and t h a t they 
should have awaited the a c t i o n or massacre at 
Guru before applying f o r t h a t sanction. 
He held up to a degree of r i d i c u l e the fears of Russian p e n e t r a t i o n 
of T i b e t , and declared t h a t Asia was s u r e l y l a r g e enough f o r both 
B r i t a i n and Russia. He warned the government against a l l o w i n g 
i t s e l f t o be stampeded by Curzon's zeal f o r the forward p o l i c y 
I n t o s t a t i o n i n g a permanent di p l o m a t i c r e p r e s e n t a t i v e and ended 
w i t h what was i n e f f e c t a v e i l e d warning to B a l f o u r , t h a t so long 
as Balfour could r e a f f i r m the telegram of 6 November 1903, and 
assure the House t h a t there would be no annexation and no r e s i d e n t 
29 i n T i b e t , there would be no backbench Conservative r e v o l t . 
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A f t e r these Tory pyrotechnics, the speech of the L i b e r a l 
frontbench spokesman who wound up f o r the Opposition was f a i r l y 
tame, though even so more f o r t h r i g h t than Campbell-Bannerman 
had been; he d i d r e i t e r a t e the c r u c i a l demand of the House, t h a t 
the Prime M i n i s t e r should r e a f f i r m the p o l i c y of the telegram of 
November 1903. Unlike Campbell-Bannerman, Fowler was prominent 
on the L i b e r a l I m p e r i a l i s t wing of the p a r t y and a leading member 
of the L i b e r a l League (the supporters of the s t r o n g l y i m p e r i a l i s t 
l i n e taken by Lord Rosebery i n f o r e i g n and i m p e r i a l a f f a i r s ) . 
He had been Secretary of State f o r I n d i a under Rosebery i n 1894-95 
which may e x p l a i n why i t was he, and not Grey, who spoke f o r the 
L i b e r a l I m p e r i a l i s t s i n t h i s debate (since Campbell-Bannerman 
would have found i t hard to keep h i s more r a d i c a l supporters i n 
l i n e w i t h the L i b e r a l f r o n t bench's p o l i c y of absention i f he 
had permitted the i m p e r i a l i s t wing of the p a r t y t o both open and 
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close the debate f o r the Opposition). As: spokesman f o r the o f f i c i a l 
L i b e r a l view on empire, Fowler could h a r d l y f o l l o w the l i n e of 
Lough and Trevelyan, but he d i d emphasise the need to maintain 
proper Parliamentary c o n t r o l over the Viceroy. He echoed Gibson 
Bowies' view t h a t Asia was large enough f o r both great i m p e r i a l 
powers and argued t h a t Russia had 'no serious aggressive designs 
on I n d i a ' and t h a t there was 'no reason t o fear any aggression 
from Russia as f a r as Tibet i s concerned' (thus looking forward 
by i m p l i c a t i o n t o the p o l i c y of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n w i t h Russia which 
was to be followed by Grey as L i b e r a l Foreign Secretary a f t e r 
December 1905). 
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For the L i b e r a l s , Fowler gave the c r u c i a l assurance t h a t they 
would not disavow the mission, since the country would not 
allow i t to be deserted; i n r e t u r n , they expected Balfour 
c l e a r l y to t e l l us ^whether he adheres t o the despatch of 
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6th November'. 
With t h a t o f f e r from the L i b e r a l s , and Balfour's compliance 
w i t h the general view t h a t he r e a f f i r m h i s r e j e c t i o n of the forward 
p o l i c y , the government's overwhelming m a j o r i t y i n the d i v i s i o n 
was a foregone conclusion. Beneath the p a r t y controversy and 
the sarcasm and resentment expressed by each side towards the 
other, there e v i d e n t l y i n the end l a y a s u b s t a n t i a l community 
of view, t h a t the time f o r i m p e r i a l adventures i n Central Asia 
i n c ompetition w i t h Russia was past. That community of view 
was i n the end to ensure s u b s t a n t i a l b i - p a r t i s a n support f o r 
the Asian agreement which was concluded by the L i b e r a l s i n 1907. 
* * * 
CHAPTER FOUR 
69 
PARLIAMENT AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1904-1907 
4.1 B r i t a i n and the C r i s i s of 1905 
Chr o n o l o g i c a l l y of course the debate on the Younghusband 
mission preceded t h a t on the Anglo-French entente, but i t has 
been appr o p r i a t e to consider i t out of i t s c h r o n o l o g i c a l sequence 
because i t o f f e r s , as we have already seen at the end of the 
l a s t chapter, an i n s i g h t i n t o the development of a b i - p a r t i s a n 
p o l i c y towards i m p e r i a l f r o n t i e r s i n Asia, and p o l i c y towards 
Russia i n p a r t i c u l a r , which i n r e t r o s p e c t can be seen t o have 
prepared the way f o r the achievement of S i r Edward Grey and 
the L i b e r a l Government i n securing agreement w i t h Russia on 
t h e i r i m p e r i a l r i v a l r i e s i n Asia i n August 1907. For reasons 
which w i l l be considered l a t e r , there was no debate on the 
Russian Convention u n t i l February 1908. I t i s a remarkable 
f a c t which re q u i r e s some explanation t h a t there was no major 
f o r e i g n p o l i c y debate between th a t on the French entente i n 
June 1904 and t h a t on the Russian agreement i n February 1908, 
although several momentous developments i n f o r e i g n a f f a i r s took 
place during t h a t period which one might expect t h a t backbenchers 
(and indeed the Opposition f r o n t bench) would have wished t o 
discuss, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n so f a r as B r i t a i n was i n v o l v e d . ^ 
We have already seen that one of the u n d e r l y i n g motives 
f o r the conclusion of the Anglo-French entente was to prevent 
the two western European powers from being drawn i n t o the war 
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i n the Far East between Russia and Japan, on opposing sides. 
This aspect of the entente was successful, as indeed were 
other aspects, and indeed the French were able t o prevent 
the Dogger Bank c r i s i s from e s c a l a t i n g i n t o war between 
Russia and B r i t a i n , and were i n s t r u m e n t a l i n g e t t i n g the 
Russians to agree to i n t e r n a t i o n a l a r b i t r a t i o n to s e t t l e 
the dispute p e a c e f u l l y . This was an e a r l y sign t h a t the 
French would use t h e i r i n f l u e n c e t o b r i n g B r i t a i n and Russia 
closer together, i n the hope of c r e a t i n g a t r i p l e grouping 
w i t h t h e i r Russian a l l y and t h e i r B r i t i s h entente partner to 
act as a more e f f e c t i v e counterweight to the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e of 
Germany, Austria-Hungary and I t a l y i n the European balance 
2 
of power. For the time being, no more could be done than 
maintain c o r r e c t r a t h e r than f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s , and leave the 
Russian forces both on land and at sea to be defeated by the 
new and growing power of Japan. Neither France as the a l l y of 
Russia, nor B r i t a i n as the a l l y of Japan, were at a l l c l o s e l y 
involved i n the American mediation which r e s u l t e d i n the Treaty 
of Portsmouth of September 1905, which e s t a b l i s h e d Japanese 
preponderance i n Korea and e v i c t e d the Russians from Manchuria. 
Since these terms were n a t u r a l l y d i s t a s t e f u l t o the Russians 
and since they s t i l l resented B r i t a i n ' s a l l i a n c e w i t h Japan, 
there was as y e t no prospect of working towards any k i n d of 
Anglo-Russian rapprochement. I n any case, the renewal on revised 
terms of the Anglo-Japanese a l l i a n c e i n 1905, which rendered 
the Russians even more embittered and I s o l a t e d , made i t i n the 
short term less important to the B r i t i s h t o have an agreement 
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w i t h Russia, since the renegotiated terms included the 
remarkable p r o v i s i o n t h a t the casus b e l l i would a r i s e i f e i t h e r 
partner were involved i n war w i t h Russia alone ( i . e . even i f 
unsupported by any a l l y ) , and since the Japanese agreed t o 
extend the scope of the a l l i a n c e to cover B r i t a i n ' s I n d i a n 
f r o n t i e r w i t h Russia i n Central Asia. This was done d e l i b e r a t e l y 
i n order t o deter the Russians from seeking t o compensate 
themselves f o r t h e i r d i s a s t e r s i n the Far East by resuming 
t h e i r forward p o l i c y i n Central Asia, and a powerful d e t e r r e n t 
i t was. I n so f a r as i t would convince the Russians t h a t they 
had now no prospect of a f u r t h e r successful advance i n Asia 
i n o p p o s i t i o n t o B r i t a i n and Japan i t was expected t h a t , i n the 
long term, i t would promote a review of Russian f o r e i g n p o l i c y 
and lead t o a settlement w i t h B r i t a i n (which of course i s 
p r e c i s e l y what i t d i d ) . I n the immediate s i t u a t i o n , however, 
Lansdowne and Balfour had a more p r a c t i c a l and p o l i t i c a l 
o b j e c t i v e . They wished to p r o f i t from Japan's success against 
Russia t o improve B r i t a i n ' s i m p e r i a l p o s i t i o n , and to renew 
the a l l i a n c e on more favourable terms w h i l e i t was s t i l l a 
Conservative government t h a t was i n o f f i c e . A n t i c i p a t i n g t h a t 
the i n c r e a s i n g domestic d i f f i c u l t i e s of the government (and 
p a r t i c u l a r l y the i n c r e a s i n g l y b i t t e r s t r u g g l e w i t h i n the ranks 
of the Conservatives over the question of f r e e trade versus 
t a r i f f reform) might p r e c i p i t a t e an e a r l y general e l e c t i o n , 
which might r e s u l t i n the r e t u r n of a L i b e r a l government, 
Lansdowne and Balfour were anxious to pre-empt the question of 
1 
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renewing the a l l i a n c e , and to pass on to t h e i r successors 
a renewed a l l i a n c e which they would f i n d i t d i f f i c u l t to 
abandon. Of course they knew t h a t Grey and the other L i b e r a l 
I m p e r i a l i s t s were i n favour of the a l l i a n c e , and would maintain 
i t , but they could not know at t h a t stage what the complexion 
of a new L i b e r a l m a j o r i t y would be, how strong i n i t would 
be those they s l i g h t i n g l y c a l l e d ' L i t t l e Englanders', nor 
whether c o n t r o l of f o r e i g n p o l i c y would remain i n the hands 
of the L i b e r a l I m p e r i a l i s t s as i t had been under Rosebery or 
whether i t would pass to the Gladstonians. For a l l of these 
considerations the a l l i a n c e w i t h Japan was renewed ahead of 
3 
time, and i n an extended form-
Meanwhile the Moroccan c r i s i s of 1905 threatened t o 
throw the European power-system i n t o t u r m o i l , and to force 
the B r i t i s h t o decide how f a r t h e i r commitment t o France i n 
Morocco would i n p r a c t i s e extend; f o r on 31 March 1905 the 
German Kaiser made a speech i n Tangier d e c l a r i n g Germany's 
support f o r Moroccan independence (against French encroachment) 
and thus challenged not only France, but the cohesion of the 
Anglo-French agreement on Morocco concluded i n 1904. There i s 
no doubt t h a t t h i s German demonstration of power was c a l c u l a t e d 
to t e s t the entente and break i t up before i t could become 
established as a s t a b l e diplomatic r e l a t i o n s h i p which might 
a f f e c t (as of course the French wished i t t o ) the balance of 
power i n Europe as w e l l as those extra-European areas t o which 
i t p u b l i c l y r e f e r r e d . Equally there As no doubt t h a t the Kaiser 
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and h i s Chancellor Billow had chosen the moment w e l l to mount 
t h e i r challenge: Russia, France's a l l y was, as we have seen, 
deeply embroiled i n the war w i t h Japan i n the Far East, and was 
unable t o act d e c i s i v e l y i n the European power-balance; i n 
a d d i t i o n , the e s c a l a t i n g chaos i n s i d e Russia, which f o l l o w e d 
the outbreak of the r e v o l u t i o n on 22 January 1905, meant t h a t 
the Tsar and h i s m i n i s t e r s were wholly preoccupied w i t h d e a l i n g 
w i t h the domestic s i t u a t i o n (and saving t h e i r skins) and had 
n e i t h e r energy nor resources to support France against a German 
challenge. For a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes thorughout 1905 and w e l l 
i n t o 1906, Russia was non-existent as a European power and 
useless to France as an a l l y . Consequently, Germany had 
the best o p p o r t u n i t y she was l i k e l y to have t o f o r c e France t o 
abandon her new f r i e n d s h i p w i t h B r i t a i n and agree t o subject her 
ambitions t o German approval. Pressure could be applied even 
up to the t h r e a t of war, since the French defences were known 
to be i n poor c o n d i t i o n , Russia could not be expected t o implement 
the French-Russian a l l i a n c e , and any B r i t i s h i n t e r v e n t i o n on 
land was expected t o be d e r i s o r y ; i t i s no accident t h a t i t was 
during t h i s c r i s i s t h a t the Chief of the German General S t a f f , 
Graf von S c h l i e f f e n , put the f i n i s h i n g touches t o h i s plan 
f o r an o f f e n s i v e against France through Belgium, a plan which at 
t h a t time was c l e a r l y conceived as being p r a c t i c a l l y e n t i r e l y 
f o r a war on one f r o n t , i . e . against France alone.^ The f i r s t 
f r u i t s of t h i s p o l i c y were the r e s i g n a t i o n of Delcasse, the 
French f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r regarded by the Germans as the a r c h i t e c t 
of the entente c o r d i a l e (and who was indeed the advocate of a 
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closer Anglo-French a l l i a n c e i n the short term and of an 
Anglo-Russian rapprochement i n the longer t e r m ) , and the 
agreement of the French government to submit the Moroccan 
question to an i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference. 
Delcasse resigned on 6 June 1905. Although he himself 
believed t h a t h i s f a l l had been engineered by the German 
government because i t feared t h a t he was about to emerge as a 
triumphant mediator between Russia and Japan, i t was accepted 
w i t h a l a c r i t y by h i s colleagues because they feared t h a t he 
was going to f o r c e upon them an a l l i a n c e w i t h B r i t a i n , as a 
prelude t o war w i t h Germany. I n f a c t there had been conversations 
between Lansdowne and the French ambassador i n London, Cambon, 
about Anglo-French cooperation i n r e s i s t i n g German demands i n 
Morocco, which Cambon and Delcasse had i n t e r p r e t e d as being 
an o f f e r of a l l i a n c e ; but i t i s c l e a r t h a t Lansdowne had merely 
been ur g i n g close c o n s u l t a t i o n and not an a l l i a n c e . " ' On the 
other hand, at the end of June (and so even a f t e r the f a l l of 
Delcasse), he was warning the German ambassador t h a t p u b l i c 
opinion i n B r i t a i n would not allow the government to stand 
aside i f Germany should force a war upon France. Curiously, 
or perhaps s i g n i f i c a n t l y , t h i s warning (which was repeated i n 
July and again i n September) does not appear i n the B r i t i s h 
accounts of the r e l e v a n t i n t e r v i e w s . ^ These warnings may be 
seen as c o n s t i t u t i n g the f i r s t signs of t h a t e v o l u t i o n i n 
B r i t i s h p o l i c y which was to convert the c o l o n i a l entente of 
1904 i n t o something which came i n c r e a s i n g l y to resemble a m i l i t a r y 
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understanding, however much B r i t i s h p o l i t i c i a n s i n both p a r t i e s 
might wish to back away from acknowledging i t . There were 
e v i d e n t l y f u r t h e r i n f o r m a l and u n o f f i c i a l contacts between 
m i l i t a r y men on both sides during the autumn of 1905, which 
were i n t e n s i f i e d a f t e r the r e s i g n a t i o n of the B a l f o u r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
i n December 1905, and before the incoming L i b e r a l government was 
f i r m l y i n c o n t r o l of events. Since these conversations were 
conducted from the headquarters of the Committee of I m p e r i a l 
Defence, w i t h the knowledge and p a r t i c i p a t i o n of i t s m i l i t a r y 
and naval p r o f e s s i o n a l members, and of i t s secretary, but 
without the a u t h o r i s a t i o n of the Prime M i n i s t e r , they were 
of very dubious l e g i t i m a c y and probably of d o u b t f u l u t i l i t y 
to the French. But they d i d undoubtedly create an expression 
i n French minds t h a t the B r i t i s h were preparing t o a s s i s t them 
i n war against Germany, i f the i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference which 
was scheduled to assemble at Algeciras (on the bay of G i b r a l t a r 
i n Spain) should break down. And indeed, on 3 January 1906, 
the new L i b e r a l Foreign Secretary, Grey, warned the German 
ambassador, Count Metternich, t h a t B r i t i s h o p i n i o n would make 
i t impossible f o r B r i t a i n to stand aside i f France were involved 
i n war over Morocco, a warning he d e l i b e r a t e l y r e i t e r a t e d on 
19 February.^ I n t h i s he went somewhat f u r t h e r than the more 
cautious language employed by Lansdowne, but he went much 
f u r t h e r when he t o l d Cambon, i n r e p l y to the French ambassador's 
d i r e c t question on 10 January t h a t , i n the event of a Franco-
German war i t was h i s o p i n i o n t h a t B r i t i s h p u b l i c f e e l i n g would 
be ' s t r o n g l y moved i n favour of France'; Lansdowne had never 
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made any such statement to the French. Grey was probably seeking 
to avoid the d i r e c t question put to him by Cambon, asking f o r a 
guarantee of B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y assistance, and i n h i s considered 
response d e l i v e r e d to the French ambassador on 31 January, he 
declined to give any more d e f i n i t e assurance; but on the other 
hand, he informed Cambon of the warning which he had d e l i v e r e d 
to the Germans, a step which Lansdowne had never taken and 
which must have been c a l c u l a t e d t o reassure Cambon of the 
g 
r e a l i t y of B r i t i s h support. Cambon was the more ready to 
accept Grey's assurance because he went f u r t h e r than Lansdowne 
had done i n another v i t a l respect: he gave o f f i c i a l a u t h o r i s a t i o n 
to the h i t h e r t o u n o f f i c i a l conversations which had been going 
on between the m i l i t a r y of the two c o u n t r i e s , which were intended 
to work out the d e t a i l s of B r i t a i n ' s m i l i t a r y and naval assistance 
to France i n the event of a Franco-German war. Grey d i d t h i s 
w i t h the approval of the Secretary of State f o r War, R.B. Haldane, 
and w i t h the acquiescence of the Prime M i n i s t e r , S i r Henry 
Campbell-Bannerman; the only other cabinet m i n i s t e r s who were 
informed were Lord Ripon (a L i b e r a l elder statesman who l e d f o r 
the government i n the House of Lords), and perhaps Asquith, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer and leading f i g u r e i n the government 
a f t e r Campbell-Bannerman. Although Grey and Haldane were both 
at pains to st r e s s t h a t the m i l i t a r y conversations were merely 
t e c h n i c a l and d i d not commit B r i t a i n t o going t o war, i t i s 
i n r e t r o s p e c t c l e a r t h a t they represented the next stage (and 
a major stage) i n the conversion of the entente from an i m p e r i a l 
to a European connection, and one w i t h a p o t e n t i a l m i l i t a r y 
dimension. A B r i t i s h government had now defined the 
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independence of France as a v i t a l B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t and had 
brought i t s e l f t o contemplate the p o s s i b i l i t y of m i l i t a r y 
9 a c t i o n on the European continent i n defence of t h a t i n t e r e s t . 
At the Algeciras Conference, which ended w i t h a peaceful 
settlement to France's advantage i n A p r i l 1906, the B r i t i s h 
d e legation gave f u l l support to the French p o s i t i o n and the 
Germans found themselves almost i s o l a t e d ; the f o l l o w i n g month 
a new B r i t i s h ambassador, S i r Arthur Nicolson, was sent t o 
St. Petersburg to open formal n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h the Russians 
f o r an Anglo-Russian agreement.^ This was the next stage i n 
the abandonment of B r i t a i n ' s o l d p o l i c y of i s o l a t i o n and i n 
the progression towards a closer p o s i t i o n t o the Franco-
Russian a l l i a n c e . 
4.2 The N e g o t i a t i o n of the Anglo-Russian Agreements of 
August 1907 
This i s not the place to enter i n t o a d e t a i l e d account 
of the n e g o t i a t i o n of the terms of the three agreements w i t h 
Russia which were ev e n t u a l l y signed on 31 August 1907.^* The 
ne g o t i a t i o n s of course took place i n secret and, although the 
existence of them was suspected, no i n f o r m a t i o n was divulged 
u n t i l the p u b l i c a t i o n of the terms of the Convention a f t e r i t s 
signature. There was t h e r e f o r e l i t t l e scope f o r MPs t o do much 
more than ask occasional Parliamentary Questions during 1906 
and 1907, to which they received g e n e r a l l y uninformative answers. 
But there was one area covered by the n e g o t i a t i o n s and included 
i n the f i n a l agreements which might have been expected t o a t t r a c t 
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t h e i r a t t e n t i o n and c a l l f o r debate, and t h a t was Tibet and 
the aftermath of the Younghusband e x p e d i t i o n , which they had 
debated i n 1904. Without f u r t h e r debate i n the Commons (though 
not w i t h o u t f u r t h e r Questions, and not w i t h o u t a debate i n the 
12 
Lords) , the mission advanced to Lhasa and, i n September 1904, 
imposed on the Tibetans an agreement of considerable s e v e r i t y , 
the s o - c a l l e d Lhasa Convention; had i t been accepted as i t stood 
by the B r i t i s h government, i t would have made a mockery of a l l 
the previous assurances given to Parliament (and indeed to the 
Russian government) about B r i t a i n ' s i n t e n t i o n t o a b s t a i n from 
permanent i n t e r v e n t i o n i n the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of T i b e t ; i t 
represented a s u b s t a n t i a l departure from the p o l i c y enunciated 
i n the celebrated telegram of November 1903. Not only d i d i t 
impose an indemnity upon T i b e t , but i t also provided f o r a 
m i l i t a r y occupation of the s t r a t e g i c a l l y s e n s i t i v e Chumbi 
Va l l e y f o r seventy-five years; and i t also empowered a B r i t i s h 
Agent s t a t i o n e d at Gyangtse ( i n s i d e T i b e t ) t o v i s i t Lhasa to 
n e g o t i a t e on commercial questions. This was something very close 
to the forward programme desired by Curzon, and i t caused 
co n s t e r n a t i o n i n London, not only f o r t h a t reason but also 
because i t would antagonise the Russians and render a f u t u r e 
agreement w i t h them more d i f f i c u l t t o achieve. Consequently, 
Balf o u r and Brodrick agreed on a r e d u c t i o n i n the indemnity 
and reduced the period of m i l i t a r y occupation from s e v e n t y - f i v e 
to three years. Furthermore, Lansdowne went out of h i s way to 
reassure the Russians (even though they were so deeply embroiled 
i n the war w i t h Japan as to be incapable of making any e f f e c t i v e 
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p r o t e s t against the Tibetan adventure) t h a t B r i t a i n , n o t w i t h -
standing the p r o v i s i o n f o r commercial r e l a t i o n s w i t h T i b e t , 
regarded h e r s e l f as being as much bound as any other power by 
the clauses p r o h i b i t i n g f o r e i g n i n t e r v e n t i o n or p e n e t r a t i o n 
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i n T i b e t . The way was thus cleared f o r improving r e l a t i o n s 
w i t h Russia when t h a t should become p o s s i b l e , and the b i p a r t i s a n 
r e j e c t i o n of Curzon's forward p o l i c y on India's f r o n t i e r was 
r e a f f i r m e d . 
I t was t h e r e f o r e not p a r t i c u l a r l y d i f f i c u l t f o r the B r i t i s h 
and Russian n e g o t i a t o r s to reach agreement on T i b e t , when Nicolson 
began h i s discussions w i t h the new Russian f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r i n 
the m i l d l y ' l i b e r a l ' government which followed the r e v o l u t i o n a r y 
upheavals i n Russia i n 1905 and the e a r l y months of 1906. This 
new m i n i s t e r , Alexander I s v o l s k y , was himself of a l i b e r a l 
outlook and anxious to r e p a i r Russia's r e l a t i o n s of intimacy 
w i t h France and t o achieve a rapprochement w i t h B r i t a i n which 
would begin i n Asian questions, but which he hoped would e v e n t u a l l y 
lead t o B r i t a i n being drawn i n t o the European balance of power on 
the side of Russia; i n p a r t i c u l a r , he hoped to secure B r i t a i n ' s 
agreement t o a r e v i s i o n of the r u l e of the S t r a i t s ( t h a t i s , 
those connecting the Black Sea w i t h the Mediterranean) i n 
Russia's favour. To secure these o b j e c t i v e s , I s v o l s k y was prepared 
to abandon, or at l e a s t to suspend f o r the foreseeable f u t u r e , 
Russia's h i s t o r i c ambitions and longstanding forward p o l i c y i n 
Central Asia, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n Tib e t (as we have seen, agreement 
there was r e l a t i v e l y e a s i l y reached) and also i n Afghanistan, 
which was immediately on Russia's southern f r o n t i e r and which 
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had come under increasing Russian pressure since the 1880s. 
Under the terms of the convention OT\ Afghanistan, the Russians 
accepted t h a t t h a t mountainous country, s t r a t e g i c a l l y poised 
between t h e i r f r o n t i e r to the south and the north-west 
f r o n t i e r of B r i t i s h I n d i a , lay outside t h e i r sphere of i n f l u e n c e 
and w i t h i n the B r i t i s h sphere; henceforward they agreed to 
a b s t a i n from having d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Amir of Afghanistan 
i n Kabul, and to conduct any necessary discussions w i t h him (as 
f o r instance over f r o n t i e r v i o l a t i o n s ) through the agency of 
the B r i t i s h , who would maintain d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s w i t h Kabul. 
This e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y cumbersome arrangement represented a 
considerable s a c r i f i c e of longstanding ambition on the p a r t 
of the Russians, and one which I s v o l s k y had d i f f i c u l t y i n 
g e t t i n g the Russian m i l i t a r y to accept, but i t was one which 
the Russians nevertheless t r i e d l o y a l l y t o implement over the 
14 
next few years. I n so f a r as Russia secured a settlement 
favourable t o her ambitions, and B r i t a i n one which d i d no more 
than p r o t e c t her s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s , i t was i n Persia. Under 
the terms of the arrangement about Persia, the country was 
n o t i o n a l l y d i v i d e d i n t o three zones: a Russian zone of i n f l u e n c e 
i n the n o r t h of the country ( i n c l u d i n g the c a p i t a l Tehran), 
a much smaller B r i t i s h zone of i n f l u e n c e i n the south-east of 
the country (Seistan, adjacent to the I n d i a n f r o n t i e r ) , w i t h 
a n e u t r a l zone i n between separating the two great powers from 
each other. Each power undertook not to seek concessions f o r 
r a i l w a y s , telegraph l i n e s or banks (the t y p i c a l instruments of 
i n f o r m a l i m p e r i a l expansion) i n the zone of the other, w h i l e they 
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would only do so i n the n e u t r a l zone w i t h the agreement of 
the other. Since the Russian zone was l a r g e r , mot>e populous 
and more wealthy than the B r i t i s h , since i t included Tehran, 
and since the Russians now gained B r i t i s h acquiescence i n t h e i r 
already w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d ascendancy t h e r e , i t may be observed 
t h a t they secured a Central Asian advantage i n r e t u r n f o r the 
surrender of t h e i r other Central Asian a m b i t i o n s . ^ 
Where I s v o l s k y d i d not secure the advantage he had hoped 
f o r was i n the question of the S t r a i t s , which Grey declined to 
include i n the formal n e g o t i a t i o n s or t o incorporate i n t o the 
f i n a l agreements. I n the B r i t i s h view, the f u n c t i o n of the 
Convention was not European, and the S t r a i t s question was 
unquestionably a European question i n the f u l l sense, since the 
s i g n a t o r i e s t o the successive S t r a i t s Conventions which regulated 
i t were a l l European powers. Any agreement on the S t r a i t s 
would have re q u i r e d the admission t o the n e g o t i a t i o n s of other 
European powers, which would have a l t e r e d the b i l a t e r a l nature 
of the Convention and would q u i t e probably have prevented i t s 
conclusion. The most th a t Grey would do was to o f f e r the 
Russians an inducement to conclude the Asian bargain, and 
then implement i t s terms l o y a l l y , by h o l d i n g out to them 
a prospect of 'a f r i e n d l y agreement about A s i a t i c questions , 
which should work w e l l \ as being a p r e l i m i n a r y c o n d i t i o n 
to any arrangement about the S t r a i t s . ^ C l e a r l y , and not only on 
paper, the B r i t i s h were not at t h i s stage prepared t o view t h e i r 
new r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Russia as extending beyond the confines of 
Asia. I n r e t u r n , the Russians declined to give Grey something 
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which he very much wanted; namely, e x p l i c i t r e c o g n i t i o n of 
B r i t a i n ' s preponderant p o s i t i o n i n the Persian Gulf. I s v o l s k y 
explained t h a t he could not go so f a r , since the i n t e r e s t s of 
other European powers (he meant Germany) would thereby be 
a f f e c t e d , so t h a t they would have to be consulted (the same 
argument as Grey had used about the S t r a i t s ) . I n 1903, i n 
the context of the Baghdad ra i l w a y and the prospect t h a t the 
Germans would seek to extend the l i n e to the head of the 
Gulf and e s t a b l i s h a railway terminus and p o r t t h e r e , Lansdowne 
had f o r m a l l y declared i n the House of Lords t h a t B r i t a i n would: 
... regard the establishment of a naval base 
or of a f o r t i f i e d p o r t i n the Persian Gulf as 
a very grave menace to B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s , and 
we should c e r t a i n l y r e s i s t i t w i t h a l l the 
means a t our disposal. 1-7 
Grey would have l i k e d a Russian d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t would have 
committed the Russians to abandoning any long term ambitions 
of t h e i r own f o r a p o r t on the Gulf, and also t o supporting 
B r i t a i n i n r e s i s t i n g any equivalent encroachment by the Germans. 
The most t h a t he could do w i t h Russian consent, however, was 
to p u b l i s h w i t h the Anglo-Russian Convention a despatch s t a t i n g 
t h a t the Russians d i d not dissent from the view t h a t B r i t a i n 
18 
had s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s i n the Gulf. I t may be observed t h a t 
the e n t i r e n o r t h e r n (Persian) shore of the Gulf, from the 
Shatt-al-Arab t o Bandar Abbas at the mouth of the Gulf, l a y i n 
the n e u t r a l zone; here the B r i t i s h already had considerable 
commercial i n t e r e s t s and c o n t r o l l e d the e x i s t i n g means of 
communication, and here the search f o r commercially e x p l o i t a b l e 
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q u a n t i t i e s of o i l was already under way (and was s h o r t l y to 
be s u c c e s s f u l ) . That the B r i t i s h were content w i t h an 
agreement which kept the Russians away from the shores of 
the Gulf, w h i l e c o n f i n i n g t h e i r own zone to the immediate 
v i c i n i t y of the Indian f r o n t i e r , suggests t h a t the s e c u r i t y 
of I n d i a r e a l l y was t h e i r prime concern; and t h a t i n any 
event the c o n t r o l of an o i l - b e a r i n g region q u i t e c l e a r l y was not. 
4.3 Parliament and Foreign A f f a i r s 1904-1907 
C l e a r l y , then, the months and years from the Anglo-French 
entente to the Anglo-Russian Convention were f i l l e d w i t h momentous 
events i n f o r e i g n a f f a i r s , some of them secret but most of them 
f r e e l y open to any Member of Parliament who read the newspapers. 
I t must t h e r e f o r e be asked why there was no major f o r e i g n 
p o l i c y debate i n t h i s p e r iod. F i r s t of a l l , there were of course 
some obvious t e c h n i c a l reasons why t h i s should have been so; f o r 
example, i f Parliament was not s i t t i n g , i t could hardly hold a 
debate; and i n three of the years i n question (1904, 1905 and 
1907) the Parliamentary session began i n February and ended i n 
August, so t h a t Parliament was s i t t i n g f o r b a r e l y h a l f of the 
year and there was a period of s i x months during which there 
could by d e f i n i t i o n be no debate. Thus Younghusband's Lhasa 
Convention, concluded on 7 September 1904, could be contemplated 
i n t r a n q u i l l i t y by the Balfour government since Parliament was 
i n recess, and only the Russians need be c o n c i l i a t e d ; the 
Russians pr o t e s t e d about i t on the basis of an a r t i c l e i n 
The Times of 17 September, and duly received assurances, but 
MPs could make t h e i r views known only by themselves w r i t i n g t o 
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the newspapers. By the time t h a t Parliament reassembled 
on 14 February 1905, the government had d r a s t i c a l l y r e v i s e d 
the Lhasa Convention along the l i n e s l a i d down i n November 
1903, and f u r t h e r took the s t i n g out of p o t e n t i a l Parliamentary 
20 
c r i t i c i s m by p u b l i s h i n g a t h i r d and f i n a l Blue Book on T i b e t . 
Such reference as there was i n the House of Commons came i n 
the debate on the Address, when both Campbell-Bannerman and 
Gibson Bowles o f f e r e d c r i t i c i s m s of the government f o r s t i l l 
being dragged along by Curzon, but there was no serious problem 
f o r Balfour such as there had been i n the previous year's 
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debate. Much the same t h i n g was t r u e i n the case of the 
renewal of the Anglo-Japanese a l l i a n c e i n 1905. The revise d 
t r e a t y was signed i n London on 12 August 1905, Parliament having 
been prorogued the previous day; Balfour had apparently had 
no d i f f i c u l t y i n f i n d i n g good reasons t o delay the signature 
u n t i l t h a t had happened. The t r e a t y was published as a 
Parliamentary Paper on 26 September so t h a t , of course, comment 
from MPs, whether favourable or unfavourable, had to be made 
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i n p u b l i c speeches or i n the press, but not i n Parliament. 
I t i s t r u e (as Professor Nish t e l l s us) t h a t , i n a n t i c i p a t i o n 
t h a t there was about to be a renewal of the A l l i a n c e , 'much of the 
debate on Foreign O f f i c e supply on 3 August [1905] was i n 
a n t i c i p a t i o n devoted t o the new a l l i a n c e ' , and t h a t two of the 
speeches, those of the redoubtable D i l k e and of George Harwood, 
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were c r i t i c a l . But such discussion was by d e f i n i t i o n uninformed 
and could e a s i l y be brushed aside by the government as specu l a t i o n ; 
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i t was no s u b s t i t u t e f o r the k i n d of wide ranging debate 
which the f i r s t Japanese A l l i a n c e had a t t r a c t e d , and i t i s 
p e r f e c t l y c l e a r t h a t the government p r e f e r r e d i t t h a t way. 
By the time t h a t Parliament reassembled on 13 February 1906, 
i t was a very d i f f e r e n t House of Commons w i t h a very d i f f e r e n t 
membership, i n c l u d i n g a large number of new and inexperienced 
L i b e r a l and Labour MPs. Not only had, f o r i n s t a n c e , Gibson Bowles gone, 
Ba l f o u r himself had f o r the time being gone, and there was 
a new government i n o f f i c e which could h a r d l y be pursued 
about a t r e a t y concluded by i t s predecessors (though Grey, the 
new Foreign Secretary, had made i t cl e a r t h a t the L i b e r a l 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n remained committed t o the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e ) . 
Consequently, even the most a t t e n t i v e reader w i l l scan the 
debate on the Address i n the Commons i n v a i n f o r any discussion 
of the new t r e a t y , which indeed by now was no longer new. 
I t was l e f t to the L i b e r a l leader i n the House of Lords, Lord 
Ripon, t o s t a t e t h a t the new government accepted the t r e a t y 
' i n the s p i r i t i n which we b e l i e v e i t was made' and t o r e i t e r a t e 
the government's i n t e n t i o n 'to carry out s t r i c t l y and r e a d i l y 
the o b l i g a t i o n s i t imposes on us' . I f Bal f o u r was f o r t u n a t e 
t h a t the Lhasa Convention happened to be concluded w h i l e 
Parliament was i n recess i t i s c l e a r , as Nish t e l l s us, t h a t 
the Japanese A l l i a n c e was d e l i b e r a t e l y delayed so t h a t e f f e c t i v e 
Parliamentary discussion could be avoided. 
C r i t i c s of the Conservatives' a t t i t u d e towards the r i g h t s 
of Parliament and p a r t i c u l a r l y the House of Commons might, w i t h 
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some j u s t i c e , conclude t h a t t h e i r record remained one of 
unregenerate o b s t r u c t i o n r i g h t down to the end of t h e i r 
p eriod i n o f f i c e . I t may seem more s u r p r i s i n g , but i t i s 
nevertheless the case,that the incoming L i b e r a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
behaved i n very much the same fashion. So f a r as the House 
of Commons was concerned, t h i s can best be i l l u s t r a t e d by 
the t i m i n g of the Anglo-Russian Convention and the debate 
upon i t . Parliament was prorogued on 28 August 1907; the Anglo-
Russian Convention was signed on 31 August, but a s c r u t i n y of 
the l a t e stages of the n e g o t i a t i o n s does not suggest t h a t there 
was any l a s t minute h i t c h t o hold up the signature. The 
e f f e c t of sig n i n g only three days a f t e r the end of the Parliamentary 
session was t h a t i t was s i x months before the Convention was 
debated i n Parliament, the t e x t having been published as a Blue 
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Book on 29 January 1908; and even so, the debate i n the Commons 
was he l d on an Opposition motion. The L i b e r a l s , l i k e t h e i r 
Conservative predecessors, held to the t r a d i t i o n a l view t h a t 
r a t i f i c a t i o n of a t r e a t y of t h i s nature (not i n v o l v i n g cessions 
of t e r r i t o r y or having f i n a n c i a l or l e g i s l a t i v e i m p l i c a t i o n s ) 
d i d not r e q u i r e Parliamentary sanction. Nor i s t h i s the only 
example of Grey's a t t i t u d e of reserve towards Parliament, though 
i n the case of the Anglo-French m i l i t a r y conversations which 
began on an o f f i c i a l basis only a f t e r he had assumed o f f i c e , i n 
January 1906, i t may w e l l be argued t h a t , from a pragmatic 
p o i n t of view, a l l those considerations which made Grey and 
Campbell-Bannerman u n w i l l i n g to inform the cabinet of what had 
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been done ( f o r fear of provoking a controversy so damaging 
t h a t the hard-won u n i t y of the new government would be destroyed, 
the cabinet would break up, and the f r u i t s of the great L i b e r a l 
m a j o r i t y which had j u s t been won at the p o l l s would be l o s t ) -
t h a t those considerations applied even more s t r o n g l y t o any 
r e v e l a t i o n i n Parliament t h a t the War O f f i c e was being allowed 
to p lan f o r the despatch of a B r i t i s h e x p e d i t i o n a r y f o r c e to 
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France. I t may be added th a t i t was j u s t as much the 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the Prime M i n i s t e r and of the Secretary of 
State f o r War as i t was of the Foreign Secretary to b r i n g these 
t a l k s t o the n o t i c e of the cabinet, and i t may be i n f e r r e d t h a t 
a l l three drew back from the prospect of the s p l i t between 
Radicals and L i b e r a l I m p e r i a l i s t s which such a r e v e l a t i o n would 
produce. I f they could not inform the cabinet, then n e c e s s a r i l y 
they could not inform Parliament; and by d e f i n i t i o n , Parliament 
could not debate what i t d i d not know about. Only those cabinet 
m i n i s t e r s who attended the meetings of the Committee of I m p e r i a l 
Defence, the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s advisory committee on defence 
matters, knew of the existence of the conversations, and u n t i l 
the Agadir c r i s i s of 1911 at l e a s t a l l p r e f e r r e d t o accept 
Grey's r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n t h a t , as the s t a f f t a l k s were non-commital 
and non-binding, they d i d not i n v o l v e any o b l i g a t i o n r e q u i r i n g 
the agreement of the cabinet, s t i l l less of Parliament. And of 
course, and as a matter of p l a i n d i p l o m a t i c f a c t , they were 
not (at l e a s t u n t i l the exchange of Notes between Grey and 
Cambon i n November 1912) the subject of anything remotely 
resembling a t r e a t y or other diplomatic document r e q u i r i n g any 
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kin d of formal approval. There was a f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n , 
t h a t any p u b l i c r e v e l a t i o n of Anglo-French j o i n t m i l i t a r y 
planning would i n e v i t a b l y alarm and antagonise the German 
government and inflame German p u b l i c o p i n i o n , would increase 
the German sense of i s o l a t i o n and so worsen the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
c l i m a t e , and would make the prospect of an improvement i n Anglo-
German r e l a t i o n s , t o which Grey was genuinely committed, i n c r e a s i n g l y 
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remote. There were thus reasons of both p r i n c i p l e and 
pragmatism t o j u s t i f y keeping cabinet, Parliament and p u b l i c 
o p i n i o n i n ignorance of t h i s momentous development i n the Anglo-
French entente, which f u l l y e x p l a i n why i t should have taken 
place w i t h o u t the s c r u t i n y of Parliament. 
This w i l l n ot, however, e x p l a i n why the House of Commons 
of i t s own v o l i t i o n took no greater i n t e r e s t i n matters of which 
i t d i d know, p a r t i c u l a r the e v o l u t i o n i n the f u l l l i g h t of 
p u b l i c i t y and of press comment of the Moroccan c r i s i s 
of 1905-06, and the Algeeiras Conference which l e d t o i t s 
r e s o l u t i o n i n the f i r s t three months of 1906. A f t e r a l l , the 
debate on the Address i n February 1906 took place w h i l e t h a t 
Conference was s i t t i n g , and the King's Speech contained the 
customary references t o the government's p a c i f i c i n t e n t i o n s i n 
f o r e i g n a f f a i r s - a p e r f e c t l y adequate p r e t e x t f o r a D i l k e or 
other s e l f - s t y l e d expert on f o r e i g n a f f a i r s to make a speech 
or r a i s e a debate. I n f a c t , as already observed, the Commons 
debate on the Address i n February 1906 i s , from our p o i n t 
of view, remarkable c h i e f l y f o r the absence of any s i g n i f i c a n t 
discussion of f o r e i g n p o l i c y ; and t h a t i n the Lords consisted 
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l a r g e l y of anodyne observations about mai n t a i n ^ the c o n t i n u i t y 
of p o l i c y . The new House of Commons was e v i d e n t l y much more 
i n t e r e s t e d i n domestic questions, even at a time of such major 
upheaval abroad; there was much l i v e l y i n v e c t i v e , but i t was 
on t o p i c s other than f o r e i g n a f f a i r s - on f r e e trade and t a r i f f 
reform, on the burning issue of s o - c a l l e d 'Chinese slavery' 
( i n South A f r i c a ) , on education, on the reform of trade union 
l e g i s l a t i o n , on I r e l a n d - on a l l those issues on which the 
e l e c t i o n had been fought and won and which would engross the 
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a t t e n t i o n of Parliament over the coming months and indeed years. 
The l a r g e new L i b e r a l m a j o r i t y contained a l a r g e Radical wing 
which was as yet ignorant of f o r e i g n a f f a i r s f o r the most p a r t , 
and content t o f o l l o w the lead of Campbell-Bannerman and h i s 
colleagues, of t r u s t i n g the supposedly experienced and j u d i c i o u s 
Grey to do what was necessary to defend the i n t e r e s t s of B r i t a i n 
w h i l e Radicalism got on w i t h the more e x c i t i n g business of s o c i a l 
and p o l i t i c a l reform at home. I t may be i n f e r r e d t h a t the p a r t y 
i n Parliament as w e l l as i n the cabinet accepted the t a c i t 
agreement whereby the L i b e r a l I m p e r i a l i s t s were permitted to set 
the f o r e i g n p o l i c y agenda of the government w h i l e the Radicals 
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set i t s domestic agenda. As f o r the Conservatives, they were 
s t i l l too chastened by t h e i r crushing defeat at the p o l l s , too 
d i v i d e d over the more damaging issue of t a r i f f reform, and 
b e r e f t of a leader who was also t h e i r most e f f e c t i v e performer 
i n the House, to have much stomach to challenge the government 
on f o r e i g n a f f a i r s . Only Joseph Chamberlain (himself the arch 
t a r i f f - r e f o r m e r , already a i l i n g , but i n the absence of Balfour 
the only heavyweight f i g u r e on the Conservative f r o n t bench) r a i s e d 
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a question of i n f o r m a t i o n on the Algeciras Conference. Otherwise, 
and f o r the time being, the House was more i n t e r e s t e d i n other 
matters. Consequently, and throughout the sessions of 1906 
and 1907, Grey was l e f t more or less f r e e to develop h i s own 
l i n e s of p o l i c y w i t h o u t serious dissent i n Parliament or any 
s i g n i f i c a n t c l a i m to take c o n t r o l of the f o r m u l a t i o n of p o l i c y . 
The r e v i v a l of Parliamentary a c t i v i t y i n the f i e l d of f o r e i g n 
a f f a i r s d i d no t , f o r the reasons we have surveyed, occur u n t i l 
1908 when r e l a t i o n s w i t h Russia and w i t h Germany began t o cause 
in c r e a s i n g concern. The f i r s t major occasion when t h i s concern 
manifested i t s e l f came i n February 1908 when, s i g n i f i c a n t l y , i t 
was the Opposition r a t h e r than the government's own backbenchers 
who voiced c r i t i c i s m of a major item i n Grey's f o r e i g n p o l i c y 
programme, the Anglo-Russian Convention, signed on 31st August 1907. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
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THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION 
OF AUGUST 1907 
5.1 The Anglo-Russian Convention and the Balance of 
Power i n Europe 
I t has f r e q u e n t l y been asserted by h i s t o r i a n s t h a t 
the r e a l purpose behind the Anglo-Russian Convention was 
to adjust the balance of power i n Europe to the advantage 
of B r i t a i n and France and against Germany, by completing 
the formation of a t r i p l e grouping of B r i t a i n , France and 
Russia, the so - c a l l e d ' T r i p l e Entente'.^ We have already 
seen t h a t the L i b e r a l s came t o o f f i c e on 11 December 1905, 
w i t h Grey as Foreign Secretary, already committed to seeking 
an accommodation w i t h Russia, as the Conservatives before 
them had desired. S h o r t l y a f t e r assuming o f f i c e , Grey t o l d 
the Russian ambassador, Count Benckendorff, of h i s desire 
f o r an agreement. The Alge c i r a s Conference, beginning on 
16 January 1906, provided an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r B r i t a i n and 
Russia to work together i n support of France and so f o r e -
shadowed the way i n which a T r i p l e Entente could work 
d i p l o m a t i c a l l y t o the advantage of i t s members, and Grey t o l d 
the House of Commons of h i s hope t h a t the f r i e n d l y cooperation 
of B r i t a i n and Russia would ' n a t u r a l l y r e s u l t i n the progressive 
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settlement of questions i n which each country has an i n t e r e s t ' . 
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This statement of course could be construed as applying 
e i t h e r to r e l a t i o n s i n general and i n c l u d i n g Europe, or 
merely t o Asian questions i n p a r t i c u l a r , but the weight 
of evidence seems t o suggest t h a t Grey was at t h i s stage 
p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h the l a t t e r . There i s however no 
doubt t h a t I s v o l s k y favoured an agreement w i t h B r i t a i n f o r 
reasons which were p r i m a r i l y European, and t h a t the French 
also wished t o promote an Anglo-Russian rapprochement i n 
order t o t i l t the European balance of power against Germany. 
We know t h a t I s v o l s k y discussed the question w i t h h i s 
ambassadors i n both London and Paris i n March 1906, when 
they agreed t h a t i n order t o prevent Germany from o b t a i n i n g 
too great an ascendancy over the d i r e c t i o n of Russian p o l i c y , 
i t should continue t o r e s t upon the i n d e s t r u c t i b l e basis of 
the a l l i a n c e w i t h France, r e i n f o r c e d by an agreement w i t h B r i t a i n . 
This would enable Russia t o escape from the i s o l a t e d p o s i t i o n 
i n the Far East imposed on her by the Anglo-Japanese a l l i a n c e 
and her defeat i n the Russo-Japanese war, and avoid having to 
become dependent on Germany f o r her s e c u r i t y i n Europe, and t o 
achieve t h i s i t would be worth e x p l o i t i n g the B r i t i s h desire 
f o r a settlement of the Anglo-Russian r i v a l r i e s i n Cent r a l 
Asia and Persia. I t would however be necessary to avoid 
antagonising Germany, and so there could from the Russian 
p o i n t of view be nothing i n an agreement which was obviously 
4 d i r e c t e d against Germany or i n j u r i o u s to Germany's i n t e r e s t s . 
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P a r a l l e l w i t h the n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r an agreement w i t h B r i t a i n , 
Russia also sought to reach an understanding w i t h Japan, 
which l e d to the conclusion of t r e a t i e s i n e f f e c t e s t a b l i s h i n g 
Japanese and Russian spheres of i n f l u e n c e i n China (which 
restored to Russia economic ascendancy i n no r t h e r n Manchuria); 
t h i s compromise, when added to the other understandings and 
a l l i a n c e s between B r i t a i n , Japan, France and Russia, had 
the e f f e c t of e s t a b l i s h i n g something l i k e a q u a d r i l a t e r a l 
grouping i n the Far East which e f f e c t i v e l y took China out of 
the f i e l d of i n t e r n a t i o n a l competition f o r the f u t u r e . 
Having resolved the r i v a l r i e s w i t h B r i t a i n i n Central Asia 
and w i t h Japan i n the Far East, Russian p o l i c y would be 
f r e e t o r e v e r t t o r e - e s t a b l i s h i n g Russian power i n Europe 
and i n p a r t i c u l a r t o securing successes and r e s t o r i n g 
Russian p r e s t i g e i n questions such as t h a t of the S t r a i t s . ^ 
Thus from the outset the Russians saw the l i m i t e d agreements 
on Central Asia as the f i r s t step i n the development of 
close r e l a t i o n s w i t h B r i t a i n i n other areas of p o l i c y , 
notably Europe. I t remains to be seen whether t h i s was 
the view taken of i t by B r i t i s h policy-makers or by the 
B r i t i s h Parliament. 
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I t i s usual to regard the Convention of 1907 as 
completing the process whereby B r i t a i n escaped from the 
p o s i t i o n of i s o l a t i o n which had characterised her European 
and g l o b a l s i t u a t i o n i n 1900. I t i s also usual to see i t as 
i n s u r i n g the B r i t i s h against the danger of a German hegemony 
i n Europe. For the Russians i t was to provide a period of 
s e c u r i t y d u r i n g which the process of recuperation from defeat 
and r e v o l u t i o n could be accomplished. R.P. C h u r c h i l l observes 
of i t t h a t , although f e a r of Germany had done much t o b r i n g the 
two former i m p e r i a l r i v a l s together, the Convention was a 
defensive not an o f f e n s i v e instrument, and was not intended 
f o r aggression against Germany.^ At the t u r n of the century, 
the German government had believed t h a t such a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n 
was impossible, and t h a t t h e r e f o r e B r i t a i n (and perhaps indeed 
Russia) would be o b l i g e d to secure t h e i r p o s i t i o n against each 
other by j o i n i n g the German system of a l l i a n c e s ; i t i s t h e r e f o r e 
u n s u r p r i s i n g t h a t i n 1907 and t h e r e a f t e r the Germans should have 
assumed t h a t the r e a l p o i n t of the Convention was turned against 
them. There i s indeed some evidence much quoted by h i s t o r i a n s 
such as Monger, who take the same view of B r i t i s h p o l i c y as d i d 
the Kaiser and h i s advisers, t h a t anxiety about German ambitions 
both .in the Middle East and i n Europe was indeed the un d e r l y i n g 
reason f o r the agreement w i t h Russia. The B r i t i s h were worri e d 
about German economic a c t i v i t y i n the Persian Gulf and i t s 
h i n t e r l a n d , and feared f o r t h e i r preponderance i n the region 
once the Baghdad r a i l w a y reached the head of the Gulf. The fe a r 
t h a t German p o l i c y i n Persia was intended t o create a s i t u a t i o n 
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which would j u s t i f y an: 
... i n t e r v e n t i o n on the Moroccan p a t t e r n 
acted ... as a stimulus to the n e g o t i a t i o n s 
w i t h Russia; and i t was the hope of B r i t i s h 
policy-makers t h a t Anglo-Russian co-operation 
i n the Middle East would enable them t o 
n e u t r a l i s e the most dangerous aspects of 
German p o l i c y i n general, and of the Baghdad 
ra i l w a y i n p a r t i c u l a r . ^ 
Even more s i g n i f i c a n t l y , as e a r l y as the period of the 
Alg e c i r a s Conference and w h i l e the Moroccan c r i s i s remained 
unresolved, there was considerable discussion i n London of the 
e f f e c t which an Anglo-Russian agreement could have on the European 
s i t u a t i o n . The War O f f i c e o f f e r e d the o p i n i o n t h a t i t would 
'tend t o weaken German's m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o n i n Europe and 
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t h e r e f o r e to strengthen our own as w e l l as t h a t of France' 
Grey himself was 'impatient to see Russia r e - e s t a b l i s h e d as a 
f a c t o r i n European p o l i t i c s ' and, i n an important memorandum 
on what would happen i f the Algeciras Conference broke up without 
agreement, argued as f o l l o w s : 
The door i s being kept open by us f o r a 
rapprochement w i t h Russia; there i s 
at l e a s t a prospect t h a t when Russia i s 
r e - e s t a b l i s h e d we s h a l l f i n d ourselves on 
good terms w i t h her. An entente between 
Russia, France and ourselves would be 
a b s o l u t e l y secure. I f i t i s necessary t o 
A f t e r the conclusion of the Convention there were several 
expressions of s a t i s f a c t i o n which emphasised the importance of 
Anglo-Russian cooperation i n a d j u s t i n g the balance of power i n 
Europe. Grey expressed h i s s a t i s f a c t i o n 'from the p o i n t of view 
check Germany i t could then be done. 3 i 
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of general p o l i c y ' , t h a t events were drawing B r i t a i n and 
Russia closer together; a view much quoted i n support of 
the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Convention as being fundamentally 
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concerned w i t h the European balance. Grey defined the p o l i c y 
of the agreement w i t h Russia as being: 
... t o begin an understanding w i t h Russia 
[ i n A s i a ] , which may lead g r a d u a l l y to good 
r e l a t i o n s i n European questions a l s o , 
and even the normally Gladstonian Campbell-Bannerman remarked 
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t h a t i t would 'make t h i n g s easier i n Europe' . We may reasonably 
conclude from t h i s evidence t h a t , w h i l e the overt terms of the 
Convention were confined t o Central Asia and Persia, and while 
the r e g u l a t i o n of Anglo-Russian r e l a t i o n s there was the 
primary and o s t e n s i b l e purpose of the agreement, there was 
from the outset a r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t i t had other f u n c t i o n s and 
would develop other purposes to the disadvantage of Germany; i t 
would strengthen B r i t a i n ' s hand i n r e s i s t i n g the Baghdad r a i l w a y 
i n the Middle East, and i t would a d j u s t the balance of power 
i n Europe to the advantage of France and B r i t a i n by d i v e r t i n g 
Russian energies away from i m p e r i a l adventures and back i n t o 
European questions. I n these c a l c u l a t i o n s , l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n 
was paid by the B r i t i s h t o the p r i c e which the Russians were 
l i k e l y t o demand i n terms of B r i t i s h support f o r t h e i r ambitions 
i n Europe; and there was i n s u f f i c i e n t r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t , the 
Russians having made the agreement at a time of weakness and on 
the basis of e x i s t i n g p o s i t i o n s i n Central Asia and Persia, 
w i t h o u t regard t o f u t u r e prospects, they were l i k e l y as they 
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recovered t h e i r s t r e n g t h to chafe at the r e s t r i c t i o n s i t placed 
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on t h e i r freedom of a c t i o n . I f they on the whole stood by 
the bargain they had made w i t h regard to Tibet and Afghanistan, 
t h e i r r o l e i n Persia was i n c r e a s i n g l y i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t and 
contrary to the s p i r i t of the Convention, and t h i s was i n the 
long run to cause Grey severe d i f f i c u l t i e s i n defending the 
Convention i n Parliament. That he continued to do so i s a 
cle a r i n d i c a t i o n t h a t there were, f o r him and h i s advisers i n 
the Foreign O f f i c e , c l e a r advantages i n m a i n t a i n i n g close 
r e l a t i o n s w i t h Russia which outweighed the disadvantages of 
being associated w i t h her p o l i c y i n Persia. 
5.2 The Anglo-Russian Convention Debated, February 1908 
As we have seen, the L i b e r a l government l a i d the 
Convention signed on 31 August 1907 before Parliament i n time 
f o r the new session which began on 29 January 1908. I t was 
debated i n the Commons at what was p r a c t i c a l l y the e a r l i e s t 
o p p o r t u n i t y , on 17 February. Since the achievement of an 
agreement w i t h Russia on i m p e r i a l questions had been one of 
the longstanding ambitions of the Conservatives, and p a r t i c u l a r l y 
of Lord Lansdowne as Foreign Secretary from 1900 to 1905, i t may 
at f i r s t s i g h t seem s u r p r i s i n g t h a t the debate should have taken 
place, not on a government motion t o take note of the Convention, 
but on a Conservative motion which, w h i l e i t welcomed the 
p r i n c i p l e of the agreement, was c r i t i c a l of i t s t e r m s . ^ I t 
was as an understanding r e l a t i n g to Asian a f f a i r s t h a t the 
Convention was debated i n both Lords and Commons, and there was 
no discussion of i t s bearing on the European balance of power 
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or B r i t i s h s e c u r i t y against German am b i t i o n s , except b r i e f l y 
i n the context of the Baghdad r a i l w a y ; i n t h i s Parliament 
was of course f o l l o w i n g the terms of the Convention as p r i n t e d 
and as presented and j u s t i f i e d by the government. Nor was Grey 
unduly d i s t u r b e d by the Conservative c r i t i c i s m s , f o r i n the 
House of Lords debate Lansdowne had, as expected, emphasised 
the c o n t i n u i t y of Grey's Russian p o l i c y w i t h h i s own, and h i s 
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speech was regarded as 'summing up i n favour of the Convention' 
P r e d i c t a b l y , Curzon attacked the agreement as throwing away 
'the e f f o r t s of our diplomacy and our trade f o r more than a 
century', but i t was e n t i r e l y p r e d i c t a b l e t h a t he should do so, 
and he could be discounted since he was so c l e a r l y at odds w i t h 
the leadership and p o l i c y of h i s own p a r t y on t h i s issue. The 
debate i n the Commons was more c r i t i c a l f o r the government becaus 
of the danger t h a t many of i t s own supporters would j o i n the 
Conservatives i n c r i t i c i s i n g the p o l i c y of the Convention, 
a l b e i t from a d i f f e r e n t p o i n t of view. The Secretary of State 
f o r I n d i a , John Morley, who was himself a Gladstonian of the 
o l d school and s t r o n g l y committed t o the Convention as r e s o l v i n g 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l antagonisms and ensuring the s t a b i l i t y of the 
Indian f r o n t i e r , expected what he c a l l e d a 'compound a t t a c k ' 
from the advocates of the forward p o l i c y on the one hand, and 
the extreme Radicals h o s t i l e to any understanding w i t h the 
'despotic bureaucracy' of Russia on the o t h e r . ^ There had indee 
been p r o t e s t s against the Convention from l o c a l L i b e r a l 
a s s o c i a t i o n s , some Chambers of Commerce, branches of the 
Independent Labour Party and of the Social-Democratic Federation 
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and other humanitarian and r a d i c a l bodies. But t h i s c r i t i c i s m 
was a l l based, as Morley r i g h t l y n o t i c e d , on h o s t i l i t y t o Russia 
and on considerations d i r e c t l y connected w i t h B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s 
i n P ersia, and not at a l l on any perception of the Russian 
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agreement as an anti-German instrument. The only MP t o 
c r i t i c i s e the Convention i n i t s bearing upon Germany was the 
E a r l of Ronaldshay, a Conservative back bencher who was a 
convinced Curzonite (he had indeed been Curzon's aide-de-camp 
i n I n d i a ) and who attacked the Convention r o o t and branch; 
but he accused the government of seeking a combination w i t h 
Russia against Germany f o r the purpose of b l o c k i n g the Baghdad 
r a i l w a y (not w h o l l y mistakenly, as we have seen); even: he: d i d not 
suggest t h a t they were b u i l d i n g an anti-German combination i n 
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Europe. 
Why then d i d the Conservatives put down t h e i r motion 
and t h e r e f o r e r a i s e a debate which would re-open the o l d wounds 
of Curzon and the forward policy? From the speeches of E a r l 
Percy, who had been Under-Secretary f o r Foreign A f f a i r s under 
Lansdowne and who introduced the motion, of Balfour h i m s e l f , 
and of other Conservatives, i t i s c l e a r t h a t they genuinely 
believed t h a t the Persian agreement had given away too much to 
Russia, had not secured f o r B r i t a i n a s u f f i c i e n t l y l a r g e or 
valuable sphere of i n f l u e n c e i n the south, and had s e r i o u s l y 
damaged B r i t a i n ' s commercial i n t e r e s t s i n Persia t o the b e n e f i t 
of the Russians. 
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This l a s t was an argument c a l c u l a t e d to appeal also 
to L i b e r a l s who had commercial l i n k s w i t h Persia or who 
represented c o n s t i t u e n c i e s which traded t h e r e , and would show 
the f o r e i g n p o l i c y of the government i n a weak and even u n p a t r i o t i c 
l i g h t . The debate of course also gave an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r Radical 
c r i t i c i s m , which would be embarrassing t o Grey, but there i s 
no reason to suppose t h a t the Conservatives wished t o d i s c o m f i t 
him t o the extent t h a t the p r i n c i p l e of the Convention would be 
jeopardised; a f t e r a l l , as Lansdowne had s t a t e d i n the Lords, 
the p o l i c y of the Convention was t h e i r p o l i c y a l s o , and indeed 
at the end of the debate Balfour was t o withdraw the Opposition 
motion, so t h a t there was no d i v i s i o n and consequently no 
o p p o r t u n i t y f o r opponents of the Convention, whether i m p e r i a l i s t 
or Radical, t o demonstrate whatever s t r e n g t h they had. I t i s 
only from the speeches of those who were c a l l e d by the Speaker 
t h a t we can gauge the f e e l i n g s of the House on t h i s , the f i r s t 
major f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e of the L i b e r a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 
I n moving the Motion, E a r l Percy was at pains t o s t r e s s 
t h a t the Opposition was f u l l y i n support of the broad p r i n c i p l e 
of the Convention and would, when i t r e t u r n e d t o o f f i c e , c a r r y 
out both i t s s p i r i t and i t s l e t t e r ; j u s t as the L i b e r a l s had 
upheld the a l l i a n c e w i t h Japan when they came to power, so 
the Conservatives would uphold the agreements w i t h Russia. 
But there were o b j e c t i o n s on important p o i n t s of d e t a i l . On 
T i b e t , Percy feared t h a t the government had gone too f a r i n 
excluding B r i t a i n as w e l l as Russia from seeking any concessions 
i n T i b e t , and had thus thrown away the b e n e f i t s as w e l l as the 
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disadvantages of the Younghusband ex p e d i t i o n . On Afghanistan, 
he constructed an ingenious argument to show t h a t the agreement 
w i t h Russia would give her a r i g h t of supe r v i s i o n over B r i t i s h 
r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Amir, even though Russia was h e r s e l f 
precluded from mai n t a i n i n g any contacts on her own account. 
But h i s main c r i t i c i s m s were reserved f o r the agreement on 
Persia, which he argued had surrendered too many B r i t i s h 
i n t e r e s t s i n r e t u r n f o r too few b e n e f i t s ; i n p a r t i c u l a r he 
feared t h a t the l a r g e n e u t r a l zone i n c l u d i n g the whole Gulf 
l i t t o r a l would be l e f t open to commercial p e n e t r a t i o n by 
t h i r d powers, w h i l e Russia would be able, q u i t e l e g i t i m a t e l y 
under the terms of the agreement, to monopolise the commercial 
development of the n o r t h ; and he maintained t h a t s u b s t a n t i a l and 
e x i s t i n g B r i t i s h t r a d i n g i n t e r e s t e d which crossed the f r o n t i e r s of 
these two zones would be s a c r i f i c e d : 
The more e x p l i c i t l y and l i b e r a l l y we recognise 
the r i g h t of Russia to complete c o n t r o l over the 
trade of the whole of northern Persia, the more 
c a r e f u l we ought t o have been to safeguard B r i t i s h 
i n t e r e s t s i n southern Persia. [But, f o r example] 
the ... B r i t i s h route running from Baghdad through 
Khanikin [on the Turkish-Persian f r o n t i e r ] to Tehran, 
which c a r r i e d B r i t i s h trade t o the amount of n e a r l y 
a m i l l i o n [pounds] a year, and i s the most important 
of a l l , has been placed from s t a r t t o f i n i s h i n 
the Russian sphere, and under the absolute c o n t r o l 
of our c h i e f commercial competitors ... 
I n a d d i t i o n , an i n c e n t i v e had been given f o r the Russians t o 
reach an agreement w i t h the German company f i n a n c i n g and 
c o n s t r u c t i n g the Baghdad r a i l w a y , f o r a Baghdad-Khanikin-
Tehran branch l i n e which, under t h e i r j o i n t c o n t r o l , would 
e f f e c t i v e l y exclude B r i t i s h e n t e r p r i s e . ( I t may i n passing be 
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observed t h a t t h i s was indeed the deal s t r u c k by Germany and 
Russia at the Potsdam meeting i n 1910, though i n the end i t 
proved t o be a b o r t i v e . ) But t o Percy, the most serious danger 
was t h a t the f r o n t i e r s of the spheres of i n f l u e n c e , i n the 
agreement defined i n economic and p o l i t i c a l terms, would i n 
p r a c t i c e become s t r a t e g i c f r o n t i e r s which would have the e f f e c t 
of advancing Russia's e f f e c t i v e f r o n t i e r deep i n t o Persia and 
so a c t u a l l y reducing d r a s t i c a l l y the area of the b u f f e r zone 
between the two great empires: 
What I am a f r a i d of i n connection w i t h the 
Government's p o l i c y i s t h a t , unless there has 
been a cle a r understanding as to the character 
and the l i m i t s of the i n f l u e n c e which the two 
Powers are at l i b e r t y t o exercise i n t h e i r 
r e s p e c t i v e spheres, we s h a l l one day f i n d ourselves 
i n the p o s i t i o n of having e i t h e r to r e s i g n the 
exiguous r i g h t s we r e t a i n i n Persia under t h i s 
Convention or to take the serious step of occupying 
t e r r i t o r y i n order t o assert those r i g h t s 
e f f e c t i v e l y . 
Percy concluded by i n v i t i n g Grey t o make such explanations as 
would a l l a y the a n x i e t i e s of the House on these p o i n t s , and 
on the vexed question of h i s i n a b i l i t y to secure unequivocal 
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Russian support f o r B r i t a i n ' s p o s i t i o n i n the Persian Gulf. 
A f t e r Grey's long and d e t a i l e d defence of h i s p o l i c y , to 
which we s h a l l t u r n i n due course, the Conservative c r i t i c i s m 
was continued by the Curzonite E a r l of Ronaldshay, who was 
p a r t i c u l a r l y c r i t i c a l of the Persian p a r t of the Convention. 
Quite apart from the f o l l y of b u i l d i n g up the power of Russia 
i n Persia i n order to 'scotch' the German r a i l w a y p r o j e c t (an 
i n t e n t i o n a n g r i l y denied by Grey), there was the f o l l y of a d m i t t i n g : 
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... t h a t we no longer were prepared to 
uphold our p o s i t i o n of ascendancy i n the 
provinces of southern Persia, which only 
a few years ago a repres e n t a t i v e of the 
l a t e Government [ i . e . Lansdowne] declared 
i n terms which could not be mistaken we 
could not abandon f o r any cause whatever. 
We had also placed the southern c a p i t a l 
of Persia, Ispahan, under Russia. 
The small t r i a n g l e of t e r r i t o r y i n the south-east, Seistan, he 
regarded as a wh o l l y inadequate compensation f o r what had been 
surrendered, and i t was not convincing t o claim t h a t the 
immunisation of the r e g i o n from r a i l w a y development by Russia 
was a r e a l gain, since the Russians had never had any i n t e n t i o n 
of a c t u a l l y attempting t o b u i l d a ra i l w a y i n such d i f f i c u l t 
t e r r a i n . Ronaldshay's experiences i n I n d i a had e v i d e n t l y made 
him e q u a l l y w e l l equipped t o c r i t i c i s e the Afghan p a r t of the 
Convention, which he d i d w i t h vigour and i n language of which 
Lord Curzon i n the 'other place' must c e r t a i n l y have approved; 
i n s h o r t , he argued t h a t what B r i t a i n had done was to surrender 
the a b i l i t y t o make preparations t o defend Afghanistan from a 
f u t u r e Russian m i l i t a r y encroachment. S i m i l a r l y , as regards 
T i b e t , he complained t h a t B r i t a i n had now deprived h e r s e l f of 
the means of ^enforcing Tibetan compliance w i t h e x i s t i n g trade 
agreements, and objected b i t t e r l y to the i n t r o d u c t i o n of Russia 
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i n t o the question of the evacuation of the Chumbi Valley. As 
the next speaker, D i l k e , remarked Ronaldshay had gone even f u r t h e r 
than the o f f i c i a l l i n e o f f e r e d by Percy i n h i s a t t a c k upon the 
Convention. 
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Since t h i s was a debate on an Opposition motion, i t 
i s curious to observe how few Conservatives spoke on i t , 
i n c o n t r a s t to the number of L i b e r a l s . Apart from the usual 
four f r o n t bench spokesmen (two from each s i d e ) , of the 
twelve backbenchers who spoke, only two were Conservatives, 
while ten were L i b e r a l supporters. Curious or n o t , t h i s 
provided ample o p p o r t u n i t y f o r the L i b e r a l exponents of B r i t a i n ' s 
i m p e r i a l and commercial i n t e r e s t s to expose t h e i r u n c e r t a i n t i e s 
about t h e i r own government's p o l i c y . There were no Labour or 
I r i s h speakers (though members of both p a r t i e s were l a t e r to 
become vehement c r i t i c s of the Convention f o r i t s i m p e r i a l i s t 
and pro-Russian tendencies) and, since there was no d i v i s i o n , 
i t i s not p o s s i b l e from the columns of Hansard to know how many 
of them were even there. Apart from Ronaldshay, e v i d e n t l y speaking 
as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the Curzonites, the only other Conservative 
speaker u n t i l B alfour wound up f o r the Opposition was Evelyn 
C e c i l who, representing what he c a l l e d 'a great commercial 
constituency' (Aston Manor), emphasised the great commercial 
s a c r i f i c e s which B r i t a i n was making and asserted t h a t the bargain 
was not a f a i r one; and expressed forebodings t h a t the past record 
of Russian adherence to promises made d i d not o f f e r much 
grounds f o r confidence t h a t t h i s time the agreements would be 
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observed. This view aligned C e c i l q u i t e c l o s e l y w i t h those 
L i b e r a l s who also feared t h a t , f o r the sake of securing an 
e s s e n t i a l l y p o l i t i c a l bargain w i t h Russia to safeguard the 
f r o n t i e r s of I n d i a against f u r t h e r Russian encroachment, the 
Foreign O f f i c e had too r e a d i l y s a c r i f i c e d the i n t e r e s t s of B r i t i s h 
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commerce. This p o s i t i o n was taken by Joseph Walton, who was 
another r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of a major i n d u s t r i a l constituency (the 
Barnsley d i v i s i o n of Yorkshire) and who had also t r a v e l l e d i n 
Persia: 
I t was a very great disappointment to him to 
f i n d t h a t the Baghdad and the Ispahan trade 
r o u t e [ s ] i n t o Persia were included i n the 
Russian sphere, and he thought t h a t i t would 
have been more e q u i t a b l e i f these had been 
placed i n the n e u t r a l zone. He f e l t t h a t there 
was a s p e c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y on a L i b e r a l and 
Free Trade Government, which objected t o 
p r o t e c t i n g our markets by imposing t a r i f f s on 
goods coming i n t o t h i s country, t o uphold and 
extend B r i t i s h markets i n every p a r t of the 
world. 
Walton also feared t h a t the terms governing the a c q u i s i t i o n of 
concessions i n the n e u t r a l zone, where B r i t i s h trade was a t 
present preponderant, would f a c i l i t a t e the b u i l d i n g of a 
Russian r a i l w a y t o a p o r t on the Gulf, which would mean t h a t 
i n due course B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s would f i n d themselves threatened 
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by a Russian as w e l l as a German r a i l w a y . However, by general 
consent the most informed and a l a r m i s t statement of commercial 
i n t e r e s t came from another L i b e r a l backbencher, H.F.B. Lynch, 
whose f a m i l y f i r m Lynch Brothers had extensive shipping and 
communications as w e l l as commercial i n t e r e s t s on the T i g r i s 
and Euphrates r i v e r s (Mesopotamia), as w e l l as on the Karun 
River i n south-west Persia and on the Persian l i t t o r a l of the 
Gulf i n general. P a r a d o x i c a l l y , Lynch was ( l i k e Grey) a L i b e r a l 
I m p e r i a l i s t and might have been expected to approve the i m p e r i a l 
defence aspects of the Convention, but he had prepared a powerful 
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a t t a c k upon the Convention f o r s a c r i f i c i n g not only undoubted 
and important economic i n t e r e s t s i n Persia, but also f o r 
abandoning those elements i n Persia who were sympathetic to 
B r i t a i n , and looked to B r i t a i n to defend the cause of 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m against the a u t o c r a c t i c a l l i a n c e of the Shah 
and the Russians; there was thus, according to Lynch, not 
merely a commercial but also a p o l i t i c a l d i s a s t e r i n the 
Persian?agreement. So lengthy indeed was Lynch's indictment t h a t 
he was unable t o d e l i v e r more than a summary of h i s main p o i n t s , 
and was reduced t o p u b l i s h i n g h i s f u l l t e x t i n the A s i a t i c 
Q u a r t e r l y Review. I t was t h e r e f o r e not merely as a merchant, 
but as a t r a d i t i o n a l L i b e r a l , t h a t Lynch c r i t i c i s e d h i s leaders: 
Whenever a people were engaged i n a s t r u g g l e 
f o r freedom [such as the Persian c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
r e v o l u t i o n of 1905-09], or ... i n a s t r u g g l e a f t e r 
s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n , they always f e l t t h a t England, and 
e s p e c i a l l y the Party to which he had the honour to 
belong, would take t h e i r p a r t and sympathise w i t h 
them and, i f circusmtances p e r m i t t e d , convert t h a t 
sympathy i n t o p r a c t i c a l support. 
This aspect appealed t o L i b e r a l p r i n c i p l e (which was t o become a 
common theme i n the l a t e r Radical attacks on the Conventions gave 
added weight t o h i s e x p o s i t i o n of the trade and communications 
of Persia; but as he was warming to h i s theme i n regard t o T i b e t 
and Afghanistan as w e l l , he was 'given to understand t h a t two 
r i g h t hon. Gentlemen [ i . e . Balfour and Morley] desired t o address 
the House', and was obliged to s i t down. But he had s a i d enough 
to i n d i c a t e a p o t e n t i a l l y powerful a l l i a n c e between commercial 
and i m p e r i a l i n t e r e s t on the one hand, and L i b e r a l and indeed 
Radical p r i n c i p l e on the other, i n mounting the l a t e r a s s a u l t s 
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on Grey's p o l i c y of the agreement w i t h Russia. He received 
some support f o r h i s p o i n t about the commercial loss t o B r i t i s h 
i n t e r e s t s involved i n the Convention from the L i b e r a l MP f o r 
S t i r l i n g s h i r e , Mr. Smeaton, but less than he might, f o r 
Smeaton was disposed to b e l i e v e t h a t the s t r a t e g i c b e n e f i t s 
of securing Seistan were r e a l , and t h a t the progress of the 
Russian people towards c o n s t i t u t i o n a l government (signs of which 
he was apparently able t o discern) would, i n due course, make 
Russia a supporter r a t h e r than an opponent of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
movement m Persia. 
And indeed, the defence of the Convention o f f e r e d by 
Grey i n h i s major speech e a r l y i n the debate d i d seem to have 
r a l l i e d most L i b e r a l speakers to the government's s i d e , and 
to have gone a long way t o reassuring the leaders of the Opposition 
( i f indeed t h e i r support had ever been genuinely i n doubt). 
Grey's approach was t w o f o l d : t o s t r e s s the s t r a t e g i c advantages 
which B r i t a i n gained by Russian exc l u s i o n from T i b e t , from 
Afghanistan, and from the south-east corner of P e r s i a , namely 
Seistan, which would make the I n d i a n f r o n t i e r much safer from 
f u t u r e Russian t h r e a t s thar\ would yiave been the case; and t o 
p o i n t out t h a t the supposed s a c r i f i c e s made by B r i t a i n i n the 
n o r t h of Persia were more apparent than r e a l , since Russian 
trade and i n f l u e n c e were already predominant i n the n o r t h , 
whereas the r e g u l a t i o n s governing developments i n the n e u t r a l 
zone and the r e a s s e r t i o n of B r i t a i n ' s s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s i n 
the Persian Gulf e f f e c t i v e l y insured her p o s i t i o n there. He 
even managed to argue t h a t the very i m p r e c i s i o n of the Persian 
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Gulf d e c l a r a t i o n was a s t r e n g t h and t h a t he would r a t h e r have 
t h a t than a statement confined to B r i t a i n ' s determination to 
r e s i s t any m i l i t a r y p e n e t r a t i o n . He shrewdly i n s i n u a t e d t h a t 
Percy's a t t a c k was a very d i f f e r e n t matter from the supportive 
statements made by Lansdowne i n the Lords, and was thus able 
by i m p l i c a t i o n t o i n v i t e Balfour to sum up by endorsing the 
Convention. And reviewing recent developments i n the Persian 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u g g l e , he was able to a n t i c i p a t e c r i t i c i s m 
from h i s own Radical supporters by observing t h a t , w i t h o u t 
the p o l i c y of the Convention to keep them i n l i n e , both B r i t a i n 
and Russia would have found themselves drawn i n t o i n t e r v e n t i o n 
already; given t h a t Tehran, the c a p i t a l , was i n the n o r t h where 
Russian i n f l u e n c e was predominant, and given t h a t the Shah's only 
r e l i a b l e troops (the Persian Cossack Brigade) were commanded by 
Russian o f f i c e r s , such i n t e r v e n t i o n would i n e v i t a b l y have been 
more t o the b e n e f i t of the Shah and the r e a c t i o n a r i e s than would 
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B r i t i s h support f o r the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s t s . U l t i m a t e l y , 
however, he based h i s defence on s t r a t e g i c a l imperatives: 
Anyone who has studied the question of Agreement 
between Great B r i t a i n and Russia would see t h a t 
the f i r s t p o i n t a l l through i n the minds of those 
who considered i t has not been the commercial but 
the s t r a t e g i c a l importance of i t . I t i s the 
s t r a t e g i c a l p o s i t i o n which makes the Agreement 
d e s i r a b l e and e s s e n t i a l ; and when you study the 
s t r a t e g i c a l p o s i t i o n you w i l l f i n d t h a t the key 
to the whole of i t i s Seistan. 
There followed a long e x p o s i t i o n of t h i s s t r a t e g i c a l imperative 
i n Grey's most m a g i s t e r i a l v e i n . Apart from Seistan, he argued 
t h a t the Russian r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t Afghanistan l a y beyond the 
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area of Russian i n f l u e n c e was a major reassurance f o r the 
defence of I n d i a , and t h a t the understanding about c o n s u l t i n g 
Russia about r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Amir was a small p r i c e to pay. 
As f o r T i b e t , nothing important had been surrendered by B r i t a i n , 
while Russia had agreed t o abandon any pretence t o i n f l u e n c e 
there. Grey concluded by urging upon the House t h a t the 
Convention both strengthened the p o s i t i o n of B r i t a i n i n Asia 
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and improved the prospects f o r peace. 
The o f f i c i a l defence of the Convention as expounded by 
Grey received strong support from an important group of L i b e r a l 
backbenchers, p a r t i c u l a r l y from those who regarded themselves 
as experts on questions of i m p e r i a l defence, l i k e S i r Charles 
D i l k e , and from L i b e r a l I m p e r i a l i s t s l i k e J.D. Rees; so t h a t , 
at t h i s stage, Lynch found himself separated from h i s f e l l o w 
L i b e r a l I m p e r i a l i s t s , and aligned r a t h e r w i t h those few Radicals 
who spoke up a t t h i s stage. Immediately a f t e r Rondaldshay's 
Curzonite onslaught, the redoubtable D i l k e gave strong support 
to Grey's defence of the Convention on s t r a t e g i c grounds 
(though he had some reser v a t i o n s about aspects of the agreement 
on A f g h a n i s t a n ) , and he looked forward t o the re d u c t i o n of 
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defence expenditure which i t would make p o s s i b l e . S i r Henry 
Norman c r i t i c i s e d the arguments advanced by Curzon i n the Lords, 
and from the weight of h i s long experience i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y 
( i t was he who had provoked the debate on the Anglo-Japanese 
A l l i a n c e i n 1902), he spoke approvingly of Grey's achievement 
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i n reaching t h i s r e c o n c i l i a t i o n w i t h the Russians." J.D. Rees, 
another longstanding exponent of B r i t a i n ' s i m p e r i a l i n t e r e s t from 
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the L i b e r a l benches, was also approving and urged t h a t 'the 
I n d i a O f f i c e as w e l l as the Foreign O f f i c e had great cause to 
be s a t i s f i e d w i t h the settlement t h a t had been e f f e c t e d ' . He 
thought t h a t the greatest danger t o I n d i a n defence would be a 
Russian r a i l w a y through Persia to the Gulf, and t h a t the 
agreement i n general and the despatch on the Gulf question i n 
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p a r t i c u l a r had done enough to obviate t h a t problem. Two 
r e t i r e d I n d i a n c i v i l servants l e n t the weight of t h e i r experience 
i n Grey's support; S i r John Jardine said t h a t : 
... a l l those who had had Ind i a n experience, 
and who had shared i n however small degree the 
great burden which rested upon the Government 
of t h a t country both ni g h t and day, would f e e l 
great s a t i s f a c t i o n t h a t t h i s country had s t a r t e d 
a p o l i c y of f r i e n d l i n e s s w i t h Russia, and had 
a c t u a l l y come to terms w i t h her. 32 
Si r Henry Cotton, who had been one of the main movers i n the 
press campaign i n 1903-05 against the Younghusband e x p e d i t i o n , 
expressed complacent s a t i s f a c t i o n t h a t the L i b e r a l government 
had i n e f f e c t adopted h i s p o l i c y on T i b e t , and had 'sounded 
the d e a t h - k n e l l ' of the forward p o l i c y (though he had some 
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r e s e r v a t i o n s about the Persian agreement). Other L i b e r a l s 
V 
cast doubt on the strictures u t t e r e d by Walton and Lynch about 
the e f f e c t of the agreement on trade i n Persia: E l l i s G r i f f i t h 
thought the damage t o trade much exaggerated, and t h a t the 
advantages of the Convention as a whole f a r outweighed i t " ; 
Thomas Hart-Davies, a Radical who had served i n the Indian 
j u d i c i a l s e r v i c e , though t h a t 'commercial a f f a i r s would p r o t e c t 
themselves', and t h a t the Convention would 'go a long way towards 
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securing peace w i t h Russia, and w i t h the whole world' ; though 
I l l 
Sraeaton, w h i l e favouring the agreement i n general, d i d endorse 
the o p i n i o n of Walton (and l a t e r Lynch) t h a t there would be 
some genuine loss of t r a d e . ^ 
When Balfour came to sum up f o r the Opposition, t h e r e f o r e , 
enough had been said from the L i b e r a l benches to make i t c l e a r 
t h a t the Conservative motion of c r i t i c i s m , i f pressed, would have 
no prospect of success, while the r e l a t i v e s i l e n c e of Conservative 
members might w e l l have suggested t h a t they would be unhappy 
about v o t i n g against a p o l i c y which was e s s e n t i a l l y a c o n t i n u a t i o n 
of t h a t of t h e i r own pa r t y p r e v i o u s l y . Balfour implied as much 
when he acknowledged t h a t he was convinced t h a t Grey, i n securing 
Seistan against the danger of Russian s t r a t e g i c r a i l w a y development, 
had 'obtained something f o r t h i s country which has genuine 
s t r a t e g i c importance', and when he agreed t h a t 'nobody on 
e i t h e r side of the House desires t h a t we should mix ourselves 
up w i t h the a f f a i r s of T i b e t ' . While i n s i s t i n g t h a t a b e t t e r 
bargain could have been s t r u c k w i t h the Russians, he ended by 
conceding t h a t what had been achieved had ' s u b s t a n t i a l advantages' 
f o r B r i t a i n and should lead to b e t t e r r e l a t i o n s and greater 
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s e c u r i t y . I n r e p l y to a j i b e from John Morley, the Secretary 
of State f o r I n d i a , who summed up f o r the government t o the 
e f f e c t t h a t Balfour and Percy should never have put t h e i r motion 
down and would be appalled i f i t were a c t u a l l y c a r r i e d , Balfour 
admitted t h a t he had no i n t e n t i o n of d i v i d i n g the House and 
withdrew the motion, which he attempted t o j u s t i f y as being 38 merely procedural and 'the most innocuous form of motion p o s s i b l e ' 
Morley then e l i c i t e d from him an admission t h a t the Conservatives 
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would accept and observe the Convention when they returned to 
o f f i c e , and stressed that both Balfour i n the Commons and 
Lansdowne i n the Lords had i n e f f e c t summed up i n favour of 
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the Convention. That Morley, ardent Gladstonian and opponent 
of the 'Empire of Swagger' should be so f o r t h r i g h t an advocate 
of the p o l i c y of the Convention, and should be so i n s i s t e n t on 
the advantages of s e c u r i t y and economy t h a t i t would b r i n g to 
I n d i a , was one important reason why so many L i b e r a l s who were 
by no means L i b e r a l I m p e r i a l i s t s should support i t ; and indeed, 
as we have seen, on the L i b e r a l benches i t was only those whose 
t r a d i n g i n t e r e s t s i n the region gave them an i m p e r i a l i s t tendency 
(Walton, Lynch) who found themselves i n alignment w i t h t h a t 
s e c t i o n of the Opposition which was i m p e r i a l i s t to the p o i n t of 
almost lamenting the abandonment of the forward p o l i c y (Percy, 
but above a l l Ronaldshay). Cl e a r l y the consensus of the 
House was i n favour of the Convention, and there was as yet 
remarkably l i t t l e s i gn of the Radical unease which Morley had 
feared. Only Lynch, and b r i e f l y Cotton, a n t i c i p a t e d the deep 
concern f o r the progress of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reform i n Persia 
which was t o surface i n Radical c i r c l e s during and a f t e r 1909, 
and there was as yet no major o b j e c t i o n to an agreement w i t h 
a u t o c r a t i c Russia. 
Nor was there any d i s p o s i t i o n to i n t e r p r e t agreement w i t h 
Russia as being s p e c i f i c a l l y connected w i t h the balance of 
power i n Europe, or w i t h the European alliance-systems. There 
was no Gibson Bowles (he had l o s t h i s seat i n 1906) t o observe, 
as he had done i n the debate on the Anglo-French entente, the 
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relevance of the Russian agreement to the 'older, simpler 
and, as I t h i n k , b e t t e r system of the balance of power'.^ 
The House of Commons seemed o b l i v i o u s to those c a l c u l a t i o n s 
of European s i g n i f i c a n c e made by some B r i t i s h policy-makers 
i n p r i v a t e . I t was as an Asian deal t h a t the Convention was 
presented t o them, and as an Asian deal t h a t they accepted i t . 
The idea of the Convention as completing a T r i p l e entente of 
B r i t a i n , France and Russia, which was so common by l a t e 1909, 
was not i n evidence i n i t s p u b l i c discussion i n e a r l y 1908. 
5.3 Radical Disenchantment w i t h the Russian Connection : the 
Persia Debate of March 1909 
The f i r s t signs of Radical discontent w i t h the p o l i c y of 
the Convention were voiced by Lynch i n the debate of February 
1908. They were r e i n f o r c e d , again by Lynch but w i t h other 
support t h i s time, on 24 March 1909. When the supply r e s o l u t i o n 
was moved, p r o v i d i n g t h a t money be voted t o the government ' f o r 
or towards d e f r a y i n g the charges f o r C i v i l Services and Revenue 
Departments' f o r the f o l l o w i n g year, Lynch moved an amendment to 
reduce the Foreign O f f i c e vote by £100, ' i n order to r a i s e an 
urgent question of f o r e i g n a f f a i r s ' : a r e l a t i v e l y r a r e example 
of a c l a s s i c technique f o r r a i s i n g a debate on a t e c h n i c a l i t y 
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but w i t h the approval of the Speaker. His case was the stronger, 
as he explained, since he had t r i e d to e l i c i t a r e p l y from Grey 
i n the debate on the Address at the beginning of the session, but 
e v i d e n t l y w i t h o u t success, and indeed on the present occasion 
i t i s cle a r t h a t Grey had thought i t advisable to attend and to 
re p l y to the concerns expressed by Lynch and by h i s other Radical 
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a l l i e s , now much more a c t i v e on the Russian connection than 
they had been i n the debate on the Convention i n February 1908. 
The c h i e f concern expressed by Lynch was t h a t Russian m i l i t a r y 
i n f l u e n c e was growing i n northern Persia, thus t h r e a t e n i n g the 
s t r a t e g i c p o s i t i o n of B r i t a i n ' s Indian possessions and r a i s i n g 
the prospect t h a t B r i t a i n would have to intervene m i l i t a r i l y 
h e r s e l f i n response. I t may be observed t h a t Lynch was already 
a n t i c i p a t i n g what was t o become the main grievance against 
Russian a c t i o n i n Persia, a f u l l month before the major Russian 
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i n c u r s i o n got under way i n l a t e A p r i l . Russian m i l i t a r y 
i n t e r v e n t i o n threatened the continuing existence of Persia as 
a b u f f e r s t a t e p r o t e c t i n g I n d i a , and according t o Lynch was p a r t 
of a c a l c u l a t e d p o l i c y of m i l i t a r y support f o r the Shah, Russia's 
c l i e n t r u l e r i n Tehran, and emphatically against the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
and n a t i o n a l i s t movement (which had, u n t i l August 1907, enjoyed 
a degree of sympathy and support from B r i t a i n ) . Lynch demanded 
th a t t h i s i l l e g i t i m a t e a c t i o n by Russian o f f i c e r s should be 
h a l t e d , and t h a t B r i t a i n should exercise i t s i n f l u e n c e i n support 
of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l movement, and seek to secure Russian 
cooperation i n promoting good government i n Persia. 
Lynch was supported most v i g o r o u s l y by John D i l l o n , the 
I r i s h N a t i o n a l i s t , who broadened h i s speech i n t o a general 
c r i t i c i s m of Grey's e n t i r e p o l i c y towards Russia; also by another 
I r i s h member, S w i f t MacNeill, who complained at great l e n g t h t h a t 
proper c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n t r o l over f o r e i g n p o l i c y had been l o s t 
to the high-handed actions of the Foreign O f f i c e , inadequately 
supervised by Grey. The Radical c r i t i c i s m was continued towards 
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the end of the debate by G.P. Gooch, who c a l l e d f o r a p o l i c y 
of a c t i v e support f o r the Persian c o n s t i t u t i o n and a 
r e p u d i a t i o n of Russian i n t e r v e n t i o n . Even Joseph Walton, 
who praised the wisdom of Grey's Russian p o l i c y , which he 
maintained had already done much t o promote s t a b i l i t y i n 
Europe, 'having regard to the co-operation of England, Russia 
and France i n the Near East, i n the present Balkan d i f f i c u l t y ' 
(he meant the so-called Bosnian c r i s i s ) , urged a much stronger 
l i n e i n support of the r e s t o r a t i o n of the Persian c o n s t i t u t i o n , 
and looked forward to B r i t i s h i n f l u e n c e being used to involve 
Russia i n t h i s p o l i c y . Only Rees ( L i b e r a l I m p e r i a l i s t i n 
the course of a metamorphosis i n t o a Conservative) was d o u b t f u l 
whether the House could r e a l l y say anything u s e f u l on the 
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i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of Persia. 
To t h i s s e l e c t though not yet p a r t i c u l a r l y powerful 
group of Radicals, Grey r e p l i e d at some modest l e n g t h i n 
defence of h i s Persian p o l i c y , i n s i s t i n g t h a t i t was designed 
to promote c o n s t i t u t i o n a l government and s t a b i l i t y i n Persia, 
w h i l e avoiding excessive i n t e r f e r e n c e by B r i t a i n and Russia. 
As t o the i n f l u e n c e of Russia i n Tehran and the n o r t h , he used 
an argument t h a t was to become i n c r e a s i n g l y f a m i l i a r whenever 
the question of PerjLa came up: t h a t Russia's p o s i t i o n i n the 
n o r t h was an accomplished f a c t w e l l before the conclusion of 
the Convention, and tha t the agreement of the two great powers 
had i n f a c t helped to r e s t r a i n r a t h e r than encourage Russian 
p o l i c y : 
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Without the Anglo-Russian Convention, had the 
ol d s u s p i c i o n continued t o e x i s t between the 
two Governments, the o l d b e l i e f t h a t we were 
working t o take advantage of each other and 
to undermine each other's i n f l u e n c e i n Persia, 
i t i s , I t h i n k , a b s o l u t e l y c e r t a i n t h a t ... the 
amount of i n t e r v e n t i o n would have been much 
greater. 
This s p i r i t e d defence of a p o l i c y which was already beginning t o 
look d i s c r e d i t a b l e t o a growing s e c t i o n of Radical o p i n i o n was 
given general support by the only speaker from the Conservative 
benches (where they were perhaps enjoying the spectacle of 
p a r t y d i s u n i t y opposite them): E a r l Percy, s t i l l a c t i n g as 
Conservative front-bench spokesman on f o r e i g n a f f a i r s . The House 
then voted to approve the o r i g i n a l Supply motion w i t h o u t Lynch's 
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t e c h n i c a l amendment. C l e a r l y the government was at t h i s stage 
s t i l l ' able to secure the general assent of the House to i t s 
p o l i c i e s towards Russia and Persia: but the genesis of the 




THE ANGLO GERMAN ANTAGONISM : THE NAVAL QUESTION 1909 
6.1 Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism 
We have dwelt at some len g t h on the reception of the 
agreement w i t h Russia, since t h a t completed the network of 
agreements which the B r i t i s h entered i n t o between 1900 and 
1914, and which were consolidated i n t o the so-called ' T r i p l e 
Entente' which drew B r i t a i n i n t o war i n Europe at the beginning 
of August 1914. That war was of course fought against Germany, 
and was the consequence of B r i t a i n ' s f a i l u r e e i t h e r to reach 
a s i m i l a r agreement w i t h Germany or t o convince the German 
government t h a t , i n the event of war, B r i t a i n would stand 
beside France and Russia against German aggression. I t w i l l 
t h e r e f o r e be necessary t o review B r i t i s h r e l a t i o n s w i t h Germany, 
even though there was no German agreement equivalent to those 
w i t h France and Russia; indeed, the f a i l u r e to achieve one 
must be regarded as the p r i n c i p a l f a i l u r e of L i b e r a l f o r e i g n 
p o l i c y a f t e r December 1905. There can be no doubt t h a t the 
L i b e r a l s came t o o f f i c e genuinely committed to complementing 
the entente w i t h France w i t h an understanding w i t h Russia 
(which they achieved) but also w i t h Germany (which they d i d n o t ) . 
Nor i s i t the case t h a t there was no e x i s t i n g area of f r i c t i o n 
w i t h Germany susc e p t i b l e t o being resolved by an equivalent 
understanding; w h i l e there were perhaps no t e r r i t o r i a l 
c o n f l i c t s as there had been w i t h France and as there were w i t h 
Russia, there were disagreements over major issues such as the 
Baghdad r a i l w a y (which we have already touched upon), but above 
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a l l over the growing naval r i v a l r y between the two c o u n t r i e s , 
the r e s o l u t i o n of which was a b i g p r i z e which the L i b e r a l s 
would dearly l i k e to have secured. This i s not the place to 
describe i n d e t a i l the r i s e of the Anglo-German antagonism 
over the question of naval armaments, nor the intense r i v a l r y 
which developed i n the area of b a t t l e s h i p c o n s t r u c t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r 
a f t e r the launch of the r e v o l u t i o n a r y new b a t t l e s h i p type, the 
Dreadnought, by the B r i t i s h i n 1906. This t o p i c has been 
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exh a u s t i v e l y examined by other scholars elsehwere. But i t 
w i l l be necessary here t o consider the view taken by the House 
of: Commons of the Anglo-German naval r i v a l r y , the extent to 
which t h a t r i v a l r y determined the development of B r i t a i n ' s 
r e l a t i o n s not only w i t h Germany but also w i t h her entente 
p a r t n e r s , and the consequent bearing of German p o l i c y upon 
B r i t a i n ' s ' place i n the European balance of power and i n the 
European alliance-systems. 
Following the German navy laws of 1898 and 1900, which 
p r o j e c t e d a compact and s u b s t a n t i a l German f l e e t operating 
i n European waters and capable of t a k i n g on and damaging i f 
not d e s t r o y i n g the B r i t i s h f l e e t , the B r i t i s h Admiralty had 
i d e n t i f i e d Germany as B r i t a i n ' s most l i k e l y naval opponent i n 
3 
war no l a t e r than 1904. The d e s t r u c t i o n of the Russian f l e e t 
at Tsushima i n 1905 r e l i e v e d the B r i t i s h of some of t h e i r naval 
a n x i e t i e s and apparently made the 'Two Power Standard' as a 
y a r d s t i c k of naval s e c u r i t y a b s o l u t e l y safe f o r the foreseeable 
f u t u r e , but the launch of the Dreadnought i n 1906 provided the 
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Germans w i t h the o p p o r t u n i t y to overtake the B r i t i s h i n the 
most modern type of b a t t l e s h i p and had thus, by 1909 at the 
l a t e s t , made the two-power standard obsolete and had forced 
the B r i t i s h Admiralty to adopt a one-power standard plus a 
margin of sa f e t y against Germany as the e f f e c t i v e c r i t e r i o n 
against which B r i t a i n ' s own b u i l d i n g of f i r s t - c l a s s b a t t l e s h i p s 
and b a t t l e c r u i s e r s had to be assessed. Consequently, although 
under the leadership of Campbell-Bannerman the L i b e r a l s f e l t 
s u f f i c i e n t l y confident i n 1906 and 1907 t o propose to the 
Germans a r e d u c t i o n i n the c o n s t r u c t i o n of warships, and indeed 
to adopt a u n i l a t e r a l r e d u c t i o n i n B r i t a i n ' s c o n s t r u c t i o n ( f o r 
which they were to pay a heavy p r i c e i n the debate on the 
Conservative motion of censure i n March 1909) , the w i n t e r of 
1908-09 saw an ominous r e v i v a l of B r i t i s h a n x i e t i e s about the 
s e c u r i t y of B r i t a i n ' s naval predominance, on which not only 
European but also I m p e r i a l s a f e t y was seen t o depend. These 
a n x i e t i e s culminated i n the s o - c a l l e d ' a c c e l e r a t i o n c r i s i s ' 
of e a r l y 1909, the b i t t e r f o u r days of debate on the 1909 
Naval Estimates, and the Motion of Censure moved by Arthur Lee 
4 
and debated i n the Commons on 29 March 1909. The naval scare 
was p o w e r f u l l y supported by the Tory and n a v a l i s t press, which 
has been a u t h o r i t a t i v e l y shown to have been r e c e i v i n g c o n f i d e n t i a l 
i n f o r m a t i o n from the Admiralty on the German naval programme, and 
which i t published i n order t o embarrass the L i b e r a l government 
and t o b u i l d up an i r r e s i s t i b l e a g i t a t i o n f o r a large increase i n 
the naval programme."' The problem was not merely the r a t e of 
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c o n s t r u c t i o n of f i r s t class b a t t l e s h i p s (of the German 
equivalent of the Dreadnought type) announced i n the Novelle 
of February 1908 (an amendment to the basic German Navy Law 
of 1900), which provided f o r the c o n s t r u c t i o n of three f i r s t 
c lass b a t t l e s h i p s and one f i r s t class b a t t l e - c r u i s e r i n each 
of the four years from 1908 to 1912, although t h i s e s c a l a t i o n 
was s u b s t a n t i a l and alarming enough ( e s p e c i a l l y since the B r i t i s h 
had themselves departed from the r a t e of f o u r Dreadnoughts a 
year l a i d down i n the Cawdor memorandum under the Conservatives 
i n 1905, but abandoned by the L i b e r a l s i n the hope of reducing 
the pace of the Anglo-German naval r i v a l r y ) . ^ More alarming 
s t i l l , the B r i t i s h Admiralty was i n the w i n t e r of 1908-09 
gathering i n t e l l i g e n c e t h a t the German Admiralty was a n t i c i p a t i n g 
the published programme by i s s u i n g orders f o r e s s e n t i a l equipment 
such as guns and armour, so t h a t i n e f f e c t there was a r e a l (or 
at l e a s t an apparent) a c c e l e r a t i o n of the German programme; t h i s 
would f o r c e the B r i t i s h t o f i x t h e i r own naval c o n s t r u c t i o n f o r 
coming years, not upon t h a t published by the German government, 
but upon t h e i r own estimate of the p o t e n t i a l s h i p b u i l d i n g 
capacity of the German shipyards. Before the naval estimates 
were presented t o the House i n March 1909, Grey had held a 
number of c o n f i d e n t i a l conversations w i t h the German ambassador, 
M e t t e r n i c h , i n an attempt t o remove any misunderstandings on 
the question of German a c c e l e r a t i o n , but the German assurances 
were not s u f f i c i e n t l y c a t e g o r i c a l t o convince Admiral S i r John 
Fisher and the Admiralty Board t h a t the govern ment could s a f e l y 
base i t s f u t u r e p o l i c y upon the published programme. Instead, the 
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Cabinet ( a f t e r a prolonged and b i t t e r controversy) came forward 
w i t h a programme announced to the Commons by the F i r s t Lord 
of the Admiralty, Reginald McKenna, i n the opening day of 
debate on the estimates on 16 March 1909; the House was asked 
to approve funding f o r f o u r f i r s t class b a t t l e s h i p s immediately, 
w h i l e g i v i n g the government power to l a y down a f u r t h e r four 
(the s o - c a l l e d 'contingent Dreadnoughts') w i t h o u t f u r t h e r 
Parliamentary s a n c t i o n , i f the progress of the German programme 
was deemed s u f f i c i e n t to j u s t i f y them; and t h i s programme was 
a l l t o be counted w i t h i n the f i n a n c i a l year 1909-10, and was t o 
be w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c e to whatever the Admiralty deemed to be 
necessary f o r 1910 and subsequent years.^ 
I t was the debate on these estimates which confronted 
the L i b e r a l government w i t h i t s most serious Parliamentary c r i s i s 
over a matter touching on f o r e i g n p o l i c y , and not only i n i t s 
r e l a t i o n s w i t h i t s own Radical supporters (who had r e g u l a r l y 
c r i t i c i s e d what they regarded as 'bloated expenditure' on naval 
armaments),but also w i t h the Conservative Opposition, which had 
u s u a l l y u n t i l now been r e l i a b l e i n i t s support f o r Grey's 
e s s e n t i a l l y conservative and i m p e r i a l i s t p o l i c i e s . 
6.2 The Debate on the Naval Estimates, March 1909 
The debate on the estimates took place over four days, 
between 16th and 22nd March 1909, the House s i t t i n g as a 
Committee of the Whole House f o r t h i s purpose, so t h a t Members 
were allowed (as they would not be i n o r d i n a r y debate) to speak 
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more than once. These debates have been thoroughly examined 
i n a c l a s s i c work, Woodward's Great B r i t a i n and the German Navy, 
Chapter 11, so i t i s not proposed here t o analyse them exh a u s t i v e l y , 
but r a t h e r to examine them i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n s p e c i f i c a l l y t o 
f o r e i g n p o l i c y r a t h e r than defence, and w i t h reference to B r i t i s h 
g 
r e l a t i o n s w i t h Germany. Of course the estimates were discussed 
annually and t o include each year's debates i n a study of f o r e i g n 
p o l i c y would unbalance the study, g i v i n g undue a t t e n t i o n t o what 
was f r e q u e n t l y a matter of defence p o l i c y r a t h e r than f o r e i g n 
p o l i c y . The debate of 1909 i s however the best example of the 
way i n which the two areas of p o l i c y sometimes interconnected, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y since so many of the c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o debate put 
t h e i r arguments i n the l i g h t of Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s . The 
Radicals on the benches behind the government, f o r instance, 
were apt t o complain t h a t what they regarded as grossly i n f l a t e d 
estimates were the r e s u l t of Grey's f a i l u r e to achieve, or indeed 
to pursue w i t h s u f f i c i e n t v i g o u r , t h a t p o l i c y of a naval 
understanding w i t h Germany which had. been associated w i t h 
Campbell-Bannerman over the f i r s t two years of the government's 
existence. For the n a v a l i s t s (overwhelmingly represented on 
the Conservative benches), i t had been the weak p o l i c y of 
Campbell-Bannerman, h i s i n a b i l i t y to r e s i s t the pressure f o r 
economy from h i s own Radical supporters, and h i s eagerness to 
c o n c i l i a t e Germany i n the v a i n p u r s u i t of an agreement w i t h 
Germany, which had brought B r i t a i n ' s naval defences to such a 
low p o i n t t h a t minimum naval s e c u r i t y could no longer be 
guaranteed even by such a large programme as the government now 
123 
proposed: Asquith, McKenna and Grey thus found themselves 
caught i n an uncomfortable c r o s s f i r e between the o f f i c i a l 
Opposition and t h e i r own nominal supporters. 
Over the four days of debate, apart from the four 
o f f i c i a l government spokesmen advocating t h e i r programme of 
four Dreadnoughts plus the four 'contingent' Dreadnoughts, 
there were f o r t y - t w o d i f f e r e n t speakers, many of them speaking 
more than once. Of these, eleven may be i d e n t i f i e d as Radicals, 
I r i s h and Labour, t a k i n g the t r a d i t i o n a l p o s i t i o n of h o s t i l i t y 
t o armaments expenditure associated w i t h Radicalism at t h i s 
time; on the other s i d e , there were nineteen Conservatives 
( i n c l u d i n g Balfour and Arthur Lee) adopting a strong n a v a l i s t 
p o s i t i o n and c r i t i c i s i n g the L i b e r a l s most v i g o r o u s l y f o r 
a l l o w i n g the s i t u a t i o n to a r i s e where i t now became possible f o r 
Germany to overtake B r i t a i n ' s necessary lead i n f i r s t class 
b a t t l e s h i p s ; apart from McKenna, Asquith, Grey and Macnamara 
(the government's f r o n t bench team on t h i s i s s u e ) , there were 
ei g h t L i b e r a l s who took a m i n i s t e r i a l i s t p o s i t i o n and may be 
counted as supporting McKenna's programme; w h i l e there were 
three L i b e r a l s and one Labour MP who took such a strong n a v a l i s t 
l i n e t h a t t h e i r r h e t o r i c was more o p p o s i t i o n a l than s u p p o r t i v e , 
although t h e i r support f o r the government would reassert i t s e l f 
i n the d i v i s i o n l o b b i e s . When the votes were counted i n the 
d i v i s i o n s at the end of the second day, the government had what 
at f i r s t s i g h t may seem to be unexpectedly comfortable m a j o r i t i e s 
i n view of a l l the c r i t i c i s m ; 246 to 152 on the procedural motion 
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to take the v o t e , and on the substantive motion to approve the 
9 
expenditure, a very comfortable m a j o r i t y of 322 to 83. This 
m a j o r i t y however was not as c l e a r - c u t as i t looked, and c a l l s 
f o r some comment. 
Those who voted 'Aye' on the f i r s t motion were v o t i n g 
merely t o b r i n g t h a t day's debate to an end by moving to the 
d i v i s i o n ; both the n a v a l i s t and the Radical c r i t i c s of the 
government could t h e r e f o r e vote together i n t h e i r wish to 
continue the debate (and indeed d i d s o ) , p a r t i c u l a r l y i f they 
had not themselves had the o p p o r t u n i t y of speaking. This explains 
the s i z e and the cross-party character of those v o t i n g i n the 
m i n o r i t y on the f i r s t d i v i s i o n . The second d i v i s i o n was, however, 
a very d i f f e r e n t a f f a i r since the p o l a r i s a t i o n was now between 
those who supported (however r e l u c t a n t l y ) the programme proposed 
by the A d m i r a l t y , and those who continued t o f i n d i t excessive. 
A close s c r u t i n y of those who voted against the second motion 
reveals t h a t they were e n t i r e l y composed of the government's c r i t i c s 
on the R a d i c a l , Labour and I r i s h benches, w h i l e those who voted 
f o r the motion were drawn not merely from Asquith's own l o y a l 
L i b e r a l supporters (whom we have categorised as m i n i s t e r i a l i s t s ) , 
but also i n s u b s t a n t i a l numbers from the Conservative o p p o s i t i o n , 
and also from those maverick L i b e r a l and Labour (there were no 
I r i s h ) n a v a l i s t s who were i n a sense more m i n i s t e r i a l i s t than 
the m i n i s t e r i a l i s t s . To an extent, there i s no mystery about 
t h i s ; i t would h a r d l y be possible f o r t h o s e ( n a v a l i s t s ) who thought 
the government's proposed programme was h a r d l y adequate to go 
i n t o the lobby w i t h those who thought i t was excessive or, i n 
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other words, on a substantive motion to vote w i t h 'extremists' 
of the opposing persuasion; thus i n the l o b b i e s , i f not i n the 
debate, the L i b e r a l government could i n p r a c t i c e enjoy the 
support of the Opposition even i f they found i t embarrassing. 
Thus mainstream L i b e r a l s plus Conservatives could agree t h a t 
the r i s e of the German navy must be met by at l e a s t the 
minimum programme of ei g h t Dreadnoughts i m p l i e d i n the statement 
of McKenna, and e x p l i c i t l y promised by Asquith i n the event of 
German a c c e l e r a t i o n being e s t a b l i s h e d . ^ ^ Opposition was confined 
to the t r a d i t i o n a l opponents of 'bloated' expenditure on 
armaments. But i t i s p r e c i s e l y t h e i r weak showing which c a l l s 
f o r comment; i t was, a f t e r a l l , a major p a r t of t h e i r case t h a t 
the problem was not merely w i t h the general d i s p o s i t i o n of 
governments to waste scarce resources on expensive armaments, 
but w i t h the s p e c i f i c f a i l u r e of the L i b e r a l s t o seek w i t h 
s u f f i c i e n t energy an agreement w i t h Germany, which would cl e a r 
the way f o r reductions I n naval expenditure. I n a Parliament 
which had an o v e r a l l L i b e r a l m a j o r i t y , w i t h a Gladstonian 
m a j o r i t y plus a l a r g e Radical wing, together w i t h a small but 
s i g n i f i c a n t Labour party of around 40 w i t h an I r i s h N a t i o n a l i s t 
p a r t y of over 80, a vote i n favour of economy on armaments 
expenditure of no more than 83 ( w i t h a m a j o r i t y f o r the advocates 
of a b i g navy of over 230) must seem d e r i s o r y . The r e a l question 
must be, what happened to the Radical vote and the cause of 
agreement w i t h Germany to complement the e x i s t i n g agreements 
w i t h France and Russia? 
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The answer here l i e s not w i t h anything said i n debate 
by the n a v a l i s t s on the Conservative s i d e , but by the devastating 
r e v e l a t i o n s made by McKenna i n h i s opening speech, and above a l l 
by Asquith i n h i s e x t r a o r d i n a r y appeal t o h i s own back-bench 
c r i t i c s . The whole debate was c h a r a c t e r i s e d by exchanges of a 
complicated nature about rates of progress i n naval b u i l d i n g , 
dates of completion, and arms and s h i p b u i l d i n g capacity, i n which 
the Opposition spokesmen ( e s p e c i a l l y B a l f o u r ) ^ had sought to 
show t h e i r superior knowledge and wisdom. But Asquith's purpose 
was d i f f e r e n t , t o reassure h i s anxious supporters on the Radical 
benches t h a t the s i t u a t i o n was as grave as the government said 
i t was, and t h a t the government's programme (dismaying as i t 
might b e ) , was e s s e n t i a l ; i n other words, he sought t o head o f f 
the Radical r e v o l t against a b i g navy programme which he feared. 
His c l o s i n g statement on 16 March produced an e f f e c t which was 
reported t o be devastating to h i s own supporters: 
I speak q u i t e f r a n k l y t o the House, because I 
am o b l i g e d t o t e l l them these matters i n order 
to l e t them understand why we economists [ i n 
naval estimates] have presented these Estimates 
to the House: there has been such an enormous 
development i n Germany ... i n the p r o v i s i o n f o r 
gun mountings and armaments of those great monsters, 
those Dreadnoughts which are now the dominating type 
of ship ... t h a t we could no longer take t o ourselves, 
as we could a year ago w i t h reason, the consoling 
and comforting r e f l e c t i o n t h a t we have the advantage 
i n the speed and the r a t e a t which ships can be 
constructed. ... I t h i n k t h a t Hon. Members on t h i s 
side of the House should t h i n k twice or t h r i c e before 
they refuse to the govSpnent the power which we are 
asking the House to give. ^ 
This powerful appeal to p a t r i o t i s m and t o p a r t y l o y a l t y had i t s 
e f f e c t , and goes a long way to e x p l a i n i n g why Radical c r i t i c s 
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kept out of the 'No' lobby when the vote was taken (though most 
of them s t i l l could not b r i n g themselves t o enter the 'Aye' 
lo b b y ) . The next day, the same day as the d i v i s i o n was taken, 
one of the Radicals' leaders, A.G.C. Harvey, rose t o e x p l a i n 
t h a t , i n the l i g h t of "the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s solemn observations, 
he was withdrawing the h o s t i l e motion which he had p r e v i o u s l y put 
down; and although he went on t o r e g r e t the w a s t e f u l expenditure 
on armaments and to express the hope f o r an agreement w i t h 
Germany, he d i d not press h i s amendment and he d i d not vote 
against the government i n the c r i t i c a l vote (though he apparently 
could not b r i n g himself t o vote f o r them e i t h e r ) . The e s s e n t i a l 
gain which Asquith had achieved was the abstention of Radical 
13 
c r i t i c s such as Harvey. 
So long as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e L i b e r a l Radicals l i k e Harvey 
withdrew t h e i r r e s i s t a n c e t o the government's programme, i t d i d 
not matter so much to Asquith i f there remained a hard core of 
opponents determined to vote against the estimates i n any 
e v e n t u a l i t y . Their most e f f e c t i v e spokesman was the Labour MP 
Arthur Henderson, who had also put down an amendment against the 
estimates and who i n s i s t e d t h a t those who thought l i k e him were 
e n t i t l e d t o show t h e i r o p i n i o n i n the d i v i s i o n l o b b i e s , even i f 
they were a m i n o r i t y . Of the withdrawal of Harvey's amendment, 
he complained t h a t there had been 'too much w i r e - p u l l i n g i n 
connection w i t h t h i s debate', and i n s i s t e d t h a t , since h i s own 
amendment was not to be c a l l e d , he and h i s f r i e n d s would i n s i s t 
on ' a v a i l i n g ourselves of the only o p p o r t u n i t y there i s l e f t t o 
us, to d i v i d e against the main question: "That the Speaker do 
now leave the Chair", to show our p r o t e s t ' , which they duly d i d , 
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and so revealed t h e i r own r e l a t i v e i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s against the 
powerful appeal already made by Asquith. When the debate 
resumed the next day, the n a v a l i s t s pressed on w i t h t h e i r 
accusation t h a t the programme proposed was inadequate to 
secure the sa f e t y of B r i t a i n ' s naval and i m p e r i a l communications, 
w i t h a powerful speech from Commander Carlyon B e l l a i r s , a 
L i b e r a l who i n 1909 j o i n e d the Conservatives, apparently because 
of h i s d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h the movement's naval p o l i c i e s . 
B e l l a i r s gave the most naked expression i n the whole debate t o 
the submerged f e a r of Germany which underlay the n a v a l i s t 
p o s i t i o n : 
When we are asKjed whether we are going to war 
w i t h Germany, my answer i s t h a t the o b j e c t of 
in c r e a s i n g our Navy i s t o prevent a war w i t h 
Germany. We cannot lose s i g h t of the f a c t t h a t 
Germany has undertaken three [si£] aggressive 
wars w i t h i n the l a s t 50 years. The German 
Empire was founded i n blood, was consolidated 
i n blood, and was extended by blood. We know 
t h a t the p r e v a i l i n g sentiment of the German 
people i s h o s t i l e to t h i s country, ( c r i e s of 
'No, No') . . . 1 5 
But of course the moral t h a t B e l l a i r s (and those who thought 
l i k e him) drew from t h i s gloom y scenario was not t h a t B r i t a i n 
should t h e r e f o r e draw closer t o the n a t u r a l anti-German 
c o a l i t i o n i n Europe f o r mutual p r o t e c t i o n , but on the c o n t r a r y , 
t h a t she should take more energetic measures t o ensure her own 
s e c u r i t y on her own; the German alarm d i d n o t , or not n e c e s s a r i l y , 
lead to the conclusion t h a t B r i t a i n should develop a balance-of-
power p o l i c y i n Europe, but r a t h e r t h a t there was no s u b s t i t u t e 
f o r m a i n t a i n i n g powerful naval defences single-handed. This 
129 
p o s i t i o n , though as we have seen most c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y expressed 
by a vehement n a v a l i s t from the L i b e r a l benches, may be seen as 
un d e r l y i n g the views of n a v a l i s t s on a l l sides of the House, 
i n c l u d i n g the Conservative benches; i t was l e f t to the Radical 
c r i t i c s of the government to p o i n t t o the f o r e i g n p o l i c y 
i m p l i c a t i o n s of the Anglo-German naval r i v a l r y , and of course 
t h e i r s o l u t i o n was not f o r a balance-of-power courtship of 
France and Russia, but r a t h e r an engagement w i t h Germany h e r s e l f . 
As the r i s i n g Labour MP Fred Maddison put i t , on the f o u r t h and 
l a s t day of debate: 
I b e l i e v e there are resources of statesmanship 
which have not been exhausted, or y e t entered 
upon, w i t h a r e a l b e l i e f t h a t they could accomplish 
something. My charge against the d i p l o m a t i s t i s 
t h a t he has not had so much f a i t h i n diplomacy as 
the s o l d i e r has i n war. When once the d i p l o m a t i s t 
b e l i e v e s t h a t he has mighty powers, something 
more s u b s t a n t i a l w i l l be achieved. 16 
Without naming Grey, he could hardly have u t t e r e d a ster n e r 
reproof t o the author of the cabinet's German p o l i c y ; but he was 
f o r the moment i n a small m i n o r i t y . The House adopted the 
estimates w i t h o u t f u r t h e r d i v i s i o n , and the Conservatives pressed 
ahead w i t h t h e i r s t r o n g l y n a v a l i s t motion of censure against the 
government. 
6.3 The Conservative Motion of Censure : 29 March 1909 
This motion arose d i r e c t l y out of the debates i n Committee 
on the naval estimates, and p a r t i c u l a r l y the perception of the 
Conservatives t h a t the L i b e r a l government was vulnerable to the 
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accusation t h a t i t had f a i l e d adequately t o provide f o r n a t i o n a l 
s e c u r i t y i n naval armaments against the p o t e n t i a l t h r e a t of the 
dramatic r i s e i n German naval power. I t was Asquith himself 
who provided the j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r i t . I n h i s powerful speech 
on 16 March, which was p r i m a r i l y addressed to h i s own backbenchers 
and which was designed to deter them from v o t i n g against the 
government on grounds of economy, he at the same time o f f e r e d t o 
the n a v a l i s t Opposition what might be termed a hostage to f o r t u n e ; 
i f the new naval s i t u a t i o n created by the t h r e a t of German 
a c c e l e r a t i o n was so t h r e a t e n i n g as t o demand t h a t the 'economists' 
on the L i b e r a l benches should swallow t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s , 
and accede to the demand f o r an unprecedented and l a r g e 
c o n s t r u c t i o n programme, then c l e a r l y the government was on i t s 
past record culpable f o r not having made adequate p r o v i s i o n , and 
sooner. This a t t a c k was a l l the more powerful since the 
Conservatives could p o i n t out t h a t i f the L i b e r a l s had adhered 
to the Cawdor programme of naval c o n s t r u c t i o n which they had 
i n h e r i t e d i n 1906, i n s t e a d of reducing i t i n successive years 
from 1906 t o 1909, the window of o p p o r t u n i t y o f f e r e d t o the 
Germans to overtake B r i t a i n i n naval s t r e n g t h would never have 
been opened. This was the e s s e n t i a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the vote 
of censure, and i t i s not easy to avoid the conclusion t h a t t o 
a large extent the L i b e r a l s had indeed brought t h i s p a r t i c u l a r 
problem upon themselves. 
Though the motion was e s s e n t i a l l y B a l f o u r ' s , i t was moved 
f o r the o f f i c i a l Opposition by Arthur Lee, t h e i r spokesman on 
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naval a f f a i r s . I n deploying the arguments against the L i b e r a l s ' 
inadequate defence p o l i c i e s , he was at pains t o deny t h a t there 
was any o b j e c t i o n to the German naval programme, or t h a t the 
problem arose from inadequate diplomacy. He asserted t h a t the 
German government had: 
... acted s t r i c t l y w i t h i n t h e i r own r i g h t s , 
and i t i s p e c u l i a r l y absurd f o r t h i s country 
to accuse them of treachery when they apparently 
made no secret of t h e i r programme. Accordingly, 
B r i t a i n has no l e g i t i m a t e grievances against 
Germany. The grievance, i f there i s any, i s 
against the B r i t i s h Government which landed 
the country i n t h i s predicament. ^ 
Lee c l e a r l y sought to l i m i t the Opposition's accusations of 
governmental inadequacy to the s p e c i f i c area of naval p r o v i s i o n . 
But the government was not prepared to accept t h i s r e s t r i c t i o n . 
I t i s perhaps s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t the leading spokesman f o r the 
L i b e r a l s immediately a f t e r Lee had sat down was n o t , as one 
might expect, the F i r s t Lord of the Admiralty, but the Foreign 
Secretary. Nor can t h i s be because McKenna was not able t o 
be present, because Hansard shows t h a t he responded t o some 
of Balfour's j i b e s when the l a t t e r summed up at the end of the 
debate, a f t e r Asquith had given the f i n a l statement of the 
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government's p o s i t i o n . Of course Grey, as a heavyweight 
Parliamentary spokesman f o r the rgovernment, was able t o d e l i v e r 
a strong defence of the naval p o l i c i e s of the cabinet, and no 
doubt he was a b e t t e r and more convincing House of Commons 
ap o l o g i s t than was McKenna; but he was also able to set the defence 
of the government's record on naval c o n s t r u c t i o n i n the context 
of Anglo-German d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s , which he d i d at some l e n g t h , 
arguing t h a t : 
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... since the present Government came i n t o 
o f f i c e there has been peaceful progression and 
improved r e l a t i o n s between ourselves and Germany... 
As long as the Morocco b a r r i e r which e x i s t e d at 
A l g e c i r a s was l i a b l e t o be erected again, of course 
we had a c e r t a i n f e e l i n g of discouragement t h a t 
the improvement of the moment might be again set 
back. That disappears w i t h the agreement [ o f 
February 1909] between Germany and France. And now 
as regards our f u t u r e d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s w i t h 
Germany, I see a wide space i n which both of us 
may walk i n peace and amity. Two t h i n g s , i n my 
o p i n i o n two extreme t h i n g s , would produce c o n f l i c t . 
One i s an attempt by us t o i s o l a t e Germany ... 
Another t h i n g which would c e r t a i n l y produce a 
c o n f l i c t would be the i s o l a t i o n of England, the 
i s o l a t i o n of England attempted by any great 
Continental Power [ i . e . Germany] so as t o d i c t a t e 
and dominate the p o l i c y of the Continent. That 
always has been so i n [ o u r ] h i s t o r y . ^ 
This remarkable statement by the Foreign Secretary f i r m l y set 
the debate about naval s e c u r i t y i n the context of the European 
balance of power, and moved the discussion from the question of 
naval s e c u r i t y w i t h i n the framework of i m p e r i a l s t r u c t u r e s t o 
the narrower but more immediate question of the European balance 
of px)wer. Grey d i d not need t o a l l u d e t o the understanding w i t h 
France or w i t h Russia e x p l i c i t l y t o ensure t h a t the supporters of 
the government were aware t h a t , behind the question of German naval 
p o t e n t i a l , l a y the whole question of B r i t a i n ' s European r e l a t i o n s ; 
but t h i s was not a matter on which the two f r o n t benches were 
d i v i d e d , and the vote of censure was not focused upon i t , so 
i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t the House d i d not f o l l o w Grey i n t h i s 
l i n e of argument, but p r e f e r r e d t o concentrate upon the s p e c i f i c 
accusation t h a t defence expenditure, r a t h e r than f o r e i g n p o l i c y , 
had l e f t B r i t a i n dangerously exposed to the r i s e of German naval 
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power.. On t h i s occasion, as i n the debates on the naval 
estimates which we have j u s t considered, the House c l e a r l y 
viewed naval defence as being a matter l a r g e l y divorced from 
the day-to-day questions of d i p l o m a t i c alignment. 
Whatever t h e i r motives i n b r i n g i n g forward t h i s vote 
of censure (and there i s evidence from t h e i r speeches i n 
Hansard t h a t the L i b e r a l s at l e a s t thought t h a t the Conservatives 
were e x p l o i t i n g the issue f o r e l e c t o r a l purposes), the 
Conservatives found themselves i n d i f f i c u l t y i n the House of 
Commons when the question came to a vote. I n the speeches 
themselves, the balance of argument was more or less even; 
Mr. Speaker c a l l e d seven Conservative back benchers who supported 
Balfour's motion of censure, and seven L i b e r a l s who opposed i t . 
I n a d d i t i o n , one Labour MP spoke i n support of the government 
20 
(there were no I r i s h speakers). I n the d i v i s i o n , however, 
the Opposition was h e a v i l y outvoted, there being 135 votes i n 
favour of the motion of censure, but 353 against i t ; so t h a t 
the government emerged from t h i s damaging episode w i t h a 
strong endorsement of i t s p o l i c i e s , i n s p i t e of the s t r e n g t h of 
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the Conservative case. The reason f o r t h i s i s c l e a r , t h a t 
the Conservatives almost wholly f a i l e d t o a t t r a c t support beyond 
t h e i r own Parliamentary s t r e n g t h (since B e l l a i r s was i n the 
process of abandoning h i s former L i b e r a l l o y a l t i e s anyway, h i s 
vote f o r the motion i s hardly s u r p r i s i n g ) , whereas the 
government was able t o r a l l y i n i t s support many Radical and 
Labour members who were c r i t i c s of i t s heavy expenditure on naval 
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armaments but were w h o l l y unable to vote f o r a Conservative 
motion which i n e f f e c t c a l l e d f o r even more; thus, f o r 
instance, of those who had spoken against McKenna's estimates 
i n Committee over the previous days, both Henderson (Labour) 
and Maddison (Labour) went i n t o the lobby i n support of the 
L i b e r a l government, as d i d Harvey ( L i b e r a l - R a d i c a l ) , Brunner 
( L i b e r a l - R a d i c a l ) , Cotton ( L i b e r a l - R a d i c a l ) and indeed most of 
the f r o n t bench's other Radical c r i t i c s . Thus the t a c t i c s 
of the Conservative o p p o s i t i o n had the paradoxical e f f e c t of 
u n i t i n g the L i b e r a l m i n i s t e r i a l i s t s and the Radicals i n defence 
of the government's naval programme, and exposing t h e i r own 
r e l a t i v e numerical i n f e r i o r i t y . Their motion might j u s t as 
w e l l have been designed t o consolidate the n a t u r a l m a j o r i t y 
i n t h a t Parliament i n support of the government, and i t e n t i r e l y 
f a i l e d t o tempt the government's own Radical c r i t i c s i n t o the 
lobby along w i t h the Conservatives themselves. Thus the r e a l 
s t r e n g t h of the government's p o s i t i o n was revealed by the v a r i o u s 
d i v i s i o n s on 17th and 29th March; i n p r a c t i c e they could count 
on the support of the Conservatives t o give them a large m a j o r i t y 
i n favour of t h e i r naval programme against t h e i r own back bench 
c r i t i c s , whereas they proved able t o r e l y upon those very same 
c r i t i c s t o support them when the Conservatives sought to brand 
t h a t naval programme as inadequate. Thus Asquith, Grey, McKenna 
and t h e i r colleagues were able comfortably t o survive the onslaught 
from t h e i r c r i t i c s both on the r i g h t and on the l e f t , and t o pursue 
the course of p o l i c y i n naval c o n s t r u c t i o n and i n the development of 
Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s which they had set themselves. 
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I t may be supposed t h a t the Parliamentary f u r y over the 
naval question was t h e r e f o r e i r r e l e v a n t to the development of 
f o r e i g n p o l i c y , but t h i s would be an e r r o r . There i s good 
evidence i n the d i p l o m a t i c record t h a t the debates i n the House 
of Commons d i d indeed have t h e i r e f f e c t upon German o p i n i o n ; 
and t h a t the evident determination of even a w e l l - i n t e n t i o n e d 
L i b e r a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t o p r o t e c t B r i t a i n ' s naval supremacy a t 
whatever cost had a s a l u t a r y e f f e c t upon German p o l i c y . I t i s 
no coincidence t h a t , l e ss than three months a f t e r the government's 
announcement t h a t i t was (as expected) proceeding w i t h the f o u r 
contingent Dreadnoughts of the 1909 programme, the German 
Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, came forward w i t h comprehensive 
proposals f o r n e g o t i a t i o n s on the naval and r e l a t e d issues i n 
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Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s . Of course the content of these 
n e g o t i a t i o n s was unknown to Parliament, and indeed they d i d not 
i n the end r e s u l t i n the k i n d of agreement f o r which Grey would 
have hoped or which he would have been able t o recommend to 
the House; nevertheless, the extensive n e g o t i a t i o n s which 
took place between the autumn of 1909 and the s p r i n g of 1912 
c l e a r l y owed something t o the determination showed by both 
government and Parliament i n the debates and d i v i s i o n s of 
March 1909. At the very l e a s t , as one h i s t o r i a n of t h i s 
question has argued, they served t o convince the German 
government t h a t , on the one hand, the B r i t i s h would go t o what-
ever lengths were necessary t o preserve t h e i r naval s e c u r i t y ; 
but t h a t , on the o t h e r , a genuine agreement w i t h Germany enabling them 
to reduce t h e i r naval expenditure was so a t t r a c t i v e t h a t they would 
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perhaps be w i l l i n g t o pay a high p o l i t i c a l p r i c e t o secure 
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i t . However embarrassing the naval debates of 1909 may 
have been i n domestic terms (though, as we have seen, the 
government was w e l l able t o survive them), i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
terms they proved t o be conducive to the development of 
Grey's long term s t r a t e g y of an understanding w i t h Germany 
on the naval question. 
* * * 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
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PARLIAMENT AND THE BALANCE OF POWER IN EUROPE: 
THE DEBATE OF NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1911 
7.1 Parliament and Foreign A f f a i r s 1909-1911 
From the middle of 1909 onwards, the B r i t i s h government 
was a c t u a l l y pursuing a balance-of-power p o l i c y as regards 
Germany, though r e l u c t a n t to acknowledge t h i s p u b l i c l y . As 
e a r l y as May 1909 Grey c i r c u l a t e d B r i t i s h embassies abroad 
w i t h an i n s t r u c t i o n to avoid the use of the term ' t r i p l e 
entente' w i t h regard t o the combination of France, Russia and 
B r i t a i n : 
The expression i s one which i s no doubt 
convenient, but i f i t appeared i n a Parliamentary 
Bluebook i t would be assumed to have some s p e c i a l 
o f f i c i a l meaning, and might provoke inconvenient 
comment or i n q u i r y . ! 
S i r Charles Hardinge, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign 
O f f i c e , explained p r i v a t e l y t h a t t h i s was also t o save Grey 
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embarrassment i n Cabinet, and t o avoid o f f e n d i n g Germany. I n 
p r i v a t e Grey was however more unguarded, on one occasion a t t h i s 
time observing t o the German ambassador t h a t : 
... i t was a question of preventing the balance 
of power from being destroyed. I f ... France and 
Russia were convinced t h a t England was no use, and 
they must abandon her and make f r i e n d s w i t h the 
T r i p l e A l l i a n c e , the r e s u l t would be a qu i n t u p l e 
a l l i a n c e which would leave England i s o l a t e d . 3 
This p o l i c y was e v i d e n t l y t h e r e f o r e defensive r a t h e r than o f f e n s i v e , 
aimed at preventing the domination of Europe by Germany but n o t , 
138 
as the Kaiser was prone to a l l e g e , securing her i s o l a t i o n or 
encirclement. I n p a r t i c u l a r , Grey had no i n t e n t i o n of doing 
anything t o strengthen the connection w i t h Russia, l e a s t of 
a l l by co n v e r t i n g i t i n t o an a l l i a n c e , which i n the spring of 
4 
1909 the Russian government appeared to be seeking. This was 
an o p t i o n f i r m l y r u l e d out by Hardinge, w i t h the approval of 
Grey and Asquith, on the grounds t h a t i t would be unnecessarily 
provocative to Germany, would provoke a f u r i o u s r e a c t i o n i n 
p u b l i c and Parliamentary o p i n i o n , and was not necessary t o 
maintain B r i t a i n ' s i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y . I t w i l l be n o t i c e d 
t h a t there were held to be p e r f e c t l y sound f o r e i g n - p o l i c y reasons 
f o r not adopting a p o l i c y which, however, would also increase 
Grey's Parliamentary d i f f i c u l t i e s : Hardinge's memorandum was 
apparently composed i n the immediate aftermath of the Lynch 
debate on Russian a c t i o n i n Persia (March 1909) which we 
noticed at the end of Chapter Five, and also the naval debates 
of the same month. 
Apart from the c o n t i n u a l i r r i t a n t of Parliamentary 
Questions, however, a f t e r the German/naval and the Russian/ 
Persian debates of March 1909, the government was once again 
l e f t f r e e t o develop i t s p o l i c i e s abroad w i t h o u t serious 
Parliamentary c r i t i c i s m . Between March 1909 and November 1911 
there was no debate on f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n the House of Commons, 
although (as i n the p e r i o d 1904-1908 which we noted above i n 
Chapter Four) there were important developments i n f o r e i g n a f f a i r s . 
During the most acute phase of the Bosnian c r i s i s , during February-
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A p r i l 1909, the House was preoccupied w i t h the naval and 
Russian questions, as we have seen. The discussions on the 
Russian connection between A p r i l and August 1909 were not 
discussed i n Cabinet, l e t alone i n Parliament, although there 
was a s p i r i t e d Radical campaign outside Parliament against 
the v i s i t of the Tsar to Cowes i n August 1909. Even more 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y , the major Anglo-German n e g o t i a t i o n s on the 
naval question, which began a f t e r Bethmann-Hollweg's proposals 
of 21 August 1909, which were broadened t o include the Baghdad 
r a i l w a y and Persia, and the p o s s i b i l i t y of a comprehensive 
Anglo-German p o l i t i c a l formula, and which continued w i t h 
i n t e r r u p t i o n s r i g h t through to 1910 and i n t o the Summer of 
1911 - these v i t a l n e g o t i a t i o n s were not made the subject of 
Parliamentary debate, so the government was not obliged t o 
j u s t i f y i t s cautious approach towards the German proposals.^ 
These n e g o t i a t i o n s were suspended by the Moroccan c r i s i s 
p r e c i p i t a t e d by the despatch of the German gunboat Panther 
to Agadir on 1st J u l y 1911, but even t h a t acute i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
c r i s i s w i t h a l l i t s dangers of war was not debated i n Parliament 
u n t i l i t was over: t h i s being the reason f o r , though not the 
only subject o f , the great Commons f o r e i g n a f f a i r s debate of 
November and December 1911. 
The reasons why Parliament had once more apparently 
f a l l e n s i l e n t on f o r e i g n p o l i c y may b r i e f l y be i n d i c a t e d , as 
they are e s s e n t i a l l y the same as operated during 1904-1908. 
P r i m a r i l y , i n t h i s p e r i o d the main controversies i n Parliament 
and between p a r t i e s were about major domestic issues which 
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n a t u r a l l y and i n e v i t a b l y d i v e r t e d Parliamentary a t t e n t i o n 
away from the apparently more remote questions of f o r e i g n 
p o l i c y : i n p a r t i c u l a r , the acute c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c r i s i s which 
arose from Lloyd George's 'People's Budget' of 1909, and which 
led to the c o n f r o n t a t i o n between the House of Commons and the 
House of Lords, the two general e l e c t i o n s of 1910 (January 
and December), and the great Parliament Act of 1911 which 
f i n a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d the l e g i s l a t i v e as w e l l as the budgetary 
g 
supremacy of the Commons. The b a t t l e over these c r u c i a l 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l matters not only absorbed the a t t e n t i o n of 
p o l i t i c i a n s of a l l p a r t i e s , of the press, and of p u b l i c 
o p i n i o n ; but a l s o , and from our p o i n t of view even more 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y , i t n a t u r a l l y tended t o monopolise the Parliamentary 
t i m e t a b l e , so t h a t there was n e i t h e r demand nor scope f o r debates 
on f o r e i g n a f f a i r s . Thus, f o r example, when the Agadir c r i s i s 
was at i t s peak around 21 July 1911, the cabinet discussed what 
Grey should say t o the Germans i n p r i v a t e , but the pressure of 
Parliamentary business was such t h a t the p u b l i c statement of 
the B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n was made not i n Parliament (as might be 
expected) but by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lloyd George, 
at h i s t r a d i t i o n a l a f t e r - d i n n e r speech at the Mansion House on 
21 J u l y 1911. H i s t o r i a n s have perhaps not s u f f i c i e n t l y n o t i c e d 
the l i g h t which t h i s episode sheds on the i r r e l e v a n c e of Parliament 
to much of the government's conduct of f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n t h i s 
9 
per i o d . I t i s , of course, as t r u e as ever t h a t Parliament could 
not debate what i t d i d not know about, and t h a t the Foreign O f f i c e 
p r e f e r r e d to avoid p u b l i c discussion of s e n s i t i v e n e g o t i a t i o n s 
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such as those w i t h Germany on the naval and r e l a t e d questions, 
f o r f e a r t h a t premature d i s c l o s u r e or i l l - j u d g e d comment would 
destroy whatever prospect of success there was: and t h i s 
combination of secrecy and ignorance w i l l adequately e x p l a i n 
the i n a b i l i t y of MPs to i n f l u e n c e even such an important 
question of f o r e i g n p o l i c y . That, indeed, was p r e c i s e l y the 
complaint made by the Radicals when f i n a l l y they got t o have a 
debate on f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n November 1911. 
When Parliament reassembled a f t e r the summer recess of 
t h a t year, i t was i n the middle of rumours and anxiety t h a t 
B r i t a i n had come uncomfortably close to war w i t h Germany over 
the summer, a war which p u b l i c o p i n i o n and Parliament would have 
been powerless to i n f l u e n c e , so t h a t Radical op i n i o n was p r e d i c t a b l y 
alarmed; w h i l e Conservative op i n i o n was uneasy t h a t the Admiralty 
had not been s u f f i c i e n t l y a l e r t to the danger of a German a t t a c k . 
This p u b l i c concern would no doubt have been a l l the greater had 
i t been g e n e r a l l y known (as of course i t was not) t h a t the 
Committee of I m p e r i a l Defence had, at i t s epic meeting of 23rd 
August 1911, discussed the p o s s i b i l i t y of B r i t i s h i n t e r v e n t i o n 
i n a war between France and Germany a r i s i n g out of the Moroccan 
c r i s i s , and t h a t there had been open dissension between the 
War O f f i c e and the Admiralty over the form which such i n t e r v e n t i o n 
10 'f 
should take. B u t ( o r d i n a r y Members of Parliament d i d not know, 
the members of the Cabinet d i d , so t h a t there was not only a 
Cabinet c r i s i s over the m i l i t a r y connection w i t h France, but also 
an i n s i s t e n c e i n Cabinet t h a t Grey should a l l a y the l e g i t i m a t e 
ButV o r d i n a r y 
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a n x i e t i e s of Parliament and the p u b l i c by an open e x p o s i t i o n 
of the government's p o l i c y i n the c r i s i s . This was the genesis 
of the e x t r a o r d i n a r y and unprecedented debate which was h e l d , 
on a government motion, on 27 November 1911 and continued on 
14 December.^ The motion 'that the f o r e i g n p o l i c y of His 
Majesty's Government be now considered' was moved by Grey 
him s e l f , the f i r s t and only occasion i n t h i s p e r i o d when the 
Foreign Secretary i n v i t e d the House to a wide-ranging review 
of the government's f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n general, r a t h e r than 
c o n f i n i n g discussion to a s p e c i f i c t r e a t y or issue. That t h i s 
was done at a l l i n d i c a t e s how s e r i o u s l y the Prime M i n i s t e r 
and Cabinet took the unrest i n t h e i r own p a r t y and i n the 
country over the conduct of f o r e i g n p o l i c y . 
7.2 The Debate of 27 November 1911 : Grey on the Defensive 
Grey opened the debate w i t h a long defence of h i s p o l i c y 
i n the recent c r i s i s , and a review of B r i t a i n ' s r e l a t i o n s w i t h 
France and Germany i n i t , and apparently hoped t h a t t h i s would 
set the agenda f o r the r e s t of the debate ( i n which hope he was 
to be disappointed, f o r h i s Radical c r i t i c s were not about to 
l e t s l i p such a r a r e o p p o r t u n i t y to c r i t i c i s e other aspects of 
f o r e i g n p o l i c y ) . Having d e l i v e r e d h i s defence of h i s p o l i c y 
i n the recent c r i s i s , which was e v i d e n t l y convincing and 
s a t i s f i e d a l l but the i r r e c o n c i l a b l e Radicals, Grey went on t o 
discuss the p r i n c i p l e s of h i s conduct of p o l i c y : he explained 
t h a t he d i d not b e l i e v e i n secret diplomacy i n the sense of 
secret t r e a t i e s unknown to Parliament: 
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I t would be f o o l i s h to do i t . No B r i t i s h 
Government could embark upon a war with o u t 
p u b l i c opinion behind i t , and such engagements 
as there are which r e a l l y commit Parliament 
to anything of t h a t k i n d are contained i n 
t r e a t i e s or agreements which have been l a i d 
before the House. For ourselves we have not 
made a s i n g l e secret a r t i c l e of any kin d 
since we came i n t o o f f i c e . 
He went on to j u s t i f y the entente w i t h France and Russia as 
promoting the cause of peace: 
Our f r i e n d s h i p w i t h France and Russia i s 
i n i t s e l f a guarantee t h a t n e i t h e r of them 
w i l l pursue a provocative or aggressive 
p o l i c y towards Germany ... Any support we 
would give France and Russia i n times of 
t r o u b l e would depend e n t i r e l y on the f e e l i n g 
of Parliament and p u b l i c f e e l i n g here when 
the t r o u b l e came, and both France and Russia 
know p e r f e c t l y w e l l t h a t B r i t i s h p u b l i c 
o p i n i o n would not give support t o provocative 
or aggressive a c t i o n against Germany.^ 
Grey received a warm endorsement f o r h i s explanations and p o l i c y 
from Mr. Bonar Law (speaking f o r the f i r s t time on f o r e i g n 
a f f a i r s as Leader of the Conservative O p p o s i t i o n ) , whose main 
c o n t r i b u t i o n was to s t r e s s the importance of c o n t i n u i t y i n 
13 
f o r e i g n p o l i c y between the two p a r t i e s of government ; and 
indeed i t was c l e a r throughout the debate t h a t , a f t e r h i s 
e x p o s i t i o n , Grey was not going t o have t r o u b l e from the o f f i c i a l 
Opposition but could indeed expect t h e i r support f o r the f i r m 
l i n e which he had taken. But t h i s of course could not save him 
from the c r i t i c i s m s of the Radical members behind him, or indeed 
those leaders of the minor p a r t i e s who were supporters of the 
government on most domestic (and I r i s h ) issues, but r a d i c a l c r i t i c s 
on f o r e i g n p o l i c y . Speaking f o r Labour, Ramsay MacDonald o f f e r e d 
144 
a comprehensive a t t a c k on Grey's p o l i c i e s towards France, 
Germany and Russia and threw i n the question of 'bloated 
armaments' f o r good measure.^ For the I r i s h , John D i l l o n 
repudiated Grey's p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t the House was not kept 
i n ignorance, and scorned Bonar Law's a f f e c t i o n f o r the 
d o c t r i n e of ' c o n t i n u i t y ' i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y : 
•.. the moment there i s agreement between the 
two Front Benches t o withdraw the f o r e i g n 
p o l i c y of t h i s country from the sphere of 
p a r t y p o l i t i c s , t h a t moment you set up an 
i n e v i t a b l e and by l o g i c a l sequence a secret 
system of f o r e i g n p o l i c y ... What i s the 
nature and extent of the o b l i g a t i o n s by which 
t h i s country i s bound t o France i n connection 
w i t h a f f a i r s i n Morocco? The Foreign Secretary 
made an able speech, but he gave us no 
c a t e g o r i c a l answer t o t h a t p o i n t . ^ 
These speeches set the tone f o r the r e s t of t h i s day's debate. 
Of the f i v e Conservative back-benchers who spoke, James Hope 
was g e n e r a l l y supportive of Grey's p o l i c y i n Morocco, w h i l e 
Mr. Goldman was c h i e f l y concerned about the prospects f o r 
B r i t i s h trade there; but Mark Sykes, the E a r l of Ronaldshay, 
and Colonel A.C. Yate were a l l , i n d i f f e r i n g degrees, c r i t i c a l 
of the government's p o l i c i e s i n the Middle East and, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
and p r e d i c t a b l y , i n Persia where i t was a l l e g e d B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s 
were i n danger of being sold out to R u s s i a . ^ Of the f i v e 
L i b e r a l s who were c a l l e d to speak two, namely S i r J. Compton-
R i c k e t t and ( u n s u r p r i s i n g l y ) Asquith gave t h e i r support to the 
Foreign Secretary; the other three, namely Noel Buxton, D.Mason 
and S i r Henry D a l z i e l , w h i l e paying l i p - s e r v i c e to Grey's 
r e c t i t u d e and respect f o r the House, were c r i t i c a l of important 
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aspects of p o l i c y : Buxton urged a much more sympathetic 
a t t i t u d e towards what he regarded as l e g i t i m a t e German c o l o n i a l 
ambitions, Mason was f u r i o u s l y c r i t i c a l of B r i t i s h acquiescence 
i n I t a l y ' s war of i m p e r i a l conquest i n T r i p o l i , and D a l z i e l 
followed Buxton i n urging on Grey t h a t he should make a r e a l 
attempt to f o s t e r b e t t e r r e l a t i o n s w i t h Germany.^ The only 
other speaker on t h i s day was Keir Hardie (Labour) who mounted 
a powerful s o c i a l i s t - r a d i c a l c r i t i c i s m of the whole tendency 
of B r i t i s h p o l i c y , e s p e c i a l l y i n regard t o Russian p o l i c y i n 
Persia, and the ignominy of B r i t a i n ' s apparent acquiescence 
i n i t ; i n t h i s speech Hardie echoed the concerns expressed i n 
1909 by Lynch about the e f f e c t upon I n d i a n defence of Russia's 
18 
m i l i t a r y preponderance i n northern Persia. Thus already, on 
the f i r s t day of the debate, there was emerging t h a t combined 
c r i t i c i s m from both r i g h t and l e f t of Grey's Russian p o l i c y , 
which he had hoped t o avoid. This o b l i g e d him, towards the 
end of the debate, t o r e p l y w i t h h i s usual (almost weary by 
now) defence, t h a t w i t h o u t the Anglo-Russian Convention the 
s i t u a t i o n i n Persia would have been a great deal worse, Russian 
i n t e r v e n t i o n would have been u n r e s t r a i n e d , and a c o n f l i c t between 
B r i t a i n and Russia there would have been h i g h l y probable. He went 
on to defend some aspects of Russian p o l i c y i n Persia, i n s i s t i n g 
t h a t the Russians were doing no more than defend t h e i r l e g i t i m a t e 
i n t e r e s t s , and defended h i s p o l i c y there against the accusation 
19 
tha t i t was merely subservient t o Russia's. Since there was no 
d i v i s i o n at the end of t h i s debate, i t i s not possible to determine 
j u s t how widespread was the d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h Grey outside the 
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ranks of those who spoke, but the coming together of i m p e r i a l i s t 
and Radical sentiment against him, to the extent t h a t he f e l t 
the need to o f f e r a reasoned defence, i s s i g n i f i c a n t . 
Since Grey's two speeches i n t h i s debate were the 
nearest he came to p r o v i d i n g a general statement of h i s p r i n c i p l e s 
of p o l i c y , i n the forum of Parliament, i t may be i n s t r u c t i v e t o 
compare them b r i e f l y w i t h another statement which he gave, i n 
p r i v a t e , only s i x months p r e v i o u s l y . This was on the occasion 
of the I m p e r i a l Conference i n May 1911, when Asquith convened a 
s p e c i a l meeting of the Committee of the I m p e r i a l Defence to which 
the prime m i n i s t e r s of the Dominions were i n v i t e d , so t h a t Grey 
could 'preface i t s d e l i b e r a t i o n s by an e x p o s i t i o n , comprehensive 
20 
and s t r i c t l y c o n f i d e n t i a l , of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n . ' 
Much of what he said was banal, and most of i t could e q u a l l y 
w e l l have been sai d p u b l i c l y i n Parliament; indeed, there are 
respects i n which what he said t o the Commons i n November was 
more i n f o r m a t i v e than what he sai d to the Dominion prime m i n i s t e r s 
i n May. But there was one important respect i n which he a v a i l e d 
himself of the pri v a c y of the occasion i n May t o expound w i t h 
some frankness h i s overt balance-of-power p o l i c y w i t h regard 
to Germany: 
There i s no danger ... of our being involved 
i n any considerable t r o u b l e i n Europe, unless 
there i s some Power, or group of Powers, i n 
Europe which has the ambition of achieving what 
I would c a l l the Napoleonic p o l i c y ... I f we 
are ever involved i n t r o u b l e , i t w i l l not be f o r 
the sake of any ideas of aggrandisement or 
ambition, or any other v a i n , empty th i n g s of 
t h a t k i n d . We do not need t o pursue any 
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p o l i c y of ambition i n Europe. There i s 
nothing t h a t we want to a t t a i n t here. I f 
there i s t r o u b l e i n Europe i n which we are 
engaged and i n which we have to appeal t o 
the Dominions, i t w i l l be s o l e l y because, 
i f we do not take p a r t i n i t , we s h a l l see 
t h a t the combination against us i n Europe 
may be such t h a t the command of the sea may 
be l o s t . As regards the European p o l i c y 
g e n e r a l l y and the present s i t u a t i o n , I can 
only say t h a t we are on the best of terms 
w i t h the Powers of France and Russia.21 
Here was a c l e a r l inkage of the naval r i v a l r y w i t h Germany and 
the development of the T r i p l e Entente, a c l e a r i m p l i c a t i o n 
t h a t B r i t a i n must maintain the balance of power (against Germany) 
i n Europe, i n order not to become i s o l a t e d and lose command of 
the seas, on which her s u r v i v a l as an i m p e r i a l and t r a d i n g 
n a t i o n c r u c i a l l y depended. This was not a p e r c e p t i o n which 
he shared w i t h the House of Commons i n November: perhaps h i s 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r e d i b i l i t y would have been g r e a t e r i f he had, 
but unquestionably h i s domestic problems w i t h the Radicals 
would have been even greater than they were. 
7.3 The Resumed Debate, 14 December 1911 : The Radical Offensive 
Because there were so many MPs s t i l l anxious to speak i n 
the debate, i t was adjourned to a l a t e r date, and resumed on 14th 
December. This occasion proved to be the f i e l d day f o r the Radicals 
22 
and other c r i t i c s of the government's p o l i c y . Of the twenty 
speakers (apart from Grey h i m s e l f ) , only f o u r were Conservatives, 
and the r e s t were overwhelmingly Radical, Labour and I r i s h 
N a t i o n a l i s t c r i t i c s of Grey; indeed, the Speaker e v i d e n t l y ran 
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out of Conservatives to c a l l to speak at a l l , so t h a t of the 
l a s t eleven c o n t r i b u t o r s t o the debate a f t e r Grey himself had 
spoken, there was only one who was not a f o r e i g n p o l i c y r a d i c a l , 
and even he ( A l f r e d Bigland, a Conservative) spoke i n favour 
23 
of reaching an agreement w i t h Germany. Apart from Grey 
himself, there were no front-bench speakers on e i t h e r side t o 
support him, and only one backbencher who unambiguously r e s i s t e d 
the Radical demand f o r a change of p o l i c y , a negotiated agreement 
w i t h Germany on the naval question, and greater c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h 
Parliament on f o r e i g n a f f a i r s ; t h i s was Mr. John B a i r d , a 
Conservative and former diplomat (though of no great d i s t i n c t i o n ) . ^ ' 
Such support from the other side of the House can have been of 
l i t t l e comfort t o Grey, and d i d him no good a t a l l w i t h h i s own 
back-bench c r i t i c s , but the absence of front-bench support from 
e i t h e r side does suggest t h a t the government and the Foreign 
Secretary himself had decided t h a t the best way to deal w i t h 
the Radical onslaught was simply to l e t i t have i t s say and burn 
i t s e l f out. Grey's own statement, coming about halfway through 
t h i s , the second day of debate, was l a r g e l y devoted to the question 
of Russian p o l i c y i n Persia, and B r i t a i n ' s own c o m p l i c i t y w i t h 
t h a t p o l i c y , which had by now become the ove r t subject of the 
debate. He j u s t i f i e d h i s speaking again (which t e c h n i c a l l y he was 
not e n t i t l e d to do) because he had so many s p e c i f i c questions t o 
answer, which had been r a i s e d by Members and re q u i r e d a response. 
Much of t h i s was concerned w i t h the d e t a i l s of the present c r i s i s 
i n the a f f a i r s of Persia, i n which the Russian government was 
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r e s i s t i n g the e f f o r t s of the Persian c o n s t i t u t i o n a l government 
to reform i t s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w i t h the assistance of f o r e i g n 
a dvisers, notably the American f i n a n c i a l adviser, Mr. Morgan 
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Shuster. Here Grey was reduced to defending the almost 
i n d e f e n s i b l e , since the crime of Mr. Shuster i n Russian eyes 
was no more than t h a t he had sought t o appoint B r i t i s h f i n a n c i a l 
o f f i c e r s i n the Russian sphere, wit h o u t c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h 
Russia; an act e n t i r e l y w i t h i n the r i g h t s of an independent 
s t a t e i f Persia s t i l l was one (and which the Anglo-Russian 
Convention declared her to be), and only inadmissable i f she 
were already a Russian p r o t e c t o r a t e (which w i t h B r i t i s h 
connivance she was now becoming, but which was not admitted 
e i t h e r by Russia or B r i t a i n ) . Having made the best t h a t he 
could of a d i f f i c u l t case, Grey went on to a defence of h i s 
p o l i c y against the Radical accusation t h a t i t was s e c r e t i v e and 
t h a t he d i d not adequately inform Parliament; but what he d i d 
not do was to address the accusation t h a t h i s p o l i c y towards 
Russia i n Persia was subservient because what he was r e a l l y 
f o l l o w i n g was a balance-of-power p o l i c y i n Europe, which would 
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be upset i f Russia were to be a l i e n a t e d . 
But on t h i s occasion t h i s was indeed the main charge 
l a i d against him by h i s Radical accusers. Of those L i b e r a l s who 
gave q u a l i f i e d support to Grey's p o l i c i e s , both S i r Henry Norman 
(as we have seen, a longstanding back-bench expert on f o r e i g n 
a f f a i r s ) and Mr. Atherley-Jones (a l o y a l i s t w i t h obvious qualms 
of conscience) concentrated on the Moroccan issue and urged the 
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need f o r an understanding w i t h Germany. The remainder, 
i n c l u d i n g such powerful advocates as Swift MacNeill ( I r i s h 
N a t i o n a l i s t , and longstanding c r i t i c of B r i t i s h f o r e i g n p o l i c y ) , 
Arthur Ponsonby ( L i b e r a l - R a d i c a l and former d i p l o m a t ) , and Josiah 
Wedgwood (another independent-minded L i b e r a l R a d i c a l ) , mounted 
a sustained and r e p e t i t i v e a t t a c k on Grey's p o l i c i e s across the 
board; from t h i s chorus of c r i t i c i s m four main themes, d i s t i n c t 
though interconnected, may be i s o l a t e d . I n the f i r s t place, 
there was a restatement i n more extreme form of the c a l l made 
by Norman and Atherley-Jones f o r a fundamental review of p o l i c y 
towards Germany, an ending t o the h o s t i l i t y on naval and other 
questions which had brought the two countries so close t o war, 
a r e c o g n i t i o n of Germany's l e g i t i m a t e a s p i r a t i o n s to i m p e r i a l 
expansion, and a genuine and determined e f f o r t t o reach a c o r d i a l 
understanding on a l l these questions w i t h Germany. This demand 
was made i n p a r t i c u l a r by W i l l i a m Barton ( L i b e r a l ) , by J.H. 
Whitehouse ( L i b e r a l ) , by John L y t t e l t o n (Labour), by A l l e n 
Baker ( L i b e r a l ) , by S i r W i l l i a m Byles (veteran L i b e r a l of the 
Gladstonian e r a ) , by Joseph King ( L i b e r a l ) and by Charles Duncan 
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(Labour). I n the second place, there was the constant 
c r i t i c i s m of Russian p o l i c y i n Persia, the c r i t i c i s m of Grey's 
p o l i c y f o r supporting t h a t of Russia, the demand f o r a renewed 
i n s i s t e n c e on Russia observing the Convention or else B r i t a i n 
abandoning the Russian connection, and the demand f o r measures 
to encourage the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l movement i n Persia. This l i n e was 
taken i n p a r t i c u l a r by Crawshay-Williams ( L i b e r a l ) , by Arth u r 
Ponsonby ( L i b e r a l ) , by Barton ( L i b e r a l ) , and by P h i l i p M o r r e l l 
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( L i b e r a l ) most a u t h o r i t a t i v e l y on Persia. I n the t h i r d 
place, p r a c t i c a l l y every speaker from the L i b e r a l and Radical 
groupings r a i s e d the question of the excessive secrecy i n which 
i t was a l l e g e d t h a t the Foreign O f f i c e conducted f o r e i g n p o l i c y , 
and there were widespread demands f o r the Foreign Secretary t o 
provide more i n f o r m a t i o n i n the form of Blue Books, t o speak 
more f r e q u e n t l y and f r e e l y about the p r i n c i p l e s u n d e r l y i n g h i s 
p o l i c i e s i n the House and i n response to Parliamentary Questions, 
and also i n the country at l a r g e ; and above a l l to l i s t e n t o the 
opinions of h i s supporters i n Parliament and to p u b l i c o p i n i o n 
so as to f o l l o w a more genuinely ' L i b e r a l ' p o l i c y . I t was 
ge n e r a l l y asserted t h a t i t was secret diplomacy and the 
u n c o n t r o l l e d p u r s u i t of p o w e r - p o l i t i c s which had brought the 
country so close to war over the summer, and t h a t a l a r g e i n j e c t i o n 
of democracy i n the c o n t r o l of p o l i c y was the r i g h t remedy. Those 
who dwelt most p o w e r f u l l y on t h i s theme were Hugh Law ( I r i s h 
N a t i o n a l i s t ) , de Forest ( L i b e r a l ) , Whitehouse'(Liberal),Byles 
( L i b e r a l ) >andthat redoubtable t r i o f o r t h e Radical a l l i a n c e , 
Swift MacNeill ( I r i s h N a t i o n a l i s t ) , Ponsonby ( L i b e r a l ) , and 
Wedgwood ( L i b e r a l ) . These and the r e s t of the Radicals summed 
up t h e i r d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n i n the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t the d i s a s t r o u s 
aspects of Grey's Russian and German p o l i c i e s were only made 
possible by the e x i s t i n g secrecy and by the absence of proper 
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Parliamentary discussion and c o n t r o l . 
The diagnosis was taken one stage f u r t h e r i n discussion 
of the f o u r t h Radical theme, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the powerful speeches 
of Ponsonby and of Wedgwood. For example, Ponsonby: 
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Our a t t i t u d e i n Persia i s being regarded 
throughout t h i s country as weak and u n d i g n i f i e d . 
We are p l a y i n g second f i d d l e to Russia ... Russia 
has us i n tow, and we seem to be d i s i n c l i n e d to 
assert our own o p i n i o n or t o a s s i s t i n any way 
to c a r r y out i n what we b e l i e v e to be i t s true 
s p i r i t the Anglo-Russian Convention ... What i s 
the p o l i c y which makes us act i n the pe c u l i a r and 
i l l o g i c a l way? I n a l l these matters there i s one 
governing p r i n c i p l e a t the bottom of the whole of 
our f o r e i g n p o l i c y , namely the p r i n c i p l e of the 
balance of power. This p r i n c i p l e of the balance 
of power means a c o n t i n u a l a d j u s t i n g of the scales 
of the balance, a perpetual i n t e r f e r e n c e , the making 
of ententes and a l l i a n c e s ... I t means a constant 
tension throughout Europe and throughout the world... 
This p o l i c y of the balance of power i s at the roo t 
of a l l our d i f f i c u l t i e s , and u n t i l t h i s p o l i c y i s 
gr a d u a l l y abandoned, i t i s hopeless to t h i n k t h a t 
we can get on b e t t e r terms w i t h Germany. Germany 
w i l l be placed i n the opposite scale of the balance.^1 
And again, Wedgwood: 
We have t h i s question of the balance of power ra i s e d 
to a s o r t of f e t i s h which the whole of the Foreign 
O f f i c e S t a f f , and the Foreign Secretary as w e l l , 
worship ... The p u r s u i t of these two aims - balance 
of power i n Europe, and [the defence o f ] B r i t i s h 
m a t e r i a l i n t e r e s t - was not the L i b e r a l f o r e i g n 
p o l i c y [ o f former y e a r s ] , and never has been the 
L i b e r a l f o r e i g n p o l i c y u n t i l now.32 
As we have seen, t h i s diagnosis was e s s e n t i a l l y c o r r e c t , and i n 
p r i v a t e , Grey had indeed admitted the balance-of-power character 
of h i s diplomacy, and had i d e n t i f i e d the danger of a German 
hegemony i n Europe as the c h i e f t h r e a t to B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s , 
against which the s o l i d a r i t y of the t r i p l e entente was the best 
guarantee. He d i d not admit as much i n the Commons, but Ponsonby 
and Wedgwood and t h e i r supporters were r i g h t . Unhappily f o r them, 
even the p u b l i c i t y of debate d i d nothing much to advance t h e i r 
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cause f o r a reconstructed system. When they had exhausted t h e i r 
f i r e , the debate was concluded wit h o u t a d i v i s i o n , and there was 
e v i d e n t l y no way i n which t h e i r arguments, however vehement, 
33 
could be t r a n s l a t e d i n t o a c t i o n . What we may, however, 
conclude i s t h a t by the end. of 1911 at the l a t e s t , Parliament 
was f u l l y aware of the European i m p l i c a t i o n s of the p o l i c y of 
the ententes. 
7.4 The Radicals and Foreign P o l i c y i n 1912 
I f the debates of l a t e 1911 d i d nothing e l s e , they made 
Grey s e n s i t i v e t o the charge t h a t Parliament d i d not get adequate 
o p p o r t u n i t y t o discuss f o r e i g n a f f a i r s under the e x i s t i n g 
arrangements between the two main p a r t i e s f o r arranging the 
business of the House. I n 1912 th e r e f o r e two such o p p o r t u n i t i e s 
were a f f o r d e d , one i n the debate on the Address i n February, and 
the second on the Foreign O f f i c e vote i n the Supply debates of 
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Jul y 1912. The King's Speech had contained extensive reference 
to the Persian c r i s i s , and on the s i x t h day of debate, Ponsonby 
was c a l l e d to move an amendment on i t h i g h l y c r i t i c a l of government 
p o l i c y . His speech was f u l l of the standard Radical denunciations 
of Grey's p o l i c y of maintaining s o l i d a r i t y w i t h Russia, which 
he ch a r a c t e r i s e d as contrary t o L i b e r a l o p i n i o n , d e s t r u c t i v e of 
the n a t i o n a l honour, and i n j u r i o u s t o B r i t a i n ' s s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s 
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on the I n d i a n f r o n t i e r . He was ably seconded by M o r r e l l , who 
sought to demonstrate th a t the Convention of August 1907 included 
assurances of maintaining the i n t e g r i t y and independence of Per s i a , 
assurances now f a l s i f i e d by Russian p o l i c y ; and by the I r i s h 
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N a t i o n a l i s t , John D i l l o n . Other Persia s p e c i a l i s t s from 
the Conservative benches spoke, co n t e s t i n g the view t h a t the 
Russians were i n breach of the Convention and i n s i s t i n g t h a t the 
increasing disorder and i n s e c u r i t y i n Persia made f i r m a c t i o n t o 
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res t o r e s e c u r i t y f o r l i v e s and trade necessary. Grey r e p l i e d 
at l e n g t h , g i v i n g the standard defence of h i s p o l i c y and supplying 
the House w i t h i n f o r m a t i o n and expl a n a t i o n , but i t i s c l e a r t h a t 
he d i d not go very f a r to s a t i s f y i n g the Radicals since Ponsonby, 
when he came to withdraw h i s c r i t i c a l amendment, state d t h a t 
although i t had been ' u s e f u l ' i n p r o v i d i n g o p p o r t u n i t y f o r the 
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debate, Grey's speech had l e f t him 'deeply disappointed'. And 
indeed another Radical L i b e r a l , Noel Buxton, speaking a f t e r Grey, 
made cle a r h i s co n t i n u i n g d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h the underlying 
tendencies of B r i t i s h p o l i c y : 
The Persian h i s t o r y of the l a s t three years 
has been merely a symptom of the Anglo-German 
s i t u a t i o n , i n f a c t i t has been a s o r t of by-
product of t h a t s i t u a t i o n . ... A l l these 
ob j e c t i o n s ... would be removed i f the 
Government adopted the suggestion of [ s e t t i n g up] 
a Foreign A f f a i r s Committee, and t h a t would 
p o s s i b l y have m i t i g a t e d the s i t u a t i o n i n regard 
to Germany during the l a s t two or three years and 
have l e f t us f r e e r i n regard t o the question of 
P e r s i a . 3 9 
The Radicals thus had t h e i r debate, put up t h e i r most e f f e c t i v e 
spokesmen, withdrew t h e i r motion, and were l e f t e x a c t l y where 
they were before, w i t h the o l d and t o them d i s c r e d i t e d s t r u c t u r e s 
of Cabinet, Foreign o f f i c e and Diplomatic service s t i l l i n c o n t r o l 
of f o r e i g n p o l i c y . 
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The debate of 10 J u l y 1912 was taken on the f o u r t e e n t h 
day of debate on the estimates, when the Foreign O f f i c e estimates 
were selected f o r d i s c u s s i o n ; the Conservative backbencher, the 
E a r l of Ronaldshay (who i t w i l l be remembered had spoken 
c r i t i c a l l y of the Anglo-Russian Convention i n the debate of 
February 1908) moved a r e d u c t i o n of £100 i n the Foreign O f f i c e 
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vote. The Persian s i t u a t i o n and the problems i t r a i s e d f o r 
Anglo-Russian r e l a t i o n s was." one of the major subjects of t h i s 
debate, but i t was not the only one, and MPs took the o p p o r t u n i t y 
to r a i s e a v a r i e t y of other t o p i c s , i n c l u d i n g the naval balance 
of power i n the Mediterranean, the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of Egypt, 
the r e v o l u t i o n i n P o r t u g a l , the Baghdad r a i l w a y , and the 
admission of f o r e i g n p i l o t s t o B r i t i s h t e r r i t o r i a l waters. Of 
greatest i n t e r e s t t o us was the open acknowledgement w i t h which 
two Conservatives (Ronaldshay himself, and George A. Lloyd) 
prefaced t h e i r c r i t i c i s m of the government's Persian p o l i c y , 
t h a t B r i t a i n ' s p o l i c y i n Europe was, and should be, based upon 
the balance of power and B r i t a i n ' s adhesion to the T r i p l e Entente 
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(a term which they both e x p l i c i t l y used). As Ronaldshay put 
i t : 
Our f o r e i g n p o l i c y today i s based upon the T r i p l e 
Entente. ... The whole keystone of our f o r e i g n 
p o l i c y today i s t o be found i n a closer under-
standing between t h i s country and France and Russia... 
I b e l i e v e t h a t p o l i c y t o be ab s o l u t e l y necessary to 
maintain the balance of power i n Europe. ... Everybody 
knows i t was ... the prospect of the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e 
o b t a i n i n g a p o s i t i o n i n Europe of overwhelming 
m i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y which drove t h i s country t o 
abandon i t s p o l i c y of i s o l a t i o n . ... There was 
every prospect of t h a t tremendous m i l i t a r y machine 
being enormously enhanced when, i n 1900, Germany 
broughtiin t h e i r Navy Law and proceeded to add t o t h a t 
156 
immense m i l i t a r y force an enormous naval f l e e t . 
The only object of t h i s country throwing i n i t s 
l o t , as i t were, w i t h France and Russia was i n 
order to r e s t o r e the balance of power.^2 
As we have seen throughout our account, t h i s represents a gross 
o v e r - s i m p l i f i c a t i o n of the process whereby B r i t i s h p o l i c y 
evolved from 'splendid i s o l a t i o n ' i n 1900 t o the T r i p l e 
Entente of 1909 and t h e r e a f t e r , and i t i s notable t h a t Grey, 
when he r e p l i e d to the debate, himself avoided using the words 
' T r i p l e Entente', but he was q u i t e happy to endorse the 
u n d e r l y i n g p r i n c i p l e ; he said the ' s t a r t i n g p o i n t of any 
new development i n European f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s the maintenance 
A 3 
of our f r i e n d s h i p w i t h France and Russia'. I n summing up f o r 
the Opposition, Bonar Law went so f a r as t o ascribe the use 
of the term ' T r i p l e Entente' t o Grey, described 'the good 
understanding w i t h France and Russia' as being the 'keynote of 
our f o r e i g n p o l i c y ' ; and he committed the Conservatives to 
m a i n t a i n i n g i t as 'the n a t i o n a l p o l i c y of t h i s country' whenever 
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they should be returned t o power. I t was t h e r e f o r e very 
c l e a r t h a t , whatever Radical o b j e c t i o n s there might be t o Grey's 
balance-of-power p o l i c y , i t enjoyed overwhelming support from 
the Conservatives (as indeed was to be demonstrated i n August 
1914). 
The Radicals d i d indeed have t h e i r say, notably Ponsonby, 
D i l l o n , Buxton and Whitehouse, who between them roundly c r i t i c i s e d 
B r i t a i n ' s cont i n u i n g a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h Russia i n Persia, and c a l l e d 
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f o r renewed e f f o r t s at a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n w i t h Germany. To an 
extent t h e i r o b j e c t i o n s coincided w i t h those of the Conservative 
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i m p e r i a l lobby which attacked the c o n t i n u i n g surrender of 
B r i t a i n ' s i n f l u e n c e and i n t e r e s t s i n Persia to the Russians, 
and who were at t h i s date p a r t i c u l a r l y alarmed about the prospec 
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of a trans-Persian r a i l w a y t h r e a t e n i n g the s e c u r i t y of I n d i a . 
But Grey's stubborn defence of h i s p o l i c y , and obviously the 
general endorsement of i t o f f e r e d by Bonar Law, enabled him 
to emerge from the debate w i t h h i s p o l i c y i n t a c t . Of course 
there was no way, short of c a r r y i n g Ronaldshay's motion and 
d i r e c t i n g i t t o a s p e c i f i c area of p o l i c y , i n which the House 
of Commons could e f f e c t any p a r t i c u l a r change, and the support 
of the o f f i c i a l Opposition and the r e l a t i v e l y small numbers 
of the Radicals ensured t h a t t h i s would not happen; in s t e a d , 
the Chairman of Committees l e f t the Chair w i t h o u t d i v i s i o n being 
taken, so the Foreign O f f i c e estimates were approved. The 
L i b e r a l l o y a l i s t S i r Joseph Walton, who made a speech s t r o n g l y 
supportive of Grey's p o l i c i e s , o f f e r e d an important and poignant 
observation on at l e a s t one reason f o r Parliament's l a c k of 
i n f l u e n c e over f o r e i g n p o l i c y : 
No more important Debate could take place i n 
t h i s House than on f o r e i g n a f f a i r s , and i t 
i s somewhat t o be r e g r e t t e d t h a t , when we 
only have p r a c t i c a l l y one n i g h t i n the whole 
Session i n which t o discuss f o r e i g n a f f a i r s , 
the attendance of Members should be so l i m i t e d . 
Perhaps we may regard i t , however, as an 
expression of the f e e l i n g of a l l p a r t i e s i n t h i s 
House of e n t i r e confidence i n the Foreign 
Secretary.^7 
I f Walton was r i g h t (and i n the absence of a d i v i s i o n l i s t i t i s 
not possible from Hansard to say how many beyond the 17 MPs who 
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spoke were p r e s e n t ) , the attempt by Radicals and Tory 
i m p e r i a l i s t s t o enforce a change of p o l i c y over Persia and 
elsewhere had run out of supporters and perhaps of enthusiasm. 
EPILOGUE AND CONCLUSION 
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BRITISH ENTRY INTO THE WAR OF 1914 
1. Parliament and Foreign A f f a i r s 1912-1914 
When Grey d e l i v e r e d h i s m a g i s t e r i a l and j u s t l y celebrated 
statement t o the House of Commons on 3 August 1914, on the eve 
of the F i r s t World War, he sta t e d unequivocally t h a t the House 
was e n t i r e l y f r e e t o decide whether B r i t a i n should go to war or 
not.^ I n view of a l l t h a t we have here discussed about the 
d i f f i c u l t i e s i n the way of Parliamentary c o n t r o l of f o r e i g n p o l i c y , 
the p l a u s i b i l i t y of t h i s statement may be doubted, and even more 
so when the developments of the period 1912-1914 are considered. 
Between the debates of February/July 1912 and t h a t of August 
1914 (as i n the years 1904-1908 and again 1910-1911), the most 
s i g n i f i c a n t developments i n B r i t a i n ' s r e l a t i o n s w i t h the European 
systems of a l l i a n c e s took place beyond the reach of Parliamentary 
s c r u t i n y and indeed of o f f i c i a l Parliamentary knowledge, so 
th a t i t was once again impossible f o r the Commons to exert 
i n f l u e n c e . 
Those speakers i n the Supply debate of Ju l y 1912 who 
urged a b e t t e r understanding w i t h Germany could not have known 
of the f a i l u r e of the secret Anglo-German n e g o t i a t i o n s which 
fo l l o w e d Haldane's v i s i t t o B e r l i n , nor t h a t the B r i t i s h government 
had a c t u a l l y o f f e r e d t o the Germans a ' p o l i t i c a l formula', which 
had been refused by the Kaiser because i t f e l l short of the 
promise of absolute n e u t r a l i t y which had by now become the minimum 
2 
German c o n d i t i o n f o r any naval agreement. Whether the Radicals 
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would have agreed w i t h Grey and Asquith t h a t the formula 
o f f e r e d was the l i m i t of the concessions t h a t B r i t a i n should 
be prepared to make t o secure a naval understanding, they were 
not given the o p p o r t u n i t y of pronouncing. A l l they were t o l d 
was what the new F i r s t Lord of the Admiralty, Winston C h u r c h i l l , 
s a i d on presenting the naval estimates on 18 March, t h a t 
circumstances appeared t o necessitate f u r t h e r increases i n 
s h i p b u i l d i n g , and t h a t B r i t a i n would maintain a s i x t y percent 
3 
margin of s u p e r i o r i t y over the German f l e e t . There were no 
f u r t h e r serious n e g o t i a t i o n s between B r i t a i n and Germany a f t e r 
A p r i l 1912. The proposals which C h u r c h i l l made from time to 
time f o r a 'naval h o l i d a y ' were indeed made i n the House of 
Commons i n 1912-1913, and were thus accessible to discussion; 
but the very f a c t t h a t they were made p u b l i c l y and were not 
accompanied by serious d i p l o m a t i c conversations i n p r i v a t e 
i n d i c a t e s t h a t they were made f o r p u b l i c consumption, and not 
4 
as substantive n e g o t i a t i o n s . 
Instead, the B r i t i s h government found i t s e l f compelled 
by the growing naval power of Germany i n the North Sea t o 
contemplate withdrawing B r i t a i n ' s f i r s t class b a t t l e s h i p s from 
the Mediterranean so t h a t they would be a v a i l a b l e t o maintain 
the margin of s u p e r i o r i t y over Germany. This would mean lea v i n g 
B r i t a i n v u lnerable i n the Mediterranean, and dependent upon 
France to defend her i n t e r e s t s i n the western basin at l e a s t . 
Since at the same time the French were going f u r t h e r i n the 
t r a n s f e r of t h e i r own main naval forces from t h e i r A t l a n t i c and 
\ 
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Channel bases to the Mediterranean, i t c l e a r l y made good sense 
i n terms of 'grand s t r a t e g y ' to come to a mutually b e n e f i c i a l 
arrangement; the d i f f i c u l t y from the B r i t i s h government's p o i n t 
of view was t h a t the French, understandably, wished to use the 
naval conversations and the Mediterranean naval agreement which 
r e s u l t e d t o secure from B r i t a i n a more precise and bin d i n g 
d e f i n i t i o n of the Anglo-French entente than had pr e v i o u s l y 
e x i s t e d ; i d e a l l y , the French prime m i n i s t e r , Poincare, would 
have l i k e d something amounting t o a defensive a l l i a n c e , though 
he was w i l l i n g t o be guided by the experienced Cambon i n t o 
accepting something l e s s , so long as i t had Cabinet approval.^ 
We know t h a t the B r i t i s h ambassador i n France took the view t h a t 
Poincare and the French appreciated the 'Parliamentary d i f f i c u l t i e s ' 
which made an o u t r i g h t a l l i a n c e impossible.^ Although informed 
observers i n the Commons could observe the naval r e d i s t r i b u t i o n s 
which took place and comment upon them, they could not comment 
upon the p o l i t i c a l formula hammered out between Grey and Cambon 
and embodied i n the important Grey-Cambon l e t t e r s of November 
1912, because t h i s c r u c i a l l y important exchange of notes was not 
l a i d before Parliament: i t d i d not amount t o a t r e a t y and i t 
was maintained by the Cabinet (which d i d approve i t ) t h a t i t d i d 
not i n v o l v e new o b l i g a t i o n s of which Parliament should be made 
aware. This exchange, as Williamson t e l l s us, 'completed the 
formal p o l i t i c a l e v o l u t i o n of the entente', and i t was as close 
as the French were able t o come t o committing the B r i t i s h to t h e i r 
side i n a f u t u r e Franco-German war.^ I t may be thought remarkable 
t h a t the Cabinet, p a r t i c u l a r l y i t s Radical wing, should not have 
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found i t necessary t o l a y the Grey-Cambon l e t t e r s before 
Parliament, but a c a r e f u l reading i n d i c a t e s t h a t indeed they 
d i d not commit B r i t a i n t o more than c o n s u l t a t i o n i n the event 
of the danger of aggression, and an undertaking t h a t i f they 
agreed on common a c t i o n against Germany, then they would 
consider 'what e f f e c t should be given' to the plans drawn up 
by t h e i r r e spective General S t a f f s . There was indeed no e x p l i c i t 
p r i o r commitment, and the Cabinet could regard the t e x t as doing 
no more than p u t t i n g on paper what Grey had on previous occasions 
made v e r b a l l y t o Cambon, a statement of the non-binding 
character of the m i l i t a r y conversations. Indeed, from the 
p o i n t of view of the Cabinet, the t e x t of the l e t t e r s was p r e c i s e l y 
a safeguard against the danger t h a t , without them, an o b l i g a t i o n 
would have been i n c u r r e d by the very f a c t of the naval under-
standing. Poincare had t r i e d t o secure, i n the f i n a l sentence, 
an assurance t h a t the plans of the General S t a f f s would form the 
basis of j o i n t a c t i o n i f i t was agreed t h a t such a c t i o n was 
necessary: t h i s was the s t i c k i n g p o i n t f o r the B r i t i s h m i n i s t e r s , 
who would agree t o no more than the undertaking t o take those 
plans i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n ; and i n t h i s the Radicals and Asquith 
were e v i d e n t l y i n agreement, t h a t they would not be committed i n 
advance t o a c o n t i n e n t a l s t r a t e g y , even i f they d i d decide t o 
g 
go t o the assistance of France. 
These l e t t e r s , approved i n Cabinet, were not reported to 
Parliament and t h e r e f o r e not the subject of formal debate. Their 
general content d i d e v i d e n t l y become a matter f o r s p e c u l a t i o n , and 
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d i d reach the House of Commons. For instance, on the very 
f i r s t day of the Debate on the Address i n the new session 
of 1913, Lord Hugh C e c i l picked up Asquith's remarks about 
f o r e i g n a f f a i r s i n h i s opening speech, t o enquire about the 
rumoured m i l i t a r y understanding w i t h France: 
There i s a very general b e l i e f t h a t t h i s 
country i s under an o b l i g a t i o n , not a 
t r e a t y o b l i g a t i o n , but an o b l i g a t i o n a r i s i n g 
out of an assurance given by the M i n i s t r y i n 
the course of d i p l o m a t i c n e g o t i a t i o n s , to send 
a very l a r g e armed f o r c e out of t h i s country to 
operate i n Europe. 9 
When Asquith i n t e r r u p t e d him w i t h the c a t e g o r i c a l assurance, ' I 
ought to say t h a t i t i s not t r u e ' , he was not misleading the 
House, as we have seen; and t h i s wasithe p o s i t i o n which government 
spokesmen continued t o adopt when the question was raise d on 
other occasions, and which indeed Grey himself s t i l l adhered to 
i n h i s great speech of 3 August 1914. I n s p i t e of suggestions 
to the c o n t r a r y , i t would be wrong t o impute undue cynicism or 
i n s i n c e r i t y t o Asquith or Grey i n t h i s matter, p a r t i c u l a r l y since 
we know t h a t Asquith himself was temperamentally opposed t o the 
sending of a l a r g e e x p e d i t i o n a r y force t o F r a n c e . ^ There seem 
to have been j u s t enough arguments on the government's side to 
j u s t i f y i t s d e c i s i o n not t o inv o l v e Parliament i n the Grey-Cambon 
l e t t e r s , so long as they were not then subsequently used to present 
Parliament w i t h a f a i t accompli. That i s why Grey stressed t h a t 
Parliament d i d indeed remain f r e e t o decide. The question remains, 
whether i t was, and whether i t d i d . 
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2. Grey's Statement and the Debate of 3 August 1914 
Of course Grey made i t q u i t e c l e a r i n h i s speech what he 
thought was the path of honour and of s e l f - i n t e r e s t f o r B r i t a i n 
to take. Having r e i t e r a t e d h i s view t h a t Parliament's d e c i s i o n 
was not f e t t e r e d by p r i o r commitments of which i t was ig n o r a n t , 
he read out the Grey-Cambon l e t t e r ( o m i t t i n g the f i n a l sentence, 
which had caused so much t r o u b l e i n Cabinet), not i n order t o 
show a debt of honour but p r e c i s e l y t o prove t h a t there was no 
o b l i g a t i o n t o France. However, he went on to p o i n t out t h a t , 
the French c o a s t l i n e being p r a c t i c a l l y undefended, B r i t i s h 
p u b l i c o p i n i o n would not allow Germany t o take a c t i o n against i t 
unhindered, and t h a t he had already promised France (subject to 
the approval of Parliament) t h a t German naval a c t i o n against her 
i n the Channel would not be t o l e r a t e d : an undertaking, of course, 
stopping f a r short of c o n t i n e n t a l i n t e r v e n t i o n by B r i t a i n . This 
was however made f a r more probable by the question of the lon g -
standing guarantee of Belgian n e u t r a l i t y , t o which he turned 
next, and which was already threatened by the German ultimatum. 
Here was an issue where he could take h i s stance on the s a n c t i t y 
of i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r e a t i e s and i n t e r n a t i o n a l m o r a l i t y , and on which 
he could wrap himself i n the mantle of Gladstone (which he d i d 
at some l e n g t h ) . His key sentence was t h i s : 
I f , i n a c r i s i s l i k e t h i s , we run away from those 
o b l i g a t i o n s of honour and i n t e r e s t as regards the 
Belgian Treaty, I doubt whether, whatever m a t e r i a l 
f o r c e we might have at the end, i t would be of very 
much value i n face of the respect we should have l o s t . 
Returning t o France, he argued: 
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There i s but one way i n which the Government 
could make c e r t a i n at the present moment of 
keeping outside t h i s war, and t h a t would be 
th a t i t should immediately issue a proclamation 
of u n c o n d i t i o n a l n e u t r a l i t y . We cannot do t h a t . 
We have made the commitment to France t h a t I 
have read t o the House which prevents us from 
doing t h a t . We have got the consideration of 
Belgium which also prevents us from any 
u n c o n d i t i o n a l n e u t r a l i t y ... I f we d i d take 
t h a t l i n e ... and say we would stand aside, we 
should, I b e l i e v e , s a c r i f i c e our respect and 
good name and r e p u t a t i o n before the world, and 
should not escape the most serious and grave 
economic consequences. 
He concluded by expressing h i s confidence t h a t , i f the march of 
events forced the government to go t o war, i t would have the 
support of the House.^ 
This confidence was immediately r e i n f o r c e d by a short 
statement from Bonar Law f o r the o f f i c i a l Opposition, s t a t i n g t h a t 
h i s p a r t y had already informed the government t h a t i t would give 
i t f u l l support i n the event of a r e s o r t t o war and t h a t he stood 
12 
by t h a t p o s i t i o n . John Redmond, speaking f o r the I r i s h 
N a t i o n a l i s t s ( s i g n i f i c a n t l y , i t was he and not any of h i s more 
13 
inflammatory Radical colleagues) also pledged t h e i r support. 
Only Ramsay MacDonald, speaking f o r Labour, sounded a d i s s e n t i n g 
note: he urged t h a t B r i t a i n should remain n e u t r a l and not become 
14 
involved i n war on the side of Russia. Although both government 
and o f f i c i a l Opposition c l e a r l y wished to end the proceedings 
there w i t h o u t debate ( t h e r e being no formal question before the 
House on which a debate could take p l a c e ) , i n the face of Radical 
pressure f o r a debate ( n o t a b l y from M o r r e l l , r a i s i n g p o i n t s of o r d e r ) , 
Asquith conceded a debate f o r l a t e r the same d a y . ^ 
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As soon as Asquith had moved the adjournment so t h a t the 
debate could proceed, Grey announced formal c o n f i r m a t i o n of the 
German ultimatum t o Belgium, and then sat down to l i s t e n to a 
procession of Radical speeches opposing the recommendation f o r 
war, of v a r y i n g degrees of vehemence. Only two L i b e r a l speakers, 
Sir A r t h u r Markham and W i l l i a m P r i n g l e , gave unreserved support 
to Grey's p o l i c y ; one or two others, i n c l u d i n g the l o y a l i s t , S i r 
A l b e r t Spicer, were prepared to t r u s t the Foreign Secretary but 
urged f u r t h e r n e g o t i a t i o n w i t h Germany t o avert a c a l a m i t y . ^ 
Apart from them, no fewer than f o u r t e e n L i b e r a l s and one Labour 
member spoke against Grey, i n c l u d i n g a p r e d i c t a b l e r o l l c a l l of 
f o r e i g n p o l i c y Radicals: M o r r e l l , Harvey, Keir Hardie (Labour), 
Ponsonby, Rowntree, Jardine, Byl.es, King: some of these (notably 
King) became i n v o l v e d i n angry exchanges w i t h the Opposition, 
and some of the speakers towards the end, notable Jardine and 
Byles were (as Hansard puts i t ) ' i n d i s t i n c t l y heard' because of 
the mounting unrest on the Tory benches.^ The burden of a l l 
these speeches maybe summarised as f o l l o w s : t h a t the d e c i s i o n f o r 
war was premature i f the war was f o r the i n t e r e s t s of B r i t a i n or 
the i n t e g r i t y of Belgium; t h a t i t looked more l i k e a war f o r the 
defence of France i n the balance of power; t h a t i t involved B r i t a i n 
i n support of Russia, a despotic and aggressive power; and t h a t i t 
was being undertaken out of h o s t i l i t y towards Germany r a t h e r than 
out of any r a t i o n a l c a l c u l a t i o n of where B r i t a i n ' s t r u e i n t e r e s t s 
l a y . We may take Arthur Ponsonby's c o n t r i b u t i o n as being 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e : 
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I t h i n k we have plunged too q u i c k l y , and I 
t h i n k the Foreign Secretary's speech shows 
t h a t what has been r a n k l i n g a l l these years 
i s a deep animosity against German ambitions. 
The balance of power i s responsible f o r t h i s -
t h i s mad desire t o keep up an i m p o s i b i l i t y i n 
Europe, t o t r y and d i v i d e the two sections of 
Europe i n t o an armed camp, g l a r i n g at one 
another w i t h suspicion and h o s t i l i t y and 
hatr e d , and arming a l l the time, and bleeding 
the people t o pay f o r the armaments. Since 
I have been i n t h i s House [he entered i n 1908], 
I have every year p r o t e s t e d against the growth 
i n the expenditure upon armaments. Every 
year i t has mounted up and up, and o l d women 
of both sexes have t o l d us t h a t the best way 
to prepare t o maintain peace i s t o prepare 
f o r war. 
Ev i d e n t l y Ponsonby was so moved by the g r a v i t y and p o t e n t i a l 
tragedy of the occasion t h a t he was less than h i s usual urbane 
and coherent s e l f , but the f o r c e of h i s observations i s c l e a r : 
t h a t a balance-of-power p o l i c y , the p o l i c y of the T r i p l e Entente 
as a d e t e r r e n t against the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e , had i n the end not 
preserved the peace but brought on the war; and he ended w i t h an 
appeal t o Grey even at t h i s l a t e stage t o keep B r i t a i n out of i t . 
That appeal was of course i n v a i n . For the Opposition 
Balfour, supporting the p o l i c y of the government, proposed t h a t 
the debate be concluded, and f o r the government Seely f o r m a l l y 
18 
moved the closure. The question, t h a t the House should adjourn, 
was put and agreed t o w i t h o u t a d i v i s i o n , and once again the 
numerical weakness of the Radicals was exposed even on so great 
a question as t h a t of war: the government having the evident 
support of the House as a whole, i n c l u d i n g a m a j o r i t y of i t s own 
supporters, of the I r i s h ( n o t i c e t h a t none of the I r i s h Radicals 
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j o i n e d i n the Radical chorus), and of the o f f i c i a l Opposition, 
was c l e a r l y i n an impregnable p o s i t i o n . The House of Commons 
thus acquiesced i n what was e f f e c t i v e l y a de c i s i o n to go to 
war; to those u n f a m i l i a r w i t h the proceedings of Parliament, 
i t may seem i r o n i c a l t h a t t h i s was on a motion no more serious 
than a simple motion to adjourn the House. 
This p o i n t r e q u i r e s some e l u c i d a t i o n . When Balfour 
urged t h a t the adjournment debate be concluded, he gave two 
reasons: t h a t the speeches of the Radicals were doing the House 
no c r e d i t (he was very scathing about them); and tha t the 
motion was merely f o r the adjournment, and t h a t the Prime 
M i n i s t e r had promised t h a t there would be occasion f o r debate 
on a proper motion on another occasion. For Balfour (whose 
long experience of Parliamentary procedure was almost u n r i v a l l e d ) , 
the adjournment debate was t h e r e f o r e an occasion f o r discussion 
but not f o r d e c i s i o n . He supposed t h a t the substantive debate 
would take place when the government came before the House t o 
ask f o r the supply necessary t o iembark on war, and i n t h i s 
s u p p o s i t i o n he was c o r r e c t . Equally, when Grey had assured the 
House t h a t the d e c i s i o n f o r war rested w i t h Parliament, he was 
t e c h n i c a l l y c o r r e c t , since only the House of Commons could vote 
the funds f o r the war, and at l e a s t i n theory the House could 
w i t h o l d funds f o r a war of which i t disapproved. But (as the debate 
on the Younghusband e x p e d i t i o n i n 1904 had shown), the House d i d 
not i n p r a c t i c e f i n d i t possible t o refuse supplies f o r a m i l i t a r y 
e n t e r p r i s e t h a t had already commenced; and by the time the government 
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sought i t s s u p p l i e s , on 6 August 1914, B r i t a i n was already at 
war and i t was e v i d e n t l y unthinkable t h a t even the most ardent 
p a c i f i s t (which most of the Radicals were not) would a c t u a l l y 
d i v i d e the House against the war, s t i l l less t h a t he would secure 
i 
a m a j o r i t y . With the House s i t t i n g i n Committee, Asquith moved 
a r e s o l u t i o n t h a t £100,000,000 be voted t o the government f o r 
19 
the prosecution of the war. A f t e r Bonar Law had s i g n i f i e d 
the support of the Conservatives, the next speaker was none other 
than Arthur Ponsonby, the impassioned opponent of war only three 
days p r e v i o u s l y , who i n d i c a t e d h i s i n t e n t i o n t o vote f o r the 
r e s o l u t i o n , saying t h a t 'at a moment of t h i s s o r t I consider 
t h a t there i s not time f o r reproaches or r e c r i m i n a t i o n s ' ; and 
he was i n due course followed by Wedgwood, Rowntree, and other 
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of the Radicals. There i s no need to f o l l o w t h i s ( r a t h e r 
b r i e f ) debate i n any d e t a i l : i t ended w i t h o u t d i v i s i o n and, 
2 
as Hansard records, 'Resolution agreed t o , nemine contradicente'. 
I f t h i s was the substantive v o t e , as Balfour had i m p l i e d , of 
course i t was taken too l a t e t o be e f f e c t i v e , as the country 
was already at war; though i t must be added t h a t a l l the 
i n d i c a t i o n s were t h a t the House, had i t been c a l l e d upon t o take 
the d e c i s i o n on 3 August, would not have refused the government 
the endorsement which i t sought. 
3. Conclusion : The House of Commons and the Balance of Power 
From what has gone before i n t h i s study, i t i s c l e a r t h a t 
House of Commons regarded those t r e a t i e s which are g e n e r a l l y 
taken as embodying the end of B r i t i s h i s o l a t i o n (the a l l i a n c e 
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w i t h Japan of 1902, the entente w i t h France of 1904, and 
the agreement w i t h Russia of 1907), and which were l a i d before 
i t as c o n s t i t u t i o n a l convention r e q u i r e d , and which were duly 
debated, from an i m p e r i a l r a t h e r than a European standpoint. I n 
so doing they were l a r g e l y f o l l o w i n g the lead given by government 
spokesmen, who s t u d i o u s l y ignored whatever i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r 
the European balance of power the t r e a t i e s contained, even where 
(as i n the case of the Russian agreement) they were p o t e n t i a l l y 
very considerable. There were very few MPs prepared t o n o t i c e 
the p o t e n t i a l which these new connections,ostensibly i m p e r i a l , 
would have i n i n v o l v i n g B r i t a i n i n the competing network of 
European a l l i a n c e s ; those who d i d , or who were prepared to say 
so i n Parliament, were back-benchers l i k e Gib son Bowles on the 
Conservative side and D i l k e on the L i b e r a l , who tended to 
welcome the hidden i m p l i c a t i o n s anyway. Since Parliament 
e v i d e n t l y took i n s u f f i c i e n t n o t i c e of t h e i r p r e d i c t i o n s , i t 
found i t s e l f already committed t o those r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h 
European powers which from 1909 onwards became consolidated 
i n t o t h a t grouping known as the T r i p l e Entente. As we have 
seen, ' T r i p l e Entente' was an expression frowned upon by 
the government i n 1909, but by 1912 i t had become the common 
currency of Parliamentary discussion of B r i t a i n ' s European p o l i c y . 
This development was undoubtedly accelerated and hardened by 
the growing r e c o g n i t i o n of the danger t o B r i t a i n ' s naval s e c u r i t y 
posed by the r a p i d r i s e of the German navy i n the new era 
created by the development of the Dreadnought type of b a t t l e s h i p ; 
a r e c o g n i t i o n which came close t o panic i n the debates on the 
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naval estimates held i n March 1909. Thereafter, the p o l i c y of 
the government rested on two p i l l a r s , the maintenance of an 
adequate margin of s e c u r i t y over the growing German f l e e t , and 
the maintenance of the T r i p l e Entente as a balancing and 
d e t e r r e n t f a c t o r against the danger posed by German ambitions 
i n Europe and the naval sphere. Once the (genuine) attempt t o 
reach a d i r e c t understanding w i t h Germany had f a i l e d , which may 
be d e f i n i t i v e l y dated no l a t e r than March-April 1912 although 
the w r i t i n g was on the w a l l a year p r e v i o u s l y , the government 
saw no v i a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i c y to the a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h France 
and Russia, which goes some way t o e x p l a i n i n g why the Cabinet 
agreed t o the c l o s e r d e f i n i t i o n of the French connection i n the 
Grey-Cambon l e t t e r s of November 1912. 
As we have seen, t h i s exchange was not reported t o 
Parliament, j u s t as the Anglo-French m i l i t a r y conversations 
whose i m p l i c a t i o n s i t sought to c l a r i f y had not been revealed 
to Parliament; so t h a t from 1906 onwards both Houses were discussing 
f o r e i g n p o l i c y (when they d i d discuss i t ) w i t h o u t being i n 
possession of a l l the r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n . When the Radicals 
complained i n the great f o r e i g n p o l i c y debates of November-
December 1911 t h a t they were groping i n a t w i l i g h t of p a r t i a l 
i n f o r m a t i o n , they spoke more t r u l y than perhaps even they knew. 
The Grey-Cambon l e t t e r s d i d not e s s e n t i a l l y change t h i s p o s i t i o n , 
which had obtained since 1906; they merely formalised i t . This 
aspect of the Anglo-French r e l a t i o n s h i p i s perhaps the best, though 
i t i s not the only,example of the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t by d e f i n i t i o n 
Parliament could not c o n t r o l , and could only i n the most hazy 
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sense i n f l u e n c e , developments of which i t was kept i n ignorance. 
Thus the Radicals between 1909 and 1912 tended t o concentrate 
t h e i r f i r e on the f a i l u r e t o reach an understanding w i t h Germany, 
and what they perceived to be the ignominy of B r i t a i n ' s connection 
w i t h Russia, while hardly at a l l n o t i c i n g the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the 
growing a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h France; i t was, a f t e r a l l and above a l l , 
the French connection which took B r i t a i n i n t o the war of 1914. 
Once i t was accepted t h a t German p o l i c y threatened the balance 
of power i n Europe which had become the guiding p r i n c i p l e of 
B r i t i s h p o l i c y under Grey, then the independence of France came 
to be i d e n t i f i e d as a v i t a l B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t : t h i s was the essence 
of B r i t i s h p o l i c y from 1906 onwards, though w i t h o u t any Parliamentary 
sanction or even s i g n i f i c a n t discussion. 
The f o r e i g n p o l i c y debates of 1911 and 1912 show t h a t i t 
was possible f o r the House of Commons to force debates even when 
there was no s p e c i f i c t r e a t y t o discuss, but the i n c o n c l u s i v e 
nature of those debates also shows how d i f f i c u l t i t was f o r the 
l e g i s l a t u r e t o exercise c o n t r o l over the government's e x t e r n a l 
p o l i c i e s . But i t should not be assumed t h a t the a c t u a l p o l i c i e s 
pursued would have been s u b s t a n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t even i f they had 
been exposed to a much more searching Parliamentary s c r u t i n y . 
We have seen some evidence t h a t Parliamentary h o s t i l i t y 
t o b i n d i n g or 'entangling' a l l i a n c e s may have i n h i b i t e d the 
government from e n t e r i n g i n t o a l l i a n c e w i t h France or Russia or 
both; but i t i s equally possible t h a t the government used the known 
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a n t i p a t h y of Parliment to such a l l i a n c e s as an excuse to 
avoid a l l i a n c e s which i n any case i t d i d not regard as necessary 
or d e s i r a b l e . There was i n many respects a closer i d e n t i t y 
of view between government and Parliament than t h i s study may 
at some p o i n t s have suggested; t h i s i s because of the a c t i v i t i e s 
of the f o r e i g n p o l i c y Radicals (as we have l o o s e l y c a l l e d them, 
since they included Labour and I r i s h MPs as w e l l as L i b e r a l 
Radicals). From 1909 through to l a t e 1912 they were a very noisy 
group, and they resurfaced i n force i n August 1914 ( b r i e f l y ) . 
But they were never more than a m i n o r i t y , and a small one at 
t h a t , as t h e i r poor showing i n the d i v i s i o n on the naval estimates 
i n March 1909 showed. Usually they were too weak to f o r c e a 
d i v i s i o n , or chose t o avoid one by not p u t t i n g down an amendment, 
perhaps because the d i v i s i o n lobbies would demonstrate t h e i r 
numerical weakness. There i s no reason to t h i n k t h a t the House 
of Commons as a whole shared the Radical programme, and every 
reason t o conclude t h a t the debates of J u l y 1912 and August 1914 
showed t h a t i t d i d not. The d o c t r i n e of the ' c o n t i n u i t y ' of 
f o r e i g n p o l i c y was not merely a convenient f i c t i o n : i t genuinely 
represented the i d e n t i f y of view between the two f r o n t benches, 
somewhat t o the f r u s t r a t i o n of some backbenchers. But i t also 
ensured t h a t the great b u l k of the Conservatives (who a f t e r the 
e l e c t i o n s of 1910 were equal i n numbers to the L i b e r a l s themselves) 
could be r e l i e d upon to support the p o l i c i e s espoused by Grey, 
and which they believed (on the whole c o r r e c t l y ) t h a t he had 
i n h e r i t e d from Lansdowne and Balfour. The noise made by the 
Radicals should not be allowed to drown out the r a t h e r obvious 
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perception t h a t the House as a whole supported what i t knew of 
the government's p o l i c i e s , and was prepared t o t r u s t i t ; only 
when i t appeared to be weak on the question of n a t i o n a l defence 
(as i n the naval debates of 1909) d i d i t run i n t o t r o u b l e , and 
even then i t was able t o win a l l the necessary votes e a s i l y . 
Once the hope of a genuine understanding w i t h Germany which d i d 
not compromise B r i t a i n ' s perceived v i t a l i n t e r e s t s had been 
f a l s i f i e d , there was broad cross-party support f o r the government's 
a t t i t u d e towards the European alliance-systems: a closer 
a f f i l i a t i o n w i t h the Franco-Russian a l l i a n c e , as a counter balance 
to the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e and a d e t e r r e n t to p o t e n t i a l German 
ambitions. This was the p o l i c y which took B r i t a i n inexorably 
i n t o the devastating war which began i n August 1914, but i t 
cannot be denied t h a t B r i t a i n entered t h a t war w i t h the whole-
hearted support of the B r i t i s h Parliament, and f o r reasons of the 
European balance of power which the great m a j o r i t y i n Parliament 
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